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Title: The Politics of Paranoia: Affect, Temporality, and the Epistemology of 
Securitization
The concept of “national security” has been an essential part of the political 
lexicon of the United States since the aftermath of World War II. Although it could be 
said that security in one way or another has always been a concern for societies, and a 
central political concern for the western world at least since the seventeenth century, it 
took its full-fledged official form in the United States with the 1947 National Security 
Act which established the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, 
as well as shaping the direction of the post-World War II foreign policy. National security 
constitutes the frame through which many political practices attain their meaning and 
justification today. My dissertation is devoted to understanding precisely this process 
wherein there is a particular political rationality at work that not only renders certain 
kinds of political practices preferable, but also insists on their necessity and inevitability. 
I call this the politics of paranoia. I argue that the concept of paranoia has explanatory 
power in relation to an array of political decisions, processes, and practices. It is 
descriptive of a diagram of power that is operative in contemporary practices of 
securitization. It is not only that these decisions, processes, and practices produce 
paranoid effects (or affects), but that they themselves entail a paranoiac logic. To this end, 
iv
I rethink Melanie Klein's account of paranoia through a Foucaultian decolonial feminist 
lens. I examine this paranoiac logic in four layers: expulsions, anticipatory temporality, 
masculinist politics, and paranoid affects.
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THE STATE OF PARANOIA
“Fear is a primal human state. From childhood on, we fear the monsters of our imaginations, lurking in
dark closets, under beds, in deserted alleyways, but we also now fear monsters in the deserts of Yemen and
the mountains of Pakistan. But perhaps it is possible to pause and subdue our fears by carefully observing
reality — just as we might advise for trying to calm and comfort a fear-stricken child. We might find that,
in reality, the more immediate danger to our democratic society comes from those who lurk in the halls of
power in Washington and other national capitols and manipulate our fears to their own ends.”
- Peter Ludlow, “Fifty States of Fear”
The War on Terror has created a massive machinery around securitization whose 
effects continue to be felt today both in and outside of the United States. It has led to the 
establishment of new institutions within the United States such as Homeland Security and 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), whose budgets for the fiscal year 2017 are 
respectively $40.6 billion1 and $7.6 billion.2 The London-based, multi-national private 
security company G4S is now the world's third largest private corporation, following 
Wal-Mart and Foxconn. Securitization has consequently become an incredibly large and 
profitable industry, whose operations are tied to techniques around policing, detention, 
deportation, surveillance, and incarceration. In what follows, I argue that paranoia is a 
notion that is descriptive of a diagram of power that is at work in these practices. 
Paranoia provides the framework through which these practices attain their meaning and 
legitimacy. The politics of paranoia names an assemblage of techniques, methods, and 
1 “Budget in Brief Fiscal Year 2017,” Homeland Security, Accessed: July 21, 2016.    
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017_BIB-MASTER.pdf
2 Peter Neffenger, “TSA's 2017 Budget – A Commitment to Security (Part I),” Transportation Security 




approaches around national security that are tied to a set of preemptive practices that are 
inherently exclusionary and violent.
Within political theory, it has become commonplace to claim that these practices 
are irrational, nonsensical, unnecessary or dysfunctional. Daniel Wirls, for instance, 
demonstrates in Irrational Security that “despite the dramatic cuts at the end of the Cold 
War, the United States perpetuated and maintained as much as possible a Cold War 
national security state in style and size for reasons that have as much or more to do with 
domestic politics than international imperatives.”3 He goes onto suggest that the practices 
around national security are “systematically dysfunctional,” and subsequently, “the 
United States failed to adjust military spending and policy in a rational manner to the end 
of the Cold War, which in turn did significant damage to itself and its national security 
with the military policies and budgets that a 'global war on terrorism' made possible.”4 In 
other words, Wirls suggests that in the case of the United States, domestic politics have 
given rise to an unreasonable foreign policy that came at a great cost. The emphasis is put 
on the “irrationality” of these decisions that have had devastating results, economic and 
otherwise.
Similarly, highlighting that the politics of security is inherently irrational, Mark 
Neocleous writes:
Take...the 2003 House of Commons Research Paper on the law of 
occupation in Iraq. Describing one of the main tasks during the 'war on 
terror' as overcoming the resistance of the Iraqi security forces, it also 
suggests reforming those same security services. This is 'to demonstrate to 
3 Daniel Wirls, Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010), 7.
4 Ibid. Emphasis added.
2
the Iraqi people that our quarrel is not with them and that their security 
and well-being is our concern'. At the same time, the Report suggests that 
the task is to secure the sites of 'weapons of mass destruction' and to 
'provide for the security of friendly forces'. Taken in a literal sense...the 
argument seems to be: security forces must be removed in order to 
improve security; something that does not exist (weapons of mass 
destruction) must be secured; that which must also be secured we must 
first partially destroy; that which is called security is not security. The 
whole thing is unintelligible.5
Security, in this regard, is self-contradictory and non-sensical. Yet the project of 
exposing the irrationality of security misses something that is pivotal within the practices 
of securitization, namely, the violence that they inflict. A rebuttal of security based on its 
apparent irrationality fails to account for not only the specific logic through which these 
mechanisms of security operate, but also how much violence is involved in these 
practices. A recent investigation by Homeland Security, for instance, has shown that the 
security measures put in place by the TSA failed 95% of the time when undercover 
investigators attempted to smuggle bombs and guns onto planes (they succeeded 67 out 
70 times).6 The inefficiency and superfluousness of these measures, however, are only the 
tip of the iceberg in a context where a UC Berkeley student Khairuldeen Makhzoomi, an 
Iraqi refugee, was removed from his flight and searched extensively by the FBI for using 
the word inshallah (God willing) in a private phone conversation, which was mistaken by 
5 Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 2.
6 Justin Fishel, et al., “EXCLUSIVE: Undercover DHS Tests Find Security Failures at US Airports,” abc 
News, June 1, 2015. Accessed: July 21, 2016. http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-undercover-dhs-
tests-find-widespread-security-failures/story?id=31434881
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another passenger for the word shahid (martyr).7 It seems shortsighted to suggest that 
these measures are simply ineffective, given that they are bound up with larger concerns 
about border security, about who may cross, who poses a threat, and who shall be 
expelled. In this sense, these concerns are very much tied to racial profiling, especially 
when sanctioned by legislation like the Patriot Act. In addition to what Dylan Matthews 
suggests in a Vox article,8 we need to rethink airport security not only because removing 
one's shoes and separating one's liquids are burdensome tasks, but because these practices 
are connected to a broader framework of securitization that has served to criminalize 
certain populations by deeming them suspect and thereby also dispensable.
It seems inadequate, in other words, to suggest that securitization is self-
contradictory or inefficient, given the severity of the violence that has been at work in 
these practices, which is overshadowed by such framing. I am much less interested, 
therefore, in whether or not securitization is irrational or the extent to which it is 
irrational, than I am in how it connects to a particular kind of political rationality. The 
politics of paranoia, I suggest, names a certain kind of political rationality, a particular 
style of governance, that has attained a dominant status in matters around national 
security. I borrow the notion of political rationality from Michel Foucault who suggests in
The Birth of Biopolitics that his inquiry on the art of government is a study “of the 
rationalization of governmental practice in the exercise of political sovereignty.” 9 An art 
of government, according to his definition, is  “the way in which the domain of the 
7 Justin Salhani, “Iraqi Man Removed From Southwest Flight for Speaking Arabic,” ThinkProgress, April 
16, 2016. Accessed: July 21, 2016. http://thinkprogress.org/world/2016/04/16/3770159/iraqi-banned-
from-flying/
8 Dylan Matthews, “The TSA is a waste of money that doesn't save lives and might actually cost them,” 
Vox, May 17, 2016. Accessed: July 21, 2016. http://www.vox.com/2016/5/17/11687014/tsa-against-
airport-security
9 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (New York: Picador, 2010c), 2.
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practice of government, with its different objects, general rules, and overall objectives, 
[which] was established so as to govern in the best possible way.”10 Similarly, I look at 
the different components that comprise securitization, in an effort to articulate paranoia as 
a type of political rationality (or an art of government) that constitutes a framework for 
the intelligibility of these political practices today.
In developing the notion of a politics of paranoia, I take Melanie Klein's and Eve 
Sedgwick's writings on paranoia as a starting point. Within Klein's psychoanalytic 
approach, paranoia designates a “position,” or a stage in development, where the infant 
develops persecutory fears and sadistic desires toward the mother due to the status of the 
breast as an object that is both gratifying and frustrating. The infant, according to Klein, 
moves past this stage by learning to cope with anxiety inducing situations and learning to 
relate to the world with trust rather than suspicion. She writes: “[T]he child conceives of 
[certain objects] as actually dangerous— persecutors who it fears will devour it, scoop 
out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, poison it—in short, compassing its destruction 
by all the means which sadism can devise...In paranoia the characteristic defences are 
chiefly aimed at annihilating the 'persecutors', while anxiety on the ego's account 
occupies a prominent place in the picture.”11 Paranoia, in Klein's account, involves an 
obsession with the annihilation of dangerous objects, which incessantly pose an 
existential threat to the infant. It comprises the particular lens through which the infant 
experiences the world, herself, and others. Sedgwick rethinks Klein's conceptualization of 
paranoia and suggests that it has a hermeneutical import. She notes that paranoid reading 
practices have become synonymous with critique itself, where the reader displays a 
10 Ibid.
11 Melanie Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis 16 (1935): 145-7.
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commitment to exposure, an inability to cope with surprise or unknowability, and a 
totalizing tendency.12 The project at hand involves reconceptualizing paranoia not only as 
a hermeneutical or critical practice, but also a political one. In this way, I propose a 
diagnostic project. I argue that the concept of paranoia has explanatory power in relation 
to an array of political decisions, processes, and practices. It is not only that these 
decisions, processes, and practices produce paranoid effects (or affects), but that they 
themselves entail a paranoiac logic. Moreover, the imperative force of paranoia insists on 
a sense of necessity and inevitability in dealing with a national crisis. For this reason, 
when an expert on peace studies like George Lakey offers non-violent strategies against 
terrorism, for instance, he is told by the Pentagon that these strategies could never be 
implemented as the government does not function in this manner.13 At a time when a 
militarized response to crisis has become so engrained that it is seen as incontestable and 
immutable, one needs tools to understand the underlying logic of securitization. I offer 
the concept of the politics of paranoia as such a tool to be used to make sense of the 
political rationality that is operative within the practices of securitization.
The politics of paranoia entails a commitment to the annihilation of threats, which 
has led to the codification of particular bodies as threatening. Securitization, in this way, 
takes place by way of racialization and against the backdrop of a biopolitical order in 
which certain lives do not count as lives. In the first chapter, I explore expulsions as a 
primary mechanism through which a politics of paranoia operates. I trace different forms 
of expulsion, including detention and deportation, and situate them within a genealogy of 
12 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You're So Paranoid, You 
Probably Think This Essay is About You,” in Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 124.
13 George Lakey, “Can There Be a Nonviolent Response to Terrorism?,” QuakerSpeak, April 7, 2016. 
Accessed: May 24, 2016, http://quakerspeak.com/nonviolent-response-to-terrorism/
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the nation-state, whereby the identity of the nation is consolidated through these 
expulsions that are historically linked to processes of racialization. I examine in the 
second chapter how a paranoiac temporality is at work within the practices of 
securitization that are preemptive. It is not only that the threat is located in the racialized 
Other, but that threat is often understood in terms of the future possibilities that are made 
to actualize in the present. In the third chapter, I suggest that the politics of paranoia does 
relies not only on racialization, but also on a practice of gendering the nation through an 
economy of desire that is attached to vindictive masculinity, which mediates these 
practices of racialization. There is, in other words, an enmeshment of race and gender in 
the way in which securitization operates in tandem with militarization. In the fourth 
chapter, I look at the intersubjective dimension of a politics of paranoia whose affective 
significations infiltrate the encounter with the racialized Other, suggesting an affective 
epistemology at work through which certain bodies attain the characteristic of being 
perceived as threatening. I offer decolonial feminist poetry as a discursive practice that 
puts forth an epistemological intervention, which could serve as a ground for establishing 
alliances across difference.
While my focus here is primarily on contemporary practices of securitization in 
and beyond the United States, it is worth noting that the concept of “national security” 
has been an essential part of the political lexicon of the United States since the aftermath 
of World War II.14 Although it could be said that security in one way or another has 
always been a concern for societies, and a central political concern for the western world 
at least since the seventeenth century,15 it took its full-fledged official form in the United 
14 Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 3.
15 Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan is a paradigmatic work to take up security as the sole purpose of civil and 
political life.
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States with the 1947 National Security Act which established the National Security 
Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as shaping the direction of the post-
World War II foreign policy. Melvin Goodman notes: “U.S. Militarization, reliance on the 
military to pursue foreign policy objectives better achieved by other means, has 
continued to expand since the end of the Cold War, when we might have expected and 
experienced a peace dividend.”16 As the Pentagon was given “an unprecedented position 
of power and influence, including huge increases in defense spending and a dominant 
voice in the making of national security and foreign policies”17 under the administrations 
of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, what we may call borrowing from 
Foucault, “a culture of danger”18 was set in place. As early as 1964, Richard Hofstadter 
wrote about what he called “the paranoid style in American politics” to highlight the 
prevalence of irrational tendencies that came in the form of “heated exaggeration, 
suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”19 in political discourse. What made the 
phenomenon compelling for him was “the use of paranoid modes of expression by more 
or less normal people,”20 which rendered it something of a political norm. Yet in the 21st 
century, the politics of paranoia operates far beyond the level of rhetoric. Goodman 
writes: “The United States lacks a strategic vision for a world without an enemy, and it 
continues to spend far more on defense, homeland security, and intelligence than the rest 
of the world combined. We are the only nation in the world that deploys its military 
primarily to support foreign policy rather than to defend our borders and people.”21 This 
16 Melvin Goodman, National Insecurity: The Cost of American Militarism (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 2013), 11.
17 Ibid.
18 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 66-67.
19 Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” Harper's Magazine (November 1964): 
77.
20 Ibid.
21 Goodman, National Insecurity, 10.
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political history comprises the background of my investigation as I take as my scope the 
particular mechanisms in which the politics of paranoia operates on a transnational level 
and their historical conditions of possibility.
While I draw some parallels between Klein's and Sedgwick's psychoanalytic 
accounts of paranoia and practices around securitization, the project at hand is neither one 
of political psychology nor an attempt at a psychoanalysis of the political. I am by no 
means interested in pathologizing securitization. While paranoia is suggestive of a stage 
in Klein's writings that is part of an infant's natural development, my account of the 
politics of paranoia is historically grounded. I see paranoia in this political formulation to 
be neither necessary nor inevitable, despite the fact that the framework of paranoia itself 
claims such imperative force. There are historical conditions of possibility that have 
produced and continue to sustain this framework. I chose the concept of paranoia as 
descriptive of a framework that upholds the practices of securitization because the 
concept is suggestive of a logic that relies on an affective disposition, or a type of 
political rationality that is laden with affect and desire. While security is tied to massive 
industries that are representative of economic and political interests (and thereby is an 
important part of global capitalism and must be taken up within this broader global 
economic and social order), I am also attentive to the circuits of desire that are at work 
that support and connect with, but also diverge from, and at times even conflict with, 
these interests. My goal is to give an account of the circuits of desire that are at work 
within the practices of securitization, without attempting to reduce these practices to a 
matter of interest.22 Much of the political theory on securitization has been written from 
22 Although it would be a huge oversight to disregard the role interest plays, given that there are a massive 
industries around securitization.
9
the standpoint of interest and thereby deemed wholly irrational. Yet from the perspective 
of desire, denouncing securitization as irrational offers an incomplete picture, as 
securitization is also tied to a particular kind of rationality (invested by desire) that 
comprises the framework for its legitimization. While the politics of paranoia has its 
conundrums, contradictions, and paradoxes (which I explore at length in what follows), 
what is more striking to me is that it also has its own set of justificatory mechanisms that 
are not only legally and politically upheld, but also receive support from the masses. 
Paranoia therefore denotes an epistemological ground for the implementation and 
legitimization of these practices.
My aim in putting forth this analysis is not simply about exposing the operations 
of a politics of paranoia. There is a certain kind of naïveté involved, I think, in the 
assumption that once something is known, once the public knows the facts, once we can 
persuade others to see the truth, then everything will change. Yet as Foucault points out, 
the issue at stake is much more persistent and tenacious than one that can be addressed 
merely by exposing the truth. “It is not because the governed do not know what is 
happening,” he writes, “or it is not because some of them know but others do not, it is 
rather because they know and it is to the extent that they know, to the extent that 
everyone is actually aware of the evidence of what is happening, it is precisely to that 
extent that things do not change.”23 For this reason, I am much less interested in a 
paranoiac project of systematization or of exposure than one that can inspire and perhaps 
offer some direction to the practice of “critical creative politics,”24 to borrow from Jasbir 
Puar. As the issue at hand is also one of desire, it is my hope that the diagnostics that I 
23 Goodman, National Insecurity, 10.
24 Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2007), xx.
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offer here in an effort to make sense of the practices around securitization is one that 
could in some way translate into a project of creating alternative possibilities for 
resistance, or as Foucault puts it, a project that would “seek to give new impetus, as far 
and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”25





WHOSE FREEDOM? WHOSE SECURITY?
“Well, I think home spat me out, the blackouts and curfews like tongue against loose tooth. God,
do you know how difficult it is, to talk about the day your own city dragged you by the hair, past the old
prison, past the school gates, past the burning torsos erected on poles like flags? When I meet others like
me I recognise the longing, the missing, the memory of ash on their faces. No one leaves home unless
home is the mouth of a shark. I've been carrying the old anthem in my mouth for so long that there's no
space for another song, another tongue or another language. I know a shame that shrouds, totally engulfs. I
tore up and ate my own passport in an airport hotel. I'm bloated with language I can't afford to forget.
They ask me how did you get here? Can't you see it on my body? The Libyan desert red with immigrant
bodies, the Gulf of Aden bloated, the city of Rome with no jacket. I hope the journey meant more than
miles because all of my children are in the water. I thought the sea was safer than the land. I want to make
love, but my hair smells of war and running and running. I want to lay down, but these countries are like
uncles who touch you when you're young and asleep. Look at all these borders, foaming at the mouth with
bodies broken and desperate. I'm the colour of hot sun on the face, my mother's remains were never buried.
I spent days and nights in the stomach of the truck; I did not come out the same. Sometimes it feels like
someone else is wearing my body.
I know a few things to be true. I do not know where I am going, where I have come from is disappearing, I
am unwelcome and my beauty is not beauty here. My body is burning with the shame of not belonging, my
body is longing. I am the sin of memory and the absence of memory. I watch the news and my mouth
becomes a sink full of blood. The lines, the forms, the people at the desks, the calling cards, the
immigration officer, the looks on the street, the cold settling deep into my bones, the English classes at
night, the distance I am from home. But Alhamdulilah all of this is better than the scent of a woman
completely on fire, or a truckload of men who look like my father, pulling out my teeth and nails, or
fourteen men between my legs, or a gun, or a promise, or a lie, or his name, or his manhood in my mouth.
I hear them say go home, I hear them say fucking immigrants, fucking refugees. Are they really this
arrogant? Do they not know that stability is like a lover with a sweet mouth upon your body one second;
the next you are a tremor lying on the floor covered in rubble and old currency waiting for its return. All I
can say is, I was once like you, the apathy, the pity, the ungrateful placement and now my home is the
mouth of a shark, now my home is the barrel of a gun. I'll see you on the other side.”
- Warsan Shire, “Conversations About Home (at the Deportation Centre)”
The audience cheers “Build that wall! Build that wall!” as Donald Trump 
unabashedly smiles and winks at the crowd during a rally on February 12, 2016 in 
Tampa, Florida. A few months prior, he had told Yahoo News that he would not be 
against establishing a database for Muslim Americans or issuing special identification 
cards that would note religious affiliation. In the same interview, he praises the New York 
City Police Department's controversial mosque surveillance program that was abandoned 
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in 2014.26 He states: “We're going to have to do things that we never did before. Some 
people are going to be upset about it, but I think that now everybody is feeling that 
security is going to rule.”27 Building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border is a part of that 
larger plan where the racialized Other is kept out and security finally reigns. Or so would 
Trump have us believe.
Of course, it is not only Trump who encourages discriminatory surveillance 
practices and racial profiling in the name of security. Following the terrorist attacks in 
Brussels, Ted Cruz told a CNN reporter that Muslim neighborhoods need to be patrolled 
and secured by the police.28 The Republican debates often turn into a screaming match of 
who can deport the highest number of immigrants in the shortest amount of time. But one 
must note that in the context of the United States, it is not only Republicans who put the 
emphasis on security understood in terms of the abjection of the racialized Other. Hillary 
Clinton, who voted for a bill that authorized building a fence along the U.S.-Mexico 
border in 2006, proclaims that the borders are now “secure” and the time has come for 
immigration reform. Similarly, on the website for his campaign, even the self-identified 
“democratic socialist” Bernie Sanders emphasizes the importance of border security for 
“immigration of law and reform,” albeit rejecting the need to increase it. 29 In mainstream 
political discourse in the United States, then, the point of contestation is not whether 
border security is good or necessary or useful but rather, how it shall be maintained. 
26 Hunter Walker, “Donald Trump has big plans for 'radical Islamic' terrorists, 2016 and 'that communist' 
Bernie Sanders,” Yahoo News, November 19, 2015. Accessed: July 22, 2016. 
https://www.yahoo.com/politics/donald-trump-has-big-plans-1303117537878070.html
27 Ibid.
28 Jeremy Diamond, “Ted Cruz: Police need to 'patrol' Muslim neighborhoods,” CNN, March 23, 2016. 
Accessed: July 22, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/22/politics/ted-cruz-muslim-
neighborhoods/index.html
29 “Border Security,” Feel the Bern. Accessed: July 22, 2016. http://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-
immigration/#border-security
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Securitization in and of itself is not up for debate, but only the way in which it shall be 
undertaken. The inherent necessity of security is something which all presidential 
candidates would agree on. This unspoken concurrence in mainstream politics in the 
United States, in this way, would exemplify what Uriel Abulof has called “deep 
securitization,” where “to politicize is to securitize.”30 What sets apart deep securitization 
from practices of securitization as responsive to particular needs is that while these 
practices may be undertaken for a given period of time, often no longer than the span of a 
few months or sometimes a few years, deep securitization names a  process whereby a 
“prolonged and widespread public discourse on probable and protracted threats to the 
very existence of the nation/state”31 discursively produce the nation-state as that which is 
always already threatened and in need of securitization. The threat then becomes 
constitutive of the nation-state itself, which needs to be guarded against dangers, where 
the nation-state can no longer be thought separately from the threat. In Trump's vision, 
where “security rules,” building a wall is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, for 
one can never be secure enough. The rule of security necessitates new measures to be 
taken, new techniques to be developed, and new policies to be implemented, as 
securitization is a never-ending process. And yet, it is also an “autoimmune” process, as 
Derrida calls it, for in its excessiveness, it often tends to self-destruct, much like an 
ouroboros, a serpent eating its own tail.
In the following, I argue that the discursive practices around securitization involve 
a paranoiac framework. Melanie Klein's account of the paranoid-schizoid position 
describes a developmental stage where the subject (i.e. the infant, in her account) 
30 Uriel Abulof, “Deep Securitization and Israel's 'Demographic Demon',” International Political 
Sociology 8, no. 4 (2014): 400. Emphasis in the original.
31 Ibid.
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experiences the world as an inherently dangerous place and commits themselves to 
eliminating all possible threats. Even those objects that sustain the subject (like the 
mother's breast) induce anxiety and are sought to be expelled. I suggest that Klein 
identifies here a framework that is also descriptive of a diagram of power that is manifest 
in practices of securitization. These practices that I take up are indicative of deep 
securitization, in that they are not temporary measures but the very means of the 
consolidation of the identity of the nation-state as always already threatened.
While the discursive construction of the nation-state as a security state is 
admittedly more evident in the Republican rhetoric in the context of the United States, I 
suggest that the paranoiac framework that undergirds the practices that the Republicans 
call for is often taken for granted by the Democrats as well. In particular, the uncritical 
embrace of border security by Sanders and Clinton overshadows certain important 
questions that bear on border security, such as, what border security entails and who it 
benefits, especially in relation to the history of the U.S.-Mexico border. There is 
ultimately little difference between the assertion that the U.S.-Mexico border is secure 
and that it is not, with regards to the absence of a discussion of the purposes the security 
of that border serves and the underlying history. Moreover, when it comes to deep 
securitization, the U.S. is hardly an exception. There is a growing trend toward 
securitization taking place globally in tandem with militarization. The most recent 
example would perhaps be the European Union's despicable approach to the Syrian 
refugee crisis as indicative of a politics of paranoia that seeks to expel the racialized 
Other as a self-sustaining mechanism.
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In this chapter, I examine the differential logic of securitization understood in 
terms of systematic expulsion. I argue that the nation-state attains its identity by the 
expulsion of the racialized Other misconstrued as an existential threat. The nation-state is 
identified as that which needs to be secured, that which is always already threatened, 
where securitization entails a purification of the body by expelling the racialized Other. In 
this sense, underlying securitization as such is a paranoiac framework, insofar as paranoia 
names a relational mode whereby subjectivity can only be sustained by means of the 
annihilation of threats. In its political formulation, I suggest that “the threat” gets attached 
to the Other, whose emergence as the threatening Other coincides with racialization. In 
other words, the racialized Other emerges as that which is threatening and thereby needs 
to be expelled for the survival of the nation-state. Moreover, I suggest that this process is 
biopolitical, insofar as the most pertinent question here is whose life matters and who 
shall be sacrificed for whom. I wish not, however, to raise this as a metaphysical point 
about the political (in the way that Arendt and Agamben do), but rather as a historically 
contingent one. For that purpose, I explore the link between the logic of expulsion at play 
in securitization and situate it in the legacies of western colonialism.
2.1 Building That Wall: Border Security and the Logic of Expulsion
At moments of national crisis, the first order of business is to secure the borders, 
much like France did following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, in declaring 
a state of emergency and closing their borders, which admittedly proved problematic at 
the very least, given that it has been years since France had systematic border 
checkpoints as it is a part of the Schengen zone. Border security, however, is by no means 
limited to a temporary closing of the borders, but often entails the implementation and 
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institutionalization of a set of techniques, tactics, and policies. Within this broader trend 
for securitization, the nation discursively emerges as that which needs to be protected 
from the threat posed by the Other. Consider, for instance, the “vital mission” that the 
Department of Homeland Security, established in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, purports to have: “to secure the nation from the many threats we face.”32 
According to the classical securitization theory that came out of the Copenhagen School 
in the early 1990s, securitization first involves a “securitizing move,” which is a 
“discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a 
referent object.”33 This speech act then in turn constitutes the justification for the 
measures taken in the name of securitization.
Yet in many cases, in the context of Europe and the United States, not only do we 
see that the existential threat gets attributed to the racialized Other, but also that the 
process whereby that attribution takes place often constitutes the very process of 
racialization. I consider, in the following, three historical examples to unpack this point: 
the arbitrary deportations of Arab and Muslim men in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, the imprisonment of Japanese Americans during World War II, and the 
controversial deal EU made with Turkey that the refugees arriving on Greek shores be 
sent back to Turkey.
Natsu Taylor Saito reports: “In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Justice 
Department began rounding up hundreds of noncitizen residents, most of them—perhaps 
all of them—men of Middle Eastern or South Asian origin. These men have literally 
disappeared: taken without notice from their homes or workplaces, held incommunicado, 
32 “About DHS,” Homeland Security. Accessed: July 22, 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs
33 Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 
1997), 25.
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moved from prison to prison, questioned without charge, forbidden from contacting their 
families or lawyers.”34 Not only were the selection criteria unclear in these practices, there 
was also no evidence that these men posed any danger. American Civil Liberties Union's 
2004 report Worlds Apart shows, however, that despite the fact that none of these men 
were found to have a connection to the terrorist attacks, the Department of Justice 
continued to present these deportations as part of their successful efforts at securitization, 
“boasting,” to use the language of this report, that “hundreds of immigrants 'linked to the 
September 11 investigation' have been deported.”35 As of 2005, the number of men who 
were detained without being charged with a crime reached five thousand, many of whom 
were deported based on technical violations of the immigration law. Hundreds of men 
who voluntarily came in for an interview with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (IMS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in order to comply with the 
new requirements were also deported.
Yet these practices of arbitrary detention and deportation on the basis of ethnicity 
(“terrorists by association”) are hardly unprecedented in the United States. There is, in 
fact, a parallel one could draw between these practices and the imprisonment of 120,000 
Japanese Americans during World War II, almost sixty percent of whom were U.S. 
citizens by birth. Saito writes: 
Hearing these reports [of post-9/11 arbitrary deportation practices], a deep 
uneasiness lodged itself in the pit of my stomach, and stories from my 
childhood came flooding back. I remembered my father talking about how 
he came home from junior high in Aberdeen, Washington, in December 
34 Natsu Taylor Saito, “The Costs of Homeland Security,” Radical History Review 93 (2005): 54.
35 “Worlds Apart: How Deporting Immigrants After 9/11 Tore Families Apart and Shattered 
Communities,” American Civil Liberties Union, December 2004. Accessed: May 24, 2016: 2, 
https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/worldsapart.pdf.
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1941 to find that his widowed mother had disappeared and FBI agents 
were ransacking the house; how it took his brother and sister three weeks 
to figure out that she was being held in the Seattle jail as a 'dangerous 
enemy alien'; how, after interrogation, she was cleared in January but was 
not released until after Easter, just in time for the family to pack what they 
could carry and, under armed guard, board a darkened, dirty train that took 
them across the desert to the internment camp at Tule Lake in northern 
California, where they remained for several years.36
What purpose do these practices really serve? Is it the case that they actually 
make the nation more secure?  It would seem that the existential threat is attributed to the 
individuals who are subject to these practices by association. At best, these practices 
serve a temporary relief at moments of national crisis, creating a “sense” of security, what 
some scholars have called a “security theater.” At worst, they are indicative of systemic 
racism that continue to plague the United States as well as Europe. In any case, it would 
be incomplete to say that these practices are solely prompted by terror attacks, as they are 
emblematic of a logic of expulsion that is at the heart of the nation-state. After all, 
detention and mass deportation are hardly the only tools of expulsion and abandonment 
directed at racialized groups who are deemed threatening. Let us not forget police 
brutality, environmental racism, incarceration, and outright murder that comprises the 
daily reality of the lives of people of color in the United States, indicative that the 
mechanisms of expulsion are systematically in place within the order of things. In such 
context, these securitization measures comprise only the tip of the iceberg, a moment 
when systematic exclusion perhaps becomes most salient. Consider, for instance, the 
36  Saito, “The Costs of Homeland Security,” 57.
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FBI's covert operations, many of which were illegal, under the name COINTELPRO 
between 1956 and 1971 directed at the Black Panther Party and other organizations for 
social and economic equality, and the subsequent the legalization of the very same 
activities under 2001 USA Patriot Act and their practical implementation. The notice sent 
by the FBI director to all offices in 1967 states: “The purpose of this new 
counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise 
neutralize the activities of black nationalist hate-type organizations and groupings.” 37 
This secret counterintelligence program is noted to be a matter of “internal security.” The 
testimony of some of the members of the Black Panther Party and other organizations 
reveal illegal surveillance, infiltration, wrongful imprisonment, false arrests, assaults, and 
various fear tactics employed by the Bureau during this time in efforts to “neutralize” 
these organization.38 Many of these activities have now been legalized under the USA 
Patriot Act as part of the War on Terror. National security, in this case, is invoked to 
legitimize and legislate practices that had been employed illegally for decades against 
people of color. It would seem that despite the fact that targets change, the existential 
threat that gets attached to particular racialized groups justifies these practices of 
expulsion undertaken in the name of securitization.
Yet misattributing the existential threat to the racialized Other is hardly a 
securitizing move that is peculiar to the United States. Following the terror attacks in 
Paris and Brussels, the European countries responded by tightening its borders in the face 
of the growing refugee crisis. Poland refused to honor its deal with the European Union 
37 “COINTELPRO Revisited: Spying & Disruption,” WRH. Accessed: July 22, 2016. 
h  ttp://whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/COINTELPRO/COINTELPRO-FBI.docs.html
38 COINTELPRO 101, Film, directed by Freedom Archives (2010; San Francisco: PM Press, 2010).
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to take in 7,000 Syrian refugees,39 while the European Union made a deal with Turkey to 
send all the refugees who arrive at the Greek shores back to Turkey, despite Amnesty 
International's warnings and Doctors Without Borders' boycotts. The European Union 
would rather hand over €6 billion to the Turkish government to keep the refugees away 
than to ensure their safety, a government whose key figures are notoriously involved in 
corruption, fraud, bribery, and money laundering, a country that is not admitted to the 
European Union due to numerous human rights violations (which apparently do not 
matter when the refugees are on the receiving end). What awaits many refugees who are 
sent back to Turkey, a state with no official asylum procedures for non-European 
refugees, is a life of statelessness, poverty, or some in some cases, deportation back to 
their countries of origin that are war-ridden. The European Union would rather spend 
billions on border control than on the safety and protection of the refugees, despite the 
fact that no Syrian refugee has been implicated in the recent terror attacks in Europe. “No 
one leaves home,” Warsan Shire writes, “unless home is the mouth of a shark.”40 These 
refugees are escaping terror when they flee Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, among other 
countries. What purpose does border security serve in this context, exactly? Whose 
security does it ensure? Certainly not the security of those who are in the most vulnerable 
position. The border security seems to secure nothing but the privilege of a few, while 
thousands of refugees are put in harm's way.  According to the International Organization 
for Migration, close to 4,000 migrants had been reported dead or missing crossing the 
Mediterranean. Since the beginning of 2016, more than 500 migrants have been reported 
39 “Poland Refuses to Accept Refugees After Brussels Attack,” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2016. Accessed: 
July 22, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/poland-refuses-accept-refugees-brussels-attack-
160323132500564.html
40 Warsan Shire, “Conversations About Home (at the Detention Centre)” in Teaching My Mother How to 
Give Birth (UK: mouthmark, 2011), 24.
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missing or dead in the Mediterranean. These fatalities occur as the migrants are left with 
no choice but to travel via “flimsy rubber dinghies or small wooden boats” that are often 
overcrowded.41 Reports show that many refugees “get robbed, face extortionate ransom 
demands and are tortured”42 at the hands of the smugglers/kidnappers. Some reports note 
that despite the fact that the police were alerted, they failed to intervene in these crimes. 
Sending the refugees back to Turkey would subject the refugees to the same conditions 
where they are forced into poverty and live without legal protection. According to the 
Amnesty International, the Global South countries (mostly in the Middle East, South 
Asia, and Africa) currently host %86 of a total of 19.5 million refugees.43 In the famous 
words of Aime Césaire, “Europe is indefensible.”44 It is “unable to justify itself either 
before the bar of 'reason' or before the bar of 'conscience'.”45 Border security, in this case, 
is no more than a euphemism for abandonment; it serves no other function than to leave 
the refugees to die.
Moreover, border security often gets paired up with militarism, where the result is 
not simply (passive) abandonment, but (active) extermination. Shortly after Turkey made 
a deal with the EU, an Afghan man in a group of refugees trying to enter Bulgaria was 
shot dead by a Turkish police officer. The officer claimed to have been firing warning 
shots as the refugees resisted arrest, when one refugee got wounded by a ricochet and 
died on the way to the hospital. The Guardian reports: “In a move to buttress its porous 
41 “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts,” BBC, March 4, 2016. Accessed: July 
22, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911
42 Henriette Johansen, “After fleeing persecution, kidnapping and genocide, what awaits the refugees in 
Greece?,” Middle East Monitor, March 28, 2016. Accessed: July 22, 2016. 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/europe/24703-after-fleeing-persecution-kidnapping-and-
genocide-what-awaits-the-refugees-in-greece
43 “8 Ways to Solve the World Refugee Crisis,” Amnesty International. Accessed: July 22, 2016. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/10/eight-solutions-world-refugee-crisis/
44 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 1. 
Emphasis in the original.
45 Ibid.
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260km (160-mile) border with Turkey, Bulgaria built a 30km razor-wire fence along part 
of it and dispatched some 2,000 border guards, police and army to guard the rest.”46 In a 
context where Turkey, a heavily militarized state that shows little regard to human life, is 
put in charge to make sure that no refugees enter Europe, I suspect that this incident will 
constitute the first of many more to come. The next phase, it seems, is the active 
annihilation of those refugees who do not perish fast enough through abandonment, so 
that the borders can once again be secure.
It is not only European countries that use border security to practice and justify 
abandonment. In order to discuss the full significance of Clinton's proud proclamation 
that the U.S.-Mexico border is secure thanks to the fence that she voted for, one must 
consider the history of this border, the history wherein Mexico lost almost half of its land 
to the U.S., following the illegal invasion of Texas in the 1800s by Anglos who 
committed “all manner of atrocities against [tejanos (native Texans of Mexican 
descent)].”47 Gloria Anzaldua recounts this history in Borderlands/La Frontera: “The 
Gringo, locked into the fiction of white superiority seized complete political power, 
stripping Indians and Mexicans of their land while their feet were still rooted in it.”48 
Beginning from the mid-20th century, multinational corporations took over the land on the 
Mexican side of the border, building maquiladoras, factories that would pay its workers, 
the majority of whom are women, as little as six dollars a day. These workers report 
unsafe working conditions, being (illegally) denied a severance package when the 
factories shut down and move to South Asia for cheaper labor, not being allowed 
46 “Afghan refugee shot dead by police while trying to enter Bulgaria,” The Guardian, October 16, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/16/afghan-refugee-shot-dead-police-turkey-enter-bulgaria
47 Gloria Anzaldúa, “The Homeland, Aztlan / El otro Mexico” in Borderlands/La Frontera: The New 
Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 2012), 28.
48 Ibid, 29.
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bathroom breaks, lead poisoning, and other serious health issues that are work-related.49 
“For many mexicanos del otro lado,” Anzaldúa writes in 1987, “the choice is to stay in 
Mexico and starve or move north and live.”50 Given the persistence of these exploitative 
conditions, this still holds true for many. Those who cross the border illegally are subject 
to similar conditions as the refugees traveling to Europe: they get robbed, tortured, 
beaten, and raped. Border security here in Clinton's discourse, who has supported 
economic liberalization via policies like NAFTA that paved the way for this crisis in the 
first place, serves to overshadow not only these legacies of imperialism, but also the brute 
reality surrounding the lives of those who cross. Borders that divide “us” from “them” 
discursively produce “us” and “them” against the backdrop of a history out of which the 
hierarchal relations of power have emerged. Disregarding the U.S. involvement in this 
history, a continuing involvement given global corporatization, economic liberalization, 
and the War on Drugs,51 is what the decontextualization of the notion of “border security” 
allows for. The term is used to relinquish responsibility, to take a position of privilege and 
superiority for granted, as if it has not been built on conquest and exploitation. While a 
fence that Clinton voted for may keep away those who cross illegally, a wall that Trump 
calls for would help render this reality altogether invisible. It is also worth noting that the 
49 Maquilapolis: City of Factories, Film, directed by Vicky Funari and Sergio De La Torre (2006; Mexico: 
Independent Television Service, 2006).
50 Anzaldúa, “The Homeland, Aztlan / El otro Mexico,” 32.
51 Greg Grandin writes about this in the following way: ﻿“The transnational gangs and drug cartels that rule 
large swaths of Central America and Mexico are direct blowback from the Cold War (in the case of 
Central America) and the War on Drugs (Mexico). Washington’s relentless promotion of trade and 
financial liberalization and its push for biofuels and mining have destroyed regional agricultural 
markets and driven down wages, leading to rural dislocation. The disaster in Central America and 
Mexico...can be traced back to Bill Clinton’s three signature Latin American initiatives: escalation of 
the drug war (Plan Colombia); economic liberalization (NAFTA, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, which paved the way for similar treaties with Central America and Colombia and will 
culminate in the Obama-backed Trans Pacific Partnership); and the militarization of the Mexican-US 
border” (Greg Grandin, “Here's Why the US Is Stepping Up the Deportation of Central Americans,” 
The Nation, January 21, 2016. Accessed: July 22, 2016. http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-why-
the-us-is-stepping-up-the-deportation-of-central-americans/).
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Republican call for a wall is taking place in a context where under a Democratic 
administration, the Homeland Security has been raiding the homes of and deporting 
thousands of Central Americans and Mexicans since the beginning of 2016.
The practices of the Department of Homeland Security, Trump's call for a wall, 
and the EU's response to the refugee crisis are not isolated instances. They are not only 
tied together by virtue of a politics of paranoia at work in the political commitment to 
annihilate the threat that is located in the racialized body of the Other, their significance 
also must be considered within the broader histories and legacies of colonialism and 
imperialism. For this purpose, in what follows I consider Hannah Arendt's account of the 
nation-state in “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man” 
alongside Aníbal Quijano's notion of “the coloniality of power and knowledge.” While 
Arendt's account diagnoses a hostility toward difference built into the nation-state as a 
political formation, the difference that the nation-state seeks to erase is left under-
theorized. I suggest that racial classification, which, according to Quijano, comprises a 
fundamental axis of the coloniality of power, is pertinent in that historically it is not any 
kind of difference whose elimination has been sought, but particularly, the elimination of 
the difference that has been projected onto groups that are racially marked. Moreover, 
this process of racialization can be traced back to the history of colonialism, whereby 
white supremacy makes up what Charles Mills calls “the unnamed political system that 
has made the modern world what it is today.”52
2.2 Racialization, Expulsions, and the Nation-state
According to Arendt, at the heart of the nation-state lies a fundamental exclusion. 
Her historical account shows that with the emergence of many new nation-states in the 
52 Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 1.
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aftermath of the First World War around a national identity, “the minority” became “a 
permanent institution.”53 Although there may have always been minorities, with 
denationalization taking place on such a massive scale, millions were left to live “outside 
normal legal protection and needed an additional guarantee of their elementary rights 
from an outside body.”54 Denationalization emerged as “a powerful weapon of totalitarian 
politics” at this time.55 The Armenian genocide, denied by the Turkish state to this day, 
constitutes an example of such mass denationalizations that took place, which, for 
Arendt, “were something entirely new and unforeseen.”56 The representatives of nation-
states, Arendt notes, responded to this crisis by contending that the minorities “must 
sooner or later be either assimilated or liquidated,” and thus repatriation and 
naturalization became the sole means to solve this problem.57 The nation-states, in other 
words, insisted on a national homogeneity that must be upheld at any cost. As Arendt puts 
it, the nation-state is a political formation that “would rather lose its citizens than harbor 
people with different views.”58 There is, in other words, something intrinsically anti-
pluralistic in the nation-state. This resonates with not only the rhetoric that continues to 
be used by conservative politicians in Europe against refugees from Muslim countries, 
but also an internalized understanding on the part of the public. A poll made by the 
French newspaper Le Monde in 2011 shows that a majority of French and German 
citizens considered Islam “a threat” to their national identity and noted that Muslims have 
not been “integrated properly.” Le Monde characterized the efforts at religious “diversity” 
53 Hannah Arendt, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” in The Origins of 







on the part of France and Germany as a “failure.”59 These sentiments have now been 
heightened with the growing refugee crisis and the terror attacks in Europe.
In a context where “the minority” poses a threat to the national identity, Arendt's 
account, written in 1951, continues to aptly describe the political climate of our time in 
many places in the world. On exile, Arendt comments: “What is unprecedented is not the 
loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one. Suddenly, there was no place 
on earth where migrants could go without the severest restrictions, no country where they 
would be assimilated, no territory where they could found a new community of their 
own.”60 In this sense, citizenship is not only a matter of belonging (where statelessness 
becomes the severest mode of non-belonging produced by the nation-state), it is also a 
racialized concept.61 
Arendt concludes that throughout history all developed political communities 
have been concerned with homogeneity and conceptualized difference as dangerous, and 
therefore as that which must be destroyed: 
The reason why highly developed political communities, such as the 
ancient city-states or modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic 
59 Peter Allen, “Islam now considered 'a threat' to national identity by almost half of French and Germans, 
according to new poll,” Daily Mail, January 6, 2011. Accessed: July 22, 2016. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344624/Islam-seen-threat-national-identity-half-French-
Germans.html
60  Arendt, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” 291.
61 One example that we may consider here includes the differential treatment of captured “war criminals” 
who were U.S. citizens. Saito reports: “U.S. citizens...have been indefinitely imprisoned in military 
custody, without charge, hearing, access to counsel, or any other constitutional rights on the 
government’s unsubstantiated assertion that they are 'enemy combatants', Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose 
Padilla, both U.S.-born citizens, have been held in this manner for nearly three years. They were kept in 
custody for more than two years before being allowed to even talk to their lawyers, and then only as a 
matter of military 'discretion', not as a civil right. Hamdi, like John Walker Lindh, was captured in 
Afghanistan; but unlike Lindh, Hamdi did not receive a hearing in a civilian criminal court. One could 
argue that the only discernable difference in their cases was that while Lindh is a Euro-American, 
Hamdi is of Middle Eastern descent. The Supreme Court finally concluded, in the spring of 2004, that 
Hamdi, as well as the hundreds of noncitizens held without charge at the Guanta namo Bay naval base, 
were entitled to some minimal judicial hearing. In response, the Justice Department, rather than having 
any sort of hearing on his detention, released Hamdi on the condition that he renounce his U.S. 
citizenship and return to Saudi Arabia” (“The Costs of Homeland Security,” 55).
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homogeneity, is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural 
and always present differences and differentiations which by themselves 
arouse dumb hatred, mistrust, and discrimination because they indicate all 
too clearly those spheres where men cannot act and change at will, i.e., the 
limitations of the human artifice. The 'alien' is a frightening symbol of the 
fact of difference as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those 
realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, 
therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy.62 
Based on this account, it could be inferred that a politics of paranoia has been at work in 
all kinds of political communities throughout history, insofar as hostility toward 
difference and commitment to homogenization comprises an axis of this kind of politics, 
manifesting itself in practices of dispossession, expulsion, and assimilation. I would, 
however, like to resist this characterization, which universalizes paranoia by locating it at 
the heart of politics. I am much more interested in the specific mechanisms at work in the 
operations of a politics of paranoia and the ways in which those mechanisms have 
historically been accumulated, tinkered with, and assembled from disparate elements. In 
the context of securitization, I contend that the politics of paranoia that locates and seeks 
to annihilate threats operates through racialization. Racialization here serves in the 
codification of certain groups as threatening and therefore marking them as those who 
must be expelled.
While Judith Butler's reading of Arendt claims that “the nation-state as a political 
formation...requires periodic expulsion and dispossession of its national minorities in 
62 Arendt, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,” 297.
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order to gain a legitimating ground for itself,”63 it is important to add that this “periodic 
expulsion and dispossession” has often taken place on the basis of race. After all, it is not 
any kind of difference that calls for hostility or creates a crisis in the identity of the 
nation-state. The differences that matter in this regard could be said to be wholly arbitrary 
and historically contingent, yet nonetheless central to the differential workings of power 
on, between, and by certain subjects. For Quijano, the coloniality of power names those 
operations of power that contemporary societies inherit from the history of colonialism. 
Race and racial identity, insofar as they serve as “instruments of basic social 
classification”64 on a global scale comprise an axis of such operation of power. Quijano 
explains that while “race” in its modern sense (as that which ascribes phenotypical 
differences to biology) did not exist before the colonization of America, during European 
colonial expansion, race served the purpose of organizing “the distribution of work of the 
entire world capitalist system, between salaried, independent peasants, independent 
merchants, and slaves and serfs,”65 the effects of which persist today, as can be observed 
in racial disparities in wealth around the world. In the context of securitization, race 
serves a function of marking particular groups as threatening and is decisive in terms of 
who shall be expelled. The expulsions that the nation-state relies on for the perpetuation 
of a national identity, in other words, take place by means of racialization. These 
expulsions may take various forms. While mass deportations may be the most salient 
form, other forms of marginalization include ghettoization, incarceration, and so on. 
63 Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? Language, Politics, Belonging (London 
and New York: Seagull Books, 2007), 33.
64 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” Nepantla: Views from South 
1, no. 3 (2000): 534.
65  Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2/3 (2007): 171.
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Given that it deploys racialization, I understand the politics of paranoia as linked to the 
coloniality of power.
Insofar as racialization names a process, rather than a pre-given “race,” one can 
trace how different groups have been racialized on the basis of different categories of 
identity. One may consider, for instance, Benedict Anderson's observations regarding the 
census and its function for the nation-state in conjunction with the establishment of racial 
identities and disappearance of religious identity “as a primary census classification.”66 
While the ideal of homogeneity has remained in place, what homogeneity consists of has 
radically changed.67 Under colonial rule, Anderson notes, race had become the primary 
identity category for classification which has left no room for ambiguity. “These 
'identities',” he writes, “imagined by the (confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial 
state, still awaited a reification which imperial administrative penetration would soon 
make possible. One notices, in addition, the census-makers' passion for completeness and 
unambiguity. Hence their intolerance of multiple, politically 'transvestite,' blurred, or 
changing identifications. Hence the weird subcategory, under each racial group, of 
'Others' – who, nonetheless, are absolutely not to be confused with other 'Others.' The 
fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one – and only one – 
extremely clear place.”68 We must remember while the census may have lost its status as 
an important biopolitical tool in the United States (as opposed to its status, say, in the first 
66 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London and New York: Verso, 2006),165.
67 Jasbir Puar's examination of “homonationalism,” that is, the position assumed by the nation-state of 
inclusion and tolerance toward homosexuality for the purposes of nation building (a position that 
justifies the invasion of states that are “intolerant”) is an example of this. Puar explains: “In the case of 
what I term 'U.S. sexual exceptionalism,' a narrative claiming the successful management of life in 
regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now 
joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. 
Collectively, they continue or extend the project of U.S. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to 
the war on terror” (Terrorist Assemblages, 2).
68 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 165-6.
30
half of the 20th century), racial (and gender) ambiguity is far from a comfortable position 
to occupy. Moreover, religious categories have not only made a comeback as one of the 
primary identifiers for classification, but have also now become racialized. This may be 
observed in the racialization of Muslims in Europe, where religion has become an 
identity category that racially marks individuals. It can also be observed in the hate 
crimes in the United States following the September 11 attacks and the Bush 
administration's official response targeting Muslims, Arab Americans, and those of 
Middle Eastern descent, but also others who had been mistakingly labeled as Muslim 
based on arbitrary phenotypes are examples of such racializations. The murder of 
Kimberly Lowe, a twenty one year old Native American woman, by two white men who 
yelled “Go back to your country!” as they assaulted her illustrates, as Saito puts it, “both 
the climate of fear and suspicion fostered by the so-called war on terror and how the 
Other in the United States has been constructed to exclude even those truly native to this 
land.”69 Sikh men wearing turbans are another group who have been affected by these 
hate crimes disproportionately, which, according to Jasbir Puar, has included:
verbal harassment (being called 'bin Laden', 'son of bin Laden', 'Osama'), 
especially on the phone and while driving; tailgating; hate mail; defecating 
and urinating on Sikh gurdwaras; Islamic mosques, and Hindu temples, 
leading in some cases to arson; blocking the entrance of a Sikh temple in 
Sacramento with a tractor and truck and jumping into the sacred holy 
water at the temple; throwing bricks, gasoline bombs, garbage, and other 
projectiles into homes of Sikhs and Arabs and slashing car ties; death 
threats and bomb threats; fatal shootings of taxi drivers, the majority of 
69 Saito, “The Costs of Homeland Security,” 53.
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whom have been turbaned Sikhs; verbal and physical harassment of 
primary and secondary school children, as well as foreign students on 
college campuses; and attacks with baseball bats, paintball guns, lit 
cigarettes, and pigs' blood.70 
Insofar as racial classification involves a hierarchal grouping of individuals based 
on arbitrary physical characteristics, these crimes in particular manifest a process of 
racialization of religion, both in the sense of incorrect labeling and grouping and in terms 
of the recodification of the turban as a racialized symbol of the terrorist. Puar writes: 
“The turban is accruing the marks of a terrorist masculinity. The turbaned man – no 
longer merely the figure of a durable and misguided tradition, a community and familial 
patriarch, a resistant antiassimilationist stance – now inhabits the space and history of 
monstrosity, of that which can never become civilized.”71 Within the political framework 
of paranoia that seeks to eliminate threats, the 'threat' gets attached to certain bodies, and 
the process through which this attachment often takes place is racialization.72
Race continues to be a central category through which power operates today, and 
unsurprisingly, not only in the United States. As racialization takes place in conjunction 
with other categories of identity, we also need to attend to the ways in which the Muslim 
identity gets racialized in intersection with gender. One may observe that the Muslim 
refugees are racialized differently on the basis of gender. While Muslim women are seen as 
subservient, docile, and oppressed, Muslim men are seen as violent, dangerous, and 
oppressive. In the codification of the Muslim refugee as threatening, which can be seen in 
70 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 179.
71 Ibid, 175.
72 The fourth chapter of this dissertation focuses on the infiltration of intersubjective relations by means of 
racialization and the process of codification of certain bodies as threatening.
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the commonplace rhetoric that attributes the increase in the number and frequency of terror 
attacks in Europe to the refugee crisis (despite the fact that none of the refugees have been 
implicated in these crimes), we witness a universalization of the “threatening” Muslim 
masculinity to stand in for “the refugee” at large, and thereby an erasure of women. Women
only emerge in the scene as those who must be saved from the oppression of Muslim men, 
despite the fact that some women are actively involved in the terrorist activities of Daesh 
(an acronym for the Arabic name al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām, also 
known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a Salafi jihadist militant group that 
separated from al-Qaeda in 2014). In terms of securitization, the point of reference is 
Muslim masculinity as constructed in the white imaginary; it is the racialized male body in 
particular that gets codified as threatening, which in turn becomes generalized for the 
Muslim identity.
One may say after reading Hardt and Negri's Empire that the nation-state is now 
an irrelevant site of analysis for political theory with the emergence of “a global order, a 
new logic and structure of rule – in short, a new form of sovereignty,”73 that is, Empire. 
“Empire,” they write, “is the political subject that effectively regulates these global 
exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.”74 Here, Hardt and Negri 
announce the death of the nation-state and its replacement by multi- and transnational 
organizations that are the main players in the political arena today. That is to say, for 
them, the nation-state is not the appropriate object when undertaking an analysis of 
power. While I am sympathetic to this account and wish to take up the nation-state by 
means of the operations of a politics of paranoia that is transnational in nature, that is, 




beyond the confines of a claimed territory, I do find the nation-state to be a relevant and 
valuable object for political analysis insofar as the focal point for such analysis is forms 
of governance, as opposed to simply the apparatuses of the state. In this project, the 
politics of paranoia is taken up as a form of governance or a political rationality that is 
operative in the construction of the nation-state, but which at the same time, operates 
beyond its borders. This can be observed, most notably, in what I call the return of the 
sovereign power in a biopolitical form to which the state lays claim. The next section is 
devoted to this phenomenon, as it operates at the hinge of freedom and security as 
discursive productions. I take up two primary examples to explore this phenomenon, 
namely, the drone strikes and indefinite detention. It would seem that the state's claim for 
sovereignty surpasses and trumps that of transnational organizations like the United 
Nations as well as international law in these instances, although one must not overlook 
the role multinational corporations play in the same surpassing, given that war is also an 
industry. I thereby do not reject Hardt and Negri's account when choosing the nation-state 
as my object of analysis, but I rather try to attend to the shifting dynamics in the ways in 
which power operates today.
In conclusion, securitization yields a differential logic of expulsion at work. As it 
operates within a paranoiac framework, with the imperative that threats must be 
annihilated, the threat is misplaced in the racialized body of the Other. As the refugees 
seek asylum fleeing war and terror, closing the borders and keeping them out as terrorists 
by association is justified through the notion of “border security,” just as the 
imprisonment of thousands of Japanese Americans for being “the enemy” by association 
and the arbitrary detainment and deportation of thousands of Arab and Muslim men were 
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matters of national security. These practices of purification are emblematic of a politics of 
paranoia that prioritizes the annihilation of threats by locating it in the racialized Other. 
Securitization, in this way, cannot be thought separately from racialization: it is the 
abjected body of the Other that is deemed threatening and therefore must be expelled.
Whose security is at stake in these practices of securitization? Who is made more 
secure and at what cost through these expulsions? In the next section, I turn to the 
differential operations of the notions of freedom and security, in an effort to show that the 
account I give of security is not merely a critique based on a defense of civil liberties. 
Despite often being seen as at odds, the way in which freedom and security get 
articulated in political discourse reveals that they in fact entail one another: freedom 
discursively emerges as that which is always already threatened and thereby necessitates 
securitization. This necessity is performed by employing an anachronistic sovereign 
practice of power that is at once biopolitical, comprising an assemblage that is 
characteristically both sovereign and biopolitical.
2.3 Freedom, Security, and Assemblages of Power
The debates around the measures taken in the name of anti-terrorism are often 
framed in terms of a trade-off between freedom and security. While many civil libertarians 
suggest that the practices around securitization curtail civil liberties, many conservatives 
argue for the value of safety over certain kinds of freedom. The issue becomes a matter of 
how much freedom one is willing to sacrifice for security. The framing seems to hinge on 
the kind of picture Thomas Hobbes illustrates in the Leviathan with the stark contrast 
between the state of nature being one of total freedom (where life is “nasty, brutish, and 
short”), and a commonwealth where the sovereign is responsible for the safety of the 
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people in exchange for their freedom (a state of total security). Yet what this framing 
conceals are the important questions, whose freedom, whose security, and for whom, as 
well as the history through which these notions emerge not in conflict, but instead as 
interdependent, a history that continues to be relevant today. Practices like torture, 
surveillance, indefinite detention, mass deportations neither affect all groups of individuals 
equally nor are acted on the population as a homogenous body, as presupposed in a 
Hobbesian framework. As Mariana Ortega and Linda Martin Alcoff put it, “Hate crimes as 
well as the practices of Homeland Security are less a rational response to real threats than 
a prompt, and alibi, for preexisting cultural chauvinisms and varied racisms.”75 I hope to 
trace the historical lineage here in which freedom and security are intertwined by engaging 
with Foucault's account of liberalism and explore the particular link these two notions 
attain in the context of the United States by analyzing the rhetoric that constructs the nation
as “the land of the free.”
Foucault approaches liberalism not simply as an ideology or an economic theory, 
but instead as a “new type of rationality in the art of government.”76 He contrasts it to 
raison d'Etat which sought to strengthen the state and expand the scope of its influence. 
While raison d'Etat aims at full control of the society through disciplinary practices 
constituting a “police state,” liberalism begins with “the premise that government [that is, 
the act of governing]...cannot be its own end.”77 This comparison also comprises the basis 
of Foucault's development of biopower which names a new set of relations that seek to 
practice power over life by way of regulating a population, in contrast to disciplinary 
75 Mariana Ortega and Linda Martin Alcoff. “Introduction: The Race of Nationalism,” in Constructing the 
Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 3.
76 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 20.
77 Ibid.
36
power, which acts on individual bodies. What raison d'Etat is to a police state, liberalism is
to a security state, Foucault contends. The latter, he suggests, corresponds to a liberal 
society, one of self-regulation.
Tracing this genealogy, Foucault shows that security has historically addressed 
some economic concerns, in that its principles had been implemented to govern the 
processes whereby different elements (goods, services, and even people) circulate. Insofar 
as liberalism denotes a “type of rationality in the art of government,” however, the scope of
security is by no means exclusive to the economy, but it becomes a way of life, as it were. 
He explains that a culture of danger has been constructed in the nineteenth century, which 
he notes is “very different from those great apocalyptic threats of plague, death, and war 
which fed the political and cosmological imagination of the Middle Ages, and even of the 
seventeenth century.”78 Here we see the emergence, proliferation, and the spread of 
“everyday dangers,” where security apparatuses are deployed in the management of fear. 
The “liberty” in liberalism and the prevalence of everyday dangers, according to Foucault, 
are interlinked such that freedom is “nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of 
apparatuses of security.”79 In this sense, Foucault contends, fear becomes “the condition, 
the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism.”80 Freedom, in other 
words, is inextricably tied to security, insofar as it is contingent on security, in this 
historical formulation.81 In his 1978-79 lectures, Foucault states: “There is no liberalism 
without a culture of danger.”82 
78 Ibid.
79 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (New York: Picador, 2007a), 48.
80 Ibid.
81 A similar argument is made by Mark Neocleous in Critique of Security where his engagement with 
Locke's account of prerogative shows that “liberalism's key concept is not liberty, but security, and this 
is so because security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society” (2008: 7).
82 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 66. Emphasis added.
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This “culture of danger,” of everyday danger, is something that one continues to 
observe in liberal societies. Under liberalism, freedoms are produced as “permanently 
endangered (by their own conditions of production) and require mechanisms of security.”83 
Thomas Lemke explains that “[d]anger and insecurity (the threat of unemployment, 
poverty, social degradation, etc.) are not only unwanted consequences or negative side-
effects but essential conditions and positive elements of liberal freedom.”84 In this 
context, we may consider the construction of a culture of danger in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks as a reconstruction, in that it constitutes an intensification, rearrangement, and 
redirection of the dynamics of danger and insecurity already in place at the level of 
everydayness in an average liberal society. The Department of Homeland Security's 
color-coded terrorism threat advisory scale, the misleading inflation of the numbers in the 
reporting of terrorist activity revealed by the Department of Justice's Internal Controls 
Over Terrorism Reporting,85 and the meticulous TSA screenings at airports constitute not 
only a management of but a “theater of fear,” whereby certain dangers are prioritized 
over others, often in statistically untenable ways. One comes to fear what is less 
dangerous or what is statistically less likely to take place. As Peter Ludlow writes: “We 
are conditioned to fear persons in caves in Pakistan but not the destruction of our water 
supply by frackers, massive industrial accidents, climate change or the work-related 
deaths of 54,000 American workers every year.”86
In the context of the United States, where freedom has become a tenet of the 
83 Ibid.
84 Thomas Lemke, “Liberalism, Biopolitics, and Technologies of Security,”  in Foucault, 
Governmentality, and Critique (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), 46.
85 The report shows that activities like marital crimes and illegal immigration had been classified as 
terrorist-related where these misleading figures are used to assess the terrorist threat against the U.S. 
and constituted a basis for budget decisions. Source: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/a0720/final.pdf
86 Peter Ludlow, “The Fifty States of Fear,” The Philosopher's Stone, January 19, 2014. Accessed: May 
24, 2016. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/fifty-states-of-fear/?_r=1
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national identity,87 there is a paranoiac formulation of freedom, as that which is always 
already threatened and in need of defense. George W. Bush's speeches in the aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks are exemplary in that they recite this identification and 
underscore freedom as endangered: “[N]ight fell on a different world, a world where 
freedom itself is under attack...Americans are asking, why do they hate us?...They hate 
our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and 
assemble and disagree with each other...This is the fight of all who believe in progress 
and pluralism, tolerance and freedom...Freedom and fear are at war.”88 What this war, 
construed here as a defense of freedom, entailed includes the deportation of thousands of 
immigrants from Muslim countries, the indefinite detention of individuals suspected of 
terrorist activity at Guantanamo Bay, the drone strikes in Pakistan, a war in Afghanistan, 
and another one in Iraq. Within this logic, the defense of freedom necessitates the 
elimination of the threat, much like in Klein's account of the paranoid-schizoid position.89
In the kind of rhetoric Bush uses, pitting freedom and fear against one another, freedom 
serves as an empty signifier, with “no fixed content” and capable of embracing “an open 
series of demands,”90 that stands for the identity of the nation whose defense necessitates 
the suspension of the rule of law. It would seem that the threat of terrorism is not only 
87 As Jasbir Puar puts it, the rhetoric of freedom is “a mainstay in philosophies of liberal democracy and is 
indeed a foundational tenet of American exceptionalism” (Terrorist Assemblages, 23).
88 “Text of George Bush's Speech,” The Guardian, September 2001. Accessed: May 24, 2016. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13
89 Klein writes: “[T]he child conceives of [certain objects] as actually dangerous— persecutors who it 
fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, poison it—in short, compassing its 
destruction by all the means which sadism can devise...In paranoia the characteristic defences are 
chiefly aimed at annihilating the 'persecutors', while anxiety on the ego's account occupies a prominent 
place in the picture” (“A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 145-7).
90 Dirk Nabers, “Filling the Void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy After 
September 11, 2001,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 2 (2009): 196. He also writes: “To perform the task 
of filling a void in an articulatory field, a signifier has to assume the role of an empty or a floating 
signifier. Empty signifiers are characterized by an indistinct or non existent signified, that is, terms that 
can have different meanings and can thereby serve to unite disparate social movements. They have no 
fixed content and can embrace an open series of demands” (Ibid).
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against individual lives, but a particular way of life, of freedom, with which the nation 
identifies. What is ultimately at stake, then, is the very identity of the nation, as a place of 
freedom. Yet freedom is much less at war with fear, in this case, than it is discursively 
produced as endangered, thereby phenomenologically entailing fear, which securitization 
supposedly attempts to suspend. 
It is, of course, not unique to the United States that freedom (as well as the 
corresponding ideas like progress and tolerance) is claimed as the identity of the nation-
state, for the history of European colonialism is full of examples where freedom is seen 
as a property of the west.91 What is peculiar, however, is the position that the United 
States assumes as the vanguard of freedom for the whole world. In the same speech, Bush
also remarks: “This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just 
America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight 
of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom...The advance of 
human freedom - the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time - 
now depends on us. Our nation - this generation - will lift a dark threat of violence from 
our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our 
courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.”92 Here, freedom is not 
91 Paraphrasing Mannoni's condescending remarks on Madagascans, Aimé Césaire writes: “Don't let the 
subtleties of vocabulary, the new terminology, frighten you! You know the old refrain: "The-Negroes-
are-big-children." They take it, they dress it up for you, tangle it up for you. The result is Mannoni. 
Once again, be reassured! At the start of the journey it may seem a bit difficult, but once you get there, 
you'll see, you will find all your baggage again. Nothing will be missing, not even the famous white 
man's burden. Therefore, give ear: "Through these ordeals" (reserved for the Occidental), "one triumphs 
over the infantile fear of abandonment and acquires freedom and autonomy, which are the most 
precious possessions and also the burdens of the Occidental." And the Madagascan? you ask. A lying 
race of bondsmen, Kipling would say. M. Mannoni makes his diagnosis: "The Madagascan does not 
even try to imagine such a situation of abandonment... He desires neither personal autonomy nor free 
responsibility." (Come on, you know how it is. These Negroes can't even imagine what freedom is. 
They don't want it, they don't demand it. It's the white agitators who put that into their heads. And if you 
gave it to them, they wouldn't know what to do with it)” (“Discourse on Colonialism,” 15).
92 “Text of George Bush's Speech,” The Guardian, September 2001. Accessed: May 24, 2016. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13
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only claimed as the identity for the nation, but the nation-state, as the possessor of such 
identity, sets itself up as “the power that guarantees world order and peace – and therefore 
every threat against the US is a threat against the world as a whole.”93 This self-
understanding is by no means confined to the kind of rhetoric the Bush administration 
chose to use. In the National Security Strategy released in February 2015, President 
Barack Obama states: “As Americans, we will always have our differences, but what 
unites us is the national consensus that American global leadership remains 
indispensable. We embrace our exceptional role and responsibilities at a time when our 
unique contributions and capabilities are needed most.”94 While the broader rhetorical 
framing has by and large shifted since 2001 (Obama states in this document, for instance, 
“we have to make hard choices among many competing priorities, and we must always 
resist the over-reach that comes when we make decisions based upon fear. Moreover, we 
must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military 
power,”95 thereby resisting alluding to emergency in the way that the Bush administration 
did in 2001), the U.S. continues to assume its position as the guarantor of the world's 
freedom.
Yet there is a paradox in this position assumed by the United States. Lars 
Svendsen notes that while assuming this position as the gatekeeper of “the continued 
existence of peace and liberal values,” the United States' own actions seem to be “exempt 
from these values in the fight to preserve them.”96 He notes that just like the sovereign in 
Hobbes' account, the United States stands outside the very order it is committed to 
93 Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy of Fear (London: Reaktion Books, 2008),115.
94 “National Security Strategy,” The White House, February 2015. Accessed: July 22, 2016. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf
95 Ibid.
96 Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy of Fear, 115.
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maintain. Employing Carl Schmitt's notion “state of exception,” that is, the sovereign 
capacity to suspend the law in a state of emergency, Agamben suggests that the concept 
has become “the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics.”97 
Referring to the investment of governments with the power to suspend constitutional 
rights, the notion “appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and 
absolutism.”98 
The state of exception, or the practice of sovereignty by suspending the law, can 
be observed in two post-9/11 practices in particular: the rise of the drone strikes and the 
indefinite detention of individuals without trial in Guantanamo Bay. In both of these 
examples, a sovereign decision is made to “to take life or let live,”99 which, according to 
Foucault, has historically been “replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the 
point of death”100 in modern nation-states. I suggest that this anachronistic sovereign, 
however, operates in a biopolitical fashion, in that what is at stake is the protection of a 
population (of “our way of life”) at the expense of another. Race, a biopolitical tool, is 
again central to this linking of sovereign power and biopower. As Judith Butler provides 
an extensive account of the permanent state of emergency established by the practice of 
indefinite detention,101 I will focus specifically on the drone wars in order to explore the 
97 Giorgio Agamben, The State of Exception (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2.
98 Ibid, 3.
99 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 136. Emphasis in 
the original.
100 Ibid, 138. Emphasis in the original.
101 In “Indefinite Detention,” Butler writes: “The state, in the name of its right to protect itself and, hence, 
and through the rhetoric of sovereignty, extends its power in excess of the law and defies international 
accords; for if the detention is indefinite, then the lawless exercise of state sovereignty becomes 
indefinite as well” (64). While “an illegitimate exercise of power,” indefinite detention is also a “part of 
a broader tactic to neutralize the rule of law in the name of security”  (67). In this way, indefinite 
detention serves as “the means by which the exceptional becomes established as a naturalized norm” 
(Ibid). Similarly, in State of Exception, Agamben notes that the state of exception is a common practice 
today as “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in the 
technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called 
democratic ones” (2). In this way, exclusion is built into the political system of these states: “[M]odern 
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linking of sovereign power and biopower.
Drone strikes have become a primary military strategy in the War on Terror, with 
the promise that these remotely piloted aircrafts armed with weaponry can isolate and 
take out known terrorists, without risking the lives of any U.S. military personnel. While 
began under the Bush administration in Pakistan, the drone strikes increased in number 
and frequency and were expanded to Yemen and Somalia under the leadership of Obama. 
While the rhetoric around the drone strikes is that they are “precise,” recent reports show 
an accuracy rate of 1.5-2%, with 98% of those killed by a strike being civilian 
casualties.102 The Guardian reports that “[a]n analytically conservative Council on 
Foreign Relations tally assesses that 500 drone strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan 
have killed 3,674 people.”103 Multiple strikes are made at each target given the low 
accuracy rate of the drones. The top five targets whose (attempted) killings have resulted 
in the highest number of casualties as reported by The Guardian are the following: 
Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed after 7 strikes, which resulted in 164 casualties; Qari 
Hussain, killed after 6 strikes, with 128 casualties; Abu Ubaidah al Masri, killed after 3 
strikes, alongside 120 casualties; Mullah Sangeen Zadran, killed after 3 strikes, with 108 
casualties; and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is still alive after 2 strikes that resulted in 105 
casualties. Many of these casualties were children.
totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil 
war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of 
citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system” (Ibid). In the case of the 
United States, Agamben notes that the practices of indefinite detention sanctioned by the PATRIOT Act 
exemplify how the state of exception allows for the radical erasure of “any legal status of the individual, 
thus producing a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being” (3), thereby reproducing, in the case of 
the suspected “terrorist,” the Roman law's figure of the Homo Sacer, who can be killed but not 
sacrificed.
102 “Get the Data: Drone Wars,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/
103 Ackerman, Spencer. “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes – the facts on the 
ground,” The Guardian November 24, 2014. Accessed: July 14, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147
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The list of targets is passed from the CIA director to the President, who must 
approve each strike as he is “authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force”104 by 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force that was passed by the Congress on 
September 14, 2011. Aside from a list of targets with names of known terrorists based on 
intelligence, “signature strikes” are made on those who are deemed suspicious. Any 
behavior from carrying a weapon to socializing with known terrorists could constitute 
suspicion and prompt a strike. This preemptive method where the target does not 
constitute an immediate threat violates international law. The United Nations Human 
Rights Council has expressed concern numerous times over these strikes being in 
violation of international law and human rights, stressing that these are extrajudicial 
killings that take place without the consent of the Pakistani government.105 
While a sense of sovereignty is very much present in the way in which drone 
strikes are authorized, by suspending the law, by the President's approval who is 
authorized to “use all necessary and appropriate force,” by means of a decision “to take 
life or let live,” such exercise of power is not wholly sovereign in the traditional sense for 
at least two reasons. First, “the sovereign,” who, in Foucault's account, exercises “his 
right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing,”106 is not a 
“he” in this case. Even though it would seem that the President is the sole subject of such 
exercise, there is, nonetheless, a complex network of power – assessments, calculations, 
reports, and so on – of which the President is not the originator, but instead within which 
104 “Public Law 107-40,” GPO September 18, 2001. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf
105 AFP, “UN wants investigation into drone attacks inside Pakistan,” Dawn June 7, 2012. Accessed: July 
14, 2016. http://www.dawn.com/news/724665/un-wants-  investigation-into-drone-attacks-in-pakistan
      Cloud, David S. “U.N. report faults prolific use of drone strikes by U.S.,” Los Angeles Times June 3, 
2010. Accessed: July 14, 2016. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/03/world/la-fg-cia-drones-
20100603
106 Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol 1, 136.
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he too is implicated, at work in these practices. This is, of course, due to how the 
government operates as a complex network. There are no “true sovereigns,” as Judith 
Butler puts it, in such practices, but instead, “their power is delegated, and they do not 
fully control the aims that animate their actions. Power precedes them, and constitutes 
them as 'sovereigns', a fact that already gives the lie to sovereignty.”107 The kind of 
sovereignty that one observes in the adjudications of life and death today, then, is not a 
reversion to the original form of sovereignty, but is instead suggestive of a new form of 
governmentality, a new formulation of power, an “updated” sovereignty. William 
Connolly explains this new form of sovereignty in the following way: “[T]he sovereign is 
not simply (as Agamben and Schmitt tend to say) he (or she) who first decides that there 
is an exception and then decides how to resolve it. Sovereign is that which decides an 
exception exists and how to decide it, with that composed of a plurality of forces 
circulating through and under the positional sovereignty of the official arbitrating 
body.”108 In other words, even though the exercise of power today may be sovereign in its 
operation, it is not necessarily located or grounded in a particular person or a particular 
institution, but is instead dispersed. This is one reason why I suggest that the kind of 
power that is exercised in such practices is a hybrid or an assemblage: it is both sovereign 
and biopolitical.109
Another reason that is demonstrative of this assemblage is the following: this 
practice (the drone strikes), despite all its shortcomings, is defended as a matter of “life 
107 Judith Butler, “Indefinite Detention,” in Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence 
(London and New York: Verso. 2006), 62. Emphasis added.
108 William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 145. Emphasis in the 
original.
109 One way in which Foucault contrasts sovereign power and biopower is that sovereign power is 
centralized or located in a specific person or an institution, while biopower is dispersed, it is not 
centrally located.
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necessity,” an essential tool in the elimination of threats (“the terrorists”) primarily in an 
effort to preserve and foster life for a whole population, the people of the United States, 
in the way in which this practice is framed. At a time when even the self-identified 
“democratic socialist” candidate Bernie Sanders has stated that he has no reservations 
about the use of drones (“and more”) as a strategy for anti-terrorism,110 we might want to 
question why this is the weapon of choice of the U.S. military despite its terrible accuracy 
rates. Here, we may again consider Foucault's distinction between sovereign power and 
biopower. Foucault notes that while sovereign power essentially consisted of “a right of 
seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to 
seize hold of life in order to suppress it,”111 the deployment of “power over life” takes a 
different form after seventeenth century: it is now a matter of preserving life, fostering it. 
He considers the phenomenon of genocide as a possible counterexample to his claim that 
now power organizes itself around the preservation and fostering of life: 
Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth 
century,112 and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such 
holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death – 
and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with 
which it has so greatly expanded its limits – now presents itself as the 
counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors
to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and 
110 Matthew Cantor, “Bernie Sanders says he would use drones to fight terror as president,” The Guardian 
October 11, 2015. Accessed: July 14, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/11/bernie-
sanders-drones-  counter-terror
111 Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol 1, 136.
112 Here Foucault seems to completely disregard the colonization of the Americas and the Native American 
genocide that followed. 
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comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a 
sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence 
of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale 
slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as 
managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes 
have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be 
killed...The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the 
power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to
guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the 
tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living 
– has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the 
existence in question is no longer the juridicial existence of sovereignty; at 
stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the 
dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient
right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, 
the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.113
In other words, what is now at stake is the existence of a threat directed at the biological 
existence of a population, which serves as a justificatory mechanism for war. While the 
exercise of the sovereign right to kill may very well pertain to a threat against 
sovereignty, here, within the realm of biopolitics, both the object of the threat and what 
follows from it are different. The paradox of biopower is that it kills in the name of life 
and that life deems these killings necessary. It is precisely at this juncture that race 
becomes an issue, as biopower functions through race and by way of establishing, 
113 Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol. 1, 136-7. My emphasis.
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securing, and operating through racial categories. There is a differential logic at work in 
the protection of life, for it is always the protection of life of a particular group at the 
expense of another. This is precisely what is at stake in the use of drones: the drone 
strikes are a biopolitical tool in that they are used in the name of preserving life that 
counts (the life of the people of the U.S.), while the fact that they kill over a hundred 
more people when attempting to kill one has little moral (and political) weight, in that 
those lives do not count as lives, thereby their deaths do not count as deaths. This 
differential logic is embodied in the concept of race whereby in the use of the notions of 
freedom and security underlie a matter of freedom and security of a particular group, at 
the expense of others. Securitization, in this context, utilizing an assemblage of sovereign 
power and biopower, is always about the security of one particular group at the expense 
of another, even when these differences are sought to be erased on the level of discourse 
with the use of generalized terms like “humanity,” “the world” or “American people.” 
Securitization, in this context, does not make the world safe. Securitization does not make 
U.S. Americans safe.114 Securitization is the prerogative of a privileged group over others, 
perpetuating the notion that some lives matter more than the others, a notion that 
manifests itself in the process of racialization. While the drone strikes annihilate whole 
communities, they are not understood as an act of genocide, but rather a matter of 
securitization. What determines the meaning here, of course, is the question: whose 
security?
This differential logic that operates through racial categories has now been 
integrated within sovereign exercises of power as in the case of drone strikes, indefinite 
114 I will unpack this point in the next section: securitization in tandem with militarization works to 
radicalize more individuals, leading to less security in the long run.
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detention, and the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq. It would seem that the lines 
between biopolitics and sovereignty have by and large been blurred in the exercise of 
power over life and death. In making the claim that there is a conjunction between 
sovereign power and biopower, I would, however, like to differentiate my position from 
that of Agamben's, who suggests that far from replacing sovereign power (as suggested 
by Foucault), biopower has always been at the very heart of sovereignty. He writes:
The present inquiry concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection 
between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power. 
What this work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely 
that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion of bare life 
in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of 
sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical 
body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is 
at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the 
center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than
bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming 
the bond (derived from a tenacious correspondence between the modern and
the archaic which one encounters in the most diverse spheres) between 
modern power and the most immemorial of the arcana imperii.115
Agamben's claim that power has always been biopolitical is a claim about the 
very nature of politics which has endured throughout history. It involves, in other words, 
a metaphysical inquiry into power, one which I do not wish to undertake. Rather than 
115 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1995), 6. Emphasis in the original.
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decontextualizing the specific mechanisms through which power operates today, my 
approach is to attempt to situate them in history. My contention is that the politics of 
paranoia, in its implementation within and by the United States (yet not restricted to this 
particular implementation), is very much tied to the broader histories and legacies of 
colonialism and imperialism. It is particularly within these broader histories that we must 
consider the politics of race in the United States both before and after the September 11 
attacks, for it is hardly the case that the government came to commit these violations in the 
name of national security only in the aftermath of these attacks. As the Westside Story song
“America” suggests, “Life is alright in America/If you are all white in America” (although 
racial hierarchy is certainly not the only form of oppression, so perhaps we might rephrase 
this as “Life is alright in America/If you're a white, able-bodied, rich, cis, heterosexual, etc. 
man in America”), the notion of freedom in this country has always been tainted by racial 
oppression, as national security has always been used as a tool for subjugating racialized 
minorities. Freedom which, according to Bush, the United States represents, is a way of life
only for a lucky few, while underlying this notion of American exceptionalism is ultimately
exception, in the form of a set of expulsions, domestic and abroad, justified within the 
framework of national security through the codification of racialized bodies as threatening. 
As Saito writes: “When we look at the treatment of immigrant groups of color in the United
States, we see that while the motivation both to bring in and to exclude has generally been 
economic, the rhetoric used to deny them rights and benefits has not only been framed in 
racialized terms; these terms, in turn, are linked to the rhetoric of national security. The oft-
evoked goal of 'preserving ‘our’ way of life' thus has both a racial and a more explicitly 
political dimension. This is interesting because the United States is consistently 
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characterized as a nation of immigrants—a framing necessary to maintain an appearance of
legitimacy, given that it is, in fact, a settler-colonial state occupying someone else’s land—
but, at the same time, immigrants are the first to be attacked as threatening to the social, 
economic, and/or racial status quo.”116
It is not a contradiction per se, then, that Bush called for securitization in the 
name of freedom, or that national security is tied to freedom both conceptually and in 
practice, for freedom in question seems to have always entailed the elimination of 
enemies (both internal and external) who are almost always racialized groups. The 
identity that the U.S. assumes for itself as the guardian of freedom hinges on its ability to 
annihilate threats, much similar to Klein's account of the infant in the paranoid-schizoid 
position seeking to preserve oneself only by means of eliminating danger. The questions 
that are pressing within the framework of the politics of paranoia are whose freedom and 
whose security, for these notions are racially differentiated. While the expulsion and 
dispossession of (racialized) minorities, intolerance to difference and ambiguity, 
obsession with categorization demonstrate some of the ways in which the politics of 
paranoia functions, and while, based on this history, one may claim that the nation-state 
itself may very well be a paranoiac political formation, attending to the specific practices 
undertaken by the state and the colonialist/imperialist legacies that ground these practices 
give us a more intricate, contextually specific picture of the workings of the politics of 
paranoia. It is my contention that the operations of the politics of paranoia within and by 
the United States only make sense within the larger framework of colonialist/imperialist 
legacies and the globalization of white supremacy.
116  Saito, “The Costs of Homeland Security,” 59.
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2.4 Paranoia as Autoimmune Politics
The biopolitical order that operates through a logic of expulsion is based on 
arbitrary, artificial distinctions (i.e. race) that are historically contingent. Cesare Pavese 
famously states, “[E]very war is a civil war,” in that the sight of the dead brings into 
question the arbitrariness and the substitutability that wars inherently entail, yet the sight 
of death erases the artificial distinctions that are made, which are meant to be the driving 
force of war: “Looking at certain dead is humiliating. One feels humiliated because one 
understands – touching it with one's eyes – that we might be in their place ourselves: 
there would be no difference, and if we live we owe it to this dirtied corpse.”117 Perhaps it 
is for this reason, in the case of drone strikes, that the civilian deaths are very much kept 
out of sight. Yet, as Judith Butler makes clear in “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” death is 
not mourned if the life of the deceased had never counted as life in the first place and the 
forcefulness that their death would have in compelling one to face one's own fragility 
thereby gets lost.
What happens, then, when the War on Terror is presented as something that is 
never-ending, in the way that the Bush administration has done? What happens when the 
preemptive measures that are taken in the name of securitization are never enough, for 
one can never be safe enough? In the context of deep securitization where the identity of 
the nation cannot be thought apart from the existential threats posed on it (in the case of  
the public discourse around “freedom” that emerges as always already endangered), 
securitization names an ever-growing machinery, an insatiable monster that swallows 
everything whole, even its own makers. Security, in such formulation, is inherently 
excessive: it has no end point, it constantly remakes and unmakes itself, it creates more 
117 Pavese, The House on the Hill (NY: Walker & Co, 1961), 176.
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enemies, bigger enemies, just so it can defeat them. It is in this sense, then, that the 
politics of paranoia is inherently self-destructive, for its excessive measures for 
securitization ultimately results in bigger endangerments. It betrays its own purpose. 
Melanie Klein's account of the paranoid-schizoid position in infants show that the 
mother's breast is at once a gratifying and a frustrating object for the infant, and thus the 
infant at this particular stage of development rejects the breast, deems it threatening, 
despite the fact that as a primary source of nourishment, the rejection of the breast risks 
the infant's own survival. Kristeva's account of abjection draws on a similar mechanism 
of expulsion that is inherently self-destructive. The process of abjection is precisely the 
process whereby the ego attempts to eliminate the threat, but only to end up harming 
itself, because of the abject's disruptive ontological status as that which blurs the lines 
between the subject and the object. She describes “food loathing” as “the most 
elementary and most archaic form of abjection”118 in following words: “'I' want none of 
that element...'I' do not want to listen, 'I' do not assimilate it, 'I' expel it. But since the 
food is not an 'other' for 'me', who am only in their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself 
out, I abject myself within the same motion through which 'I' claim to establish myself.”119
The paradox of abjection, then, is that it is a self-destructive move made for the sake of 
self-preservation. This is the case because the primary difference between an object and 
the abject is that the abject is not definable in the way that an object is, it is rather “the 
jettisoned object...radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning 
collapses.”120





Underlying abjection is a specific logic of expulsion that is inherently self-
destructive in its efforts of (what it perceives as) self-preservation. Abjection is not only a 
psychological mechanism but also a political tool, as in the case of expulsions. Derrida's 
characterization of the September 11 attacks as symptomatic of the autoimmunity of the 
foreign policy of the United States, for instance, shows this very dimension of self-
destruction within a politics of paranoia that centralizes the elimination of danger or the 
annihilation of threats as a necessary project for the nation-state under a state of 
emergency. Derrida writes: 
As we know, an autoimmunitary process is that strange behavior where a 
living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, 'itself' works to destroy its own 
protection, to immunize itself against its 'own' immunity...Immigrated, 
trained, prepared for their act in the United States by the United States, 
these hijackers incorporate, so to speak, two suicides in one: their own 
(and one will remain forever defenseless in the face of a suicidal, 
autoimmunitary aggression – and that is what terrorizes the most) but also 
the suicide of those who welcomed, armed, and trained them. For let us 
not forget that the United States had in effect paved the way for and 
consolidated the forces of the 'adversary' by training people like 'bin 
Laden', who would here be the most striking example, and by first of all 
creating the politico-military circumstances that would favor their 
emergence and their shifts in allegiance.121 
121 Jacques Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida, ed. Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 94-5.
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If we were to consider the significance of Derrida's account in the context of 
today, a similar occurrence can be observed in the rise of Daesh, which is at least partly 
to due to their success in getting a hold of Iraqi stocks of equipment, many of which had 
been left there after the Iraq War by the United States.122 What makes this even more 
striking is the fact that a report released by American intelligence agencies in 2006 
actually predicted the likely emergence of new terrorist organizations, as their assessment 
shows that “the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has helped spawn a new 
generation of Islamic radicalism and that the overall terrorist threat has grown since the 
Sept. 11 attacks.”123 The autoimmunity that one can associate with these strategies of 
securitization is particularly pertinent at a time when the U.S. just recently gave up on 
training “moderate” rebels in Syria, instead choosing to provide other groups with basic 
military equipment in their struggle against Daesh.124 
Furthermore, in terms of the excess relayed by these strategies, one may want to 
consider the process through which the United States Special Forces' kill list of seven 
targets gradually turned into a kill list of hundreds, which then in turn became a kill list of 
thousands.125 The War on Terror has “made the world a much less safe place,”126 in that 
these strategies have led to the creation of more enemies than the ones that have been 
defeated, even by the government agencies' own calculations. If we were to take the 
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's words to heart that “the war against 
122 Van Buren, “Dude Where is My Humvee? Iraq Losing Equipment to Islamic State at a Staggering 
Rate,” Reuters, June 2, 2015. Accessed: July 21, 2016. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2015/06/02/dude-wheres-my-humvee-iraqi-equipment-losses-to-islamic-state-are-out-of-control/
123 Mazzetti, “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat,” New York Times, September 24, 
2006. Accessed: July 21, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0
124 “US to scrap Syria rebel training programme,” Al Jazeera, October 9, 2015. Accessed: July 22, 2016.  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/overhaul-syria-rebel-training-programme-
151009133250518.html
125 See: Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is A Battlefield. New York: Nation Books, 2013.
126 Svendsen, A Philosophy of Fear, 114.
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terror would have been won when Americans could once more feel secure,” then, as 
Svendsen puts, “it would seem that a war is being fought that cannot be won.”127
Yet perhaps this is a war that is not meant to be won once and for all, waged 
against a shifting, unknown enemy; a permanent war to ceaselessly feed the military-
industrial complex and a handful of corporations that are its profiteers.128 There is a lot of 
money to be made in war, a fact that “the rich and powerful of America have remained 
keenly conscious of” ever since World War II, which brought an end to the Great 
Depression by resolving the disequilibrium between supply and demand as “the state 
'primed the pump' of economic demand by means of huge orders of a military nature.”129 
An economic system that is dependent on war for maximizing profit has given rise to a 
political system that constantly needs to create new enemies and new threats, without 
regard to human life or the wellbeing of the planet, as war is one of the primary culprits 
in environmental degradation. Corporate interests are central to this historical process in 
which the United States has morphed into a national security state, regardless of the 
status of immediate threats to security. Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that 
marked the end of the Cold War (and the triumph of capitalism), for instance, “the United 
States perpetuated and maintained as much as possible a Cold War national security state 
in style and size.”130 
As one protester's sign that has recently been popularized online reads: “If war is 
an industry, how can there be peace in a capitalist world?” While a major driving force 
127 Ibid.
128 For lists of companies that profit the most from war, please see: “The 25 Most Vicious Iraq War 
Profiteers,” Business Pundit, July 22, 2008; Samuel Weigley, “10 companies profiting the most from 
war,” USA Today, March 10, 2013; Vince Calio & Alexander E.M. Hess, “Here Are the 5 Companies 
Making a Killing Off War Around the World,” Time, March 14, 2014.
129 Pauwels, “Why America Needs War,” Global Research, November 9, 2014. Accessed: July 21, 2016. 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-america-needs-war/5328631
130 Wirls, Irrational Security, 7.
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for these practices of securitization (i.e. practices of war) is most certainly economic 
interest, this hardly give us the full story. The politics of paranoia, as I argued, operates as 
a political rationality with its own set of tools, techniques, and justificatory mechanisms. 
The logic of expulsion that I explored in this chapter is a thread in that web of power 
relations that make up securitization. Securitization, after all, takes place at the 
intersection of global capitalism, militarization, and white supremacy, and its operations, 
as I suggested, ensue in a paranoiac political framework. The destruction that these 
practices bring about are not limited to the paradox of autoimmunity where securitization 
brings with it more insecurity. The drone strikes in particular (and war in general) do not 
only destroy communities and result in thousands of civilian deaths, but also have a 
devastating impact on the environment. Militarization is one of the primary causes of 
environmental degradation, which brings with it a planetary emergency that affects us all. 
The interconnectedness of these issues is the reason why environmentalist groups like 
Deep Green Resistance argue: “Militarism is a feminist issue, rape is an environmental 
issue, environmental destruction is a peace issue.” The struggle against securitization, 
therefore, cannot be a “single-issue struggle,”131 to borrow from Audre Lorde, as these 
issues are very much connected. The excess that is inherent to these security measures 
may be affecting different populations differently at this point in time, yet that is bound to 
change, be it in the form of a “boomerang effect” of violence or in the context of climate 
change as a looming issue for the entire planet.
2.5 Conclusion: “Fuck Your Racist Borders”
I wish to end this chapter with a little personal anecdote that is of much relevance 
to my approach to securitization at large and border security in particular. I land in Los 
131 Audre Lorde, “Learning from the 60s” in Sister Outsider (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 2007), 138.
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Angeles after a 14 hour flight and go through passport control. I get my fingerprints 
scanned and my picture taken, as usual. As I rush to the exit, exhausted and longing for 
sleep, I recognize the growing queue to go through customs. When it is finally my turn, 
the officer asks the standard questions, where do you come from, what type of visa do 
you have, where do you study...He then asks when I'm going to Oregon, where my 
institution is located, and I tell him Saturday. That is three days later. He asks me where 
I'm staying. I say with some friends. What friends, how do you know them, where did 
you meet, he demands to know. “Well, actually,” I say, “they are the parents of my 
boyfriend. They are here to pick me up. I'll be staying with them for a few days.” He 
gives me a disconcerted look. “Is your boyfriend an American citizen?” he asks. “Yes,” I 
answer. He looks at me as if I am a thorn on his side. “So you're never leaving, huh?” he 
says. The question sounds rhetorical. I force a smile. I suffer from homesickness often 
and I'm heartbroken about all I had to leave behind. It pains me that I live two separate 
lives that I fail to reconcile, I pause and restart each time, speak in two languages, both of 
which fail me in my attempt to express the split, the alienation, the uprootedness I 
experience on a daily basis. I force a smile. For I have to convince him that I am no leech. 
Yet I stutter, for I do not know what to say. “I will leave,” I say, “when I finish my 
program,” or something to that effect. He remains unconvinced. He dismisses me and I 
can finally go out. I recall a news story that I read, about a white British family arriving 
in my home country Turkey, whose four year old had a toy passport with dinosaurs. The 
child handed the “passport” to the officer at passport control, and he stamped it without 
even looking. One has to have the right kind of government issued passport, I think, and 
the right skin color, so that she can move freely. Yet I know that I am still far more 
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privileged than many others in these spaces, those who have Irani passports, Iraqi 
passports, those who have no passports at all. Years later, I read a poem by Ijeoma 
Umebinyuo entitled “Diaspora Blues” and all of these thoughts come back to haunt me: 
“So, / here you are / too foreign for home / too foreign for here. / never enough for both.”
Today, Trump supporters continue on chanting, “Build that wall.” Under the 
Obama administration, Central Americans and Mexicans continue to be deported by tens 
of thousands, their houses raided in the middle of the night. Nearly 90,000 people had 
been deported to Central America alone in 2015.132 Meanwhile, immigrant-rights activists 
Kica Matos, Ana María Rivera-Forastieri and Alicia R. Schmidt Camacho, get arrested at 
a rally by the White House calling to end these deportations, 83 of which resulted in the 
death of those deported in 2014.133 In pro-refugee rallies all over the United States, 
protesters hold signs that read “Will Trade Racists For Refugees.” Clinton and Sanders 
seek to assure the voters that the borders are secure. Meanwhile, decolonial activist 
groups declare, “Fuck your racist borders.”134 And they have a point.
Within the framework of the politics of paranoia where the expulsion of the 
racialized Other constitutes a primary means for eliminating existential threats, what 
border security ultimately signifies is the securing of a biopolitical order where privilege 
is limited for a few, the Other's life is “disallowed,” and the nation-state sustains itself by 
132 Grandin, Greg. “Here's Why the US Is Stepping Up the Deportation of Central Americans,” The Nation 
January 21, 2016. Accessed: July 14, 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/heres-why-the-us-is-
stepping-up-the-deportation-of-central-americans/
133 “New Haven Immigrant Rights Professor Arrested At White House,” New Haven Independent February 
23, 2016. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/new_haven_immigrant_rights_protester
s_arrested_at_white_house/
134 One example is a UK based activist group called Black Dissidents who shared a video on their 
Facebook page depicting an act of hanging colorful balloons on top of the fence at Yarl's Wood 
Immigration Removal Centre, a detention center in UK where foreign nationals, many of whom are 
women. They captioned the video with the following words: “Fuck your racist borders. Their days are 
numbered. #EndDetention #ShutDownYarlsWood”
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way of purification. Desecuritization, in this context, as an undoing of these practices and 
a deconstruction of their discursive significance, is a decolonial project insofar as it 
recognizes the historical ties of these practices to coloniality and seeks their 
abandonment. It entails a decodification where the Other would no longer signify a 




In the previous chapter, I discussed the exclusionary logic of paranoia that has 
historically worked through racialization. Racialization is the identification of groups and 
individuals that are to be subjected to mechanisms of expulsion, in order for the dominant 
classes to maintain their status, a process that is understood as (and seen to be justified by) 
securitization. The practices around national security in the United States in particular have 
relied on racialization as well as the expulsion of racialized groups, which has taken many 
forms including detention and deportation. The expulsion of the racialized Other in Europe 
during the ongoing refugee crisis justified by a discourse around border security attests to 
similar investments. While economic interest has been at play historically in the 
development of these practices around national security, the politics of paranoia also 
involves kinds of attachment that cannot be explained merely through interest, but more 
appropriately through the concept of desire.
Yet, given that the annihilation of threats is its primary objective, the politics of 
paranoia involves a temporal dimension, in that the threat as threat is always structured as 
futural. Insofar as securitization works through preemption that allows for the management 
of future possibilities, the politics of paranoia entails a future-orientation of a specific kind. 
There is, in other words, a paranoid temporality at work within the practices of 
securitization. As Sedgwick explains, paranoid temporality indicates a particular relation 
to the future that seeks to eliminate the possibility of surprise: “This unidirectionally 
future-oriented vigilance of paranoia generates, paradoxically, a complex relation to 
temporality that burrows both backward and forward: because there must be no bad 
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surprises, and because learning the possibility of a bad surprise would itself constitute a bad
surprise, paranoia requires that bad news be always already known”135 This imperative, that
bad news must “always already be known” entails an intolerance toward indeterminacy, 
uncertainty, and unknowability. This intolerance calls for the use of preemptive 
mechanisms that ought to annihilate the possibility of threats before they actualize. 
Louise Amoore's account of “the politics of possibility” that seeks to preempt rather
than to prevent (a distinction she makes by drawing on two different logics at work in the 
“preemptive” use of risk management that hinges on possibility, as opposed to the 
“preventive” use of statistical data that draws on probability) names a current trend in 
securitization (and beyond, in her account) that is linked to a paranoid temporal structure. 
According to Amoore, the politics of possibility, which I see as a genre of a politics of 
paranoia, “seeks not to forestall the future via calculation but to incorporate the very 
unknowability and profound uncertainty of the future into imminent decision.”136 In other 
words, in contemporary political practice, preemption offers a way to deal with anxiety 
that is produced by unknowability and uncertainty, not by means of the prevention of 
certain events taking place, but instead through the projection of possibilities, managing 
risks, and making decisions “in anticipation of the uncertain future.”137 As Amoore's 
account shows, “the very calculus of risk had changed.”138 It now entails “the imperative 
of action...when there is low probability but high consequence.”139
In the following, I explore preemption as a set of political practices that entails a 
paranoiac temporal structure through the example of the FBI's sting operations where the 
135 Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” 130.
136 Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability (Durham and 





target that is deemed to be a “future threat” is encouraged and provided all the necessary 
means to carry out a terror attack by undercover FBI agents. I suggest that these practices 
not only are indicative of a will to manage future possibilities, but they also seek to fold the
future possibilities into the present in that they make a “future threat” actualize in the 
present, serving as, as it were, a self-fulfilling prophecy. As the calculus of risk moves 
away from high probability toward low probability/high consequence, these practices 
mimic those of the fictional organization Precrime in Philip K. Dick's famous short story 
“The Minority Report,” which seeks to arrest “criminals” before they actually commit 
any crime. While Amoore's account is helpful in mapping out the temporal logic of 
preemption, it falls short of identifying the process of racialization that is at work in these 
practices, to which one must attend. Even though the process of weeding out future threats 
emphatically entails an agential practice, the illusion provided by data, calculation, 
algorithms, and so on, serves to “deny the politics of all decision,”140 and thereby to 
relinquish all responsibility. In the last section, I investigate alternatives to this paranoiac 
relation to the future that would instill an open sense of futurity and underscore political 
responsibility, by exploring a politics of hope as an alternative.
3.1 The Politics of Paranoid Temporality
“The Minority Report” is a short story written by Philip K. Dick published in 
1956 that explores the notion of predictive policing through Precrime, an organization 
that detains “individuals who have broken no law...but...surely will,”141 with the aid of 
three “precog” mutants who see into the future: “'In our society we have no major 
crimes', Anderton went on, 'but we do have a detention camp full of would-be 
140 Ibid, 163-4.
141 Philip K. Dick, “The Minority Report” in Selected Stories of Philip K. Dick (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 224-5. Emphasis added.
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criminals'.”142 The protagonist of the story is the head of Precrime named John A. 
Anderton. As the story progresses, the question whether “criminals” who have yet to 
commit a crime are in fact criminals gets complicated for Anderton who in the beginning 
was convinced that the system he set up is “something of tremendous social value.”143 “If 
we let one criminal escape – as we did five years ago,” he states in the story, “we've got a 
human life on our conscience. We're solely responsible. If we slip up, somebody dies...It's 
a public trust.”144 Yet, upon receiving a card from the predictive machinery with his own 
name as a would-be murderer, he knows “[w]ith absolute, overwhelming conviction” that 
it cannot be true.145 Convinced that there is a conspiracy against him, he begins 
suspecting everyone around him, including his wife, Lisa: 
To plant the card in the machines would require an accomplice on the 
inside – someone who was closely connected with Precrime and had 
access to the analytical equipment. Lisa was an improbable element. But 
the possibility did exist...Of course, the conspiracy could be large-scale 
and elaborate, involving far more than a 'rigged' card inserted somewhere 
along the line. The original data itself might have been tampered with. 
Actually, there was no telling how far back the alteration went. A cold fear 
touched him as he began to see the possibilities. His original impulse – to 
tear open the machines and remove all the data – was uselessly primitive. 








Helplessly caught up within the system he himself helped create, whose work is 
premised upon the elimination of the possibility of crime, Anderton is in absolute denial 
throughout the story that he would actually commit this crime, the murder of Leopold 
Kaplan, a man he had never met. Upon hearing on the radio that there might be a 
minority report, a report by one of the precogs showing an alternative future where 
Anderton does not commit the crime, he seeks to prove his innocence by obtaining the 
minority report. The reporter on the radio explains: “...unanimity of all three precogs is a 
hoped-for but seldom-achieved phenomenon...It is much more common to obtain a 
collaborative majority report of two precogs, plus a minority report of some slight 
variation, usually with reference to time and place, from the third mutant.”147 As he 
expects, one of the precogs' reports demonstrates that upon finding out that he will kill 
someone, Anderton decides not to: “The preview of the murder had canceled out the 
murder; prophylaxis had occurred simply in his being informed. Already, a new time-path 
had been created.”148 Yet, since the collaborative report suggests otherwise, if Anderton 
ends up not committing murder, this brings the whole Precrime system into question. 
When he shares the information he found in the minority report with Lisa, she says: 
“Perhaps a lot of the people in the camps are like you.”149
“No,” Anderton insisted. But he was beginning to feel uneasy about it, too. 
“I was in a position to see the card, to get a look at the report. That's what 
did it.”
“But –” Lisa gestured significantly, “Perhaps all of them would have 





“It would have been too great a risk,” he answered stubbornly.
Lisa laughed sharply. “Risk? Chance? Uncertainty? With precogs 
around?”150
This is the point in the story where the legitimacy of the Precrime system is 
irrevocably undermined. Nothing can justify the detainment of those who have 
committed no crime any longer, as the precogs are revealed to show only future 
possibilities, rather than events that inevitably happen. If knowledge of the future alters 
the future, Anderton is forced to face the reality that detaining the “would-be criminals” 
(or rather, “could-be criminals”) may not have been the only option – even though he 
insists that it is the necessary option since the alternative would be “too great a risk.” 
Refusing to lose faith in the system, however, Anderton is afraid if he fails to kill the man 
he was “prophesied” to kill, the Senate will end up bringing down Precrime, on the 
grounds that it is inherently flawed: “They are going to demand the Senate disband us, 
and take away our authority. They're going to claim we've been arresting innocent men – 
nocturnal police raids, that sort of thing. Rule by terror.”151 Anderton believes that there is 
only one option: “We've got ourselves boxed in and there's only one direction we can go. 
Whether we like it or not, we'll have to take it...Very obviously, I'm going to have to 
fulfill the publicized report. I'm going to have to kill Kaplan. That's the only way we can 
keep them from discrediting us.”152
Interestingly, Anderton not only stubbornly refuses to doubt the legitimacy of 





while being in denial about his own criminality:
“They won't stop you?”
“Why should they? They've got that minority report that says I've changed 
my mind.”
“Then the minority report is incorrect?”
“No,” Anderton said, “it's absolutely correct. But I'm going to murder 
Kaplan anyhow.”153
In the speech his target Kaplan gives on the illegitimacy of the Precrime system, 
he notes:
“John Allison Anderton is innocent of any crime in the past, present, and 
future. The allegations against him were patent frauds, diabolical 
distortions of a contaminated penal system based on a false premise – a 
vast, impersonal engine of destruction grinding men and women to their 
doom...Many men have been seized and imprisoned under the so-called 
prophylactic Precrime structure...[a]ccused not of crimes they have 
committed, but of crimes they will commit. It is asserted that these men, if 
allowed to remain free, will at some future time commit felonies...But 
there can be no valid knowledge about the future. As soon as precognitive 
information is obtained, it cancels itself out. The assertion that this man 
will commit a future crime is paradoxical. The very act of possessing this 
data renders it spurious. In every case, without exception, the report of the 
three police precogs has invalidated their own data. If no arrests had been 
153 Ibid, 253-4.
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made, there would still have been no crimes committed.”154
While Anderton knows that Kaplan is absolutely right, he refuses to see Precrime 
dissolved. He knows that he has no interest in killing Kaplan, but ends up doing so 
regardless, so that the majority report is proven to be true and that there are no doubts 
raised about the accuracy of the system. He recognizes his position as a unique one, not 
willing to admit that others who might be in the same position, upon being told that they 
will commit murder, might very well not do it. 
The logic of Precrime that Anderton becomes a murderer in order to defend, rests 
not on probability but on possibility, for that which prompts those arrests is revealed to be 
the possibility of crime, rather than the actual likelihood. In this way, this logic is 
indicative of preemption rather than prevention, in that the future possibilities get folded 
into the present: the objective is to preempt the crime by presuming it “actualized” in the 
present, rather than to prevent it in the future. The way in which the story unfolds is 
indicative of a paranoiac logic in at least two ways, in parallel to contemporary 
preemptive practices such as the FBI's sting operations or the signature drone strikes 
where a target is selected based on involvement in “suspicious activity.” First, there is a 
paranoid temporality at work in these practices as they are not only anticipatory in nature, 
but also “only act on a potentiality that is already actualized as a possibility.” 155 Secondly, 
despite hiding behind the massive machinery that legitimizes these practices as 
“scientific,” calculative, or “neutral,” they heavily rely on “the inductive incorporation of 
suspicion, imagination, and preemption,” as opposed to “the deductive proving or 
disproving of scientific and statistical data,”156 suggesting that they involve a paranoiac 
154 Ibid, 257. Emphasis in the original.
155 Amoore, The Politics of Possibility, 26.
156 Ibid, 13.
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affective disposition in order to ground themselves. The performance of this affect, which 
I aim to underscore with the term “the politics of paranoia,” runs throughout “The 
Minority Report.” I unpack these two points in the following by drawing connections 
between the underlying logic of Precrime and the FBI's sting operations.
Trevor Aaronson reports in his journalistic work Terror Factory that since 2001, 
“the FBI has built the largest network of spies ever to exist in the United States – with ten 
times as many informants on the streets today as there were during the infamous 
Cointelpro operations under FBI director J. Edgar Hoover – with the majority of these 
spies focused on ferreting out terrorism in Muslim communities.”157 While they began 
under the Bush administration, these sting operations became much more frequent under 
Obama's presidency, which led to the prosecution of seventy-five terrorism sting targets 
in the first three years that Obama was in office.158 Aaronson writes: 
By August 2011, with nearly ten years of terrorism prosecutions since 
9/11, we had a database of 508 defendants whom the U.S. Government 
considered terrorists. The way the data broke down was illuminating. Of 
the 508 defendants, 243 had been targeted through an FBI informant, 158 
had been caught in an FBI terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an 
agent provocateur. Most of the people who didn't face off against an 
informant weren't directly involved with terrorism at all, but were instead 
Category II offenders, small-time criminals with distant links to terrorists 
overseas. Seventy-two of these Category II offenders had been charged 
with making false statements, while 121 had been prosecuted for 




immigration violations. Of the 508 cases, I could count on one hand the 
number of actual terrorists, such as failed New York City subway bomber 
Najibullah Zazi, who posed a direct and immediate threat to the United 
States.159
This data suggests that the practices undertaken in the name of War on Terror has 
practically created a monster which constantly needs to be fed. In the absence of real 
terrorists, terrorists must be created out of troubled individuals who fit the terrorist profile 
that the Bureau has, with the help of, of course, $3 billion that it receives each year “to 
prevent the next 9/11,” an amount larger than the allocation to fight organized crime.160 
What matters is not that “Islamic terrorism in the United States is not an immediate and 
dangerous threat,”161 since the focus now is on the “low probability, high consequence 
events.”162 What is particularly striking about the logic that underlies these sting 
operations is how despite the rhetoric that the government officials use, that these 
operations in turn “prevent” the real threat of terrorism, their modus operandi is 
preemption rather than prevention.  
Amoore notes that the preventive approach of the twentieth century has recently 
been replaced by preemptive techniques: “Supplying diverse domains, from border 
security to public space surveillance to fraud detection in insurance, the programs deploy 
data mining and analytics in order to derive indicators of differential risk: risk flags, 
maps, and scores that signal possible future risks. The individual elements of data may 
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reaggregated, and assembled as associated elements, novel and possibility-based forms of 
risk calculus begin to emerge.”163 These risk assessments offer a way to manage future 
possibilities that are ultimately unmanageable: “the vast proliferation of data mining and 
analytics for security is taking place against a backdrop of the impossibility of prediction. 
Seeking out precisely the unpredictable and the potentially catastrophic, algorithmic 
systems supply the sovereign with partial, incomplete knowledge of possibility.”164 Yet 
far from constituting an impasse, the impossibility of prediction is the very force that 
drives these practices that are much less concerned with probabilities than with 
possibilities. 
The management of future possibilities as a central project for securitization 
yields something more radical than a passive mapping out of future possibilities and the 
mere elimination of the “threatening” ones. If the imperative of paranoid temporality is 
that “there must be no bad surprises,” the FBI's sting operations show that those bad 
surprises are not only weeded out through threat assessments, but are also made to 
actualize to prove those assessments true. Much like the organization Precrime in “The 
Minority Report,” which operates under the presumption of the necessity to eliminate the 
possibility of crime (rather than the probability, which is not taken into account until 
Anderton himself is implicated), the FBI's preemptive practices seek not only to 
meticulously calculate the future threats, but also to make some of those possibilities take 
place in order to eradicate them. Within the logic of preemption, as Amoore puts it, “it is 
necessary to act to preempt what they would do, if they could.”165 Thus paranoid 





before they take place,” it also folds the future into the present: “[T]his is a form of 
governing that can only act on a potentiality that is already actualized as a possibility – a 
plane that would have been boarded, a border that would have been crossed, a future 
violence that would have been fully realized.”166 Just as the agents in “The Minority 
Report” are convinced that the crime would have been committed if they were not there 
to stop it, the sting operations seek to actualize a future possibility that would otherwise 
actualize if the “pre-criminals” were to be approached by “real terrorists” rather than the 
informants of the FBI. 
It is within this paranoiac logic of preemption that folds the future possibilities 
into the present that U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland Rod J. Rosenstein's 
statement about Antonio Martinez's plea agreement, who was caught as a result of a sting 
operation, attains its meaning: “We are catching dangerous suspects before they strike, 
and we are investigating them in a way that maximizes the liberty and security of law-
abiding citizens...That is what the American people expect of the Justice Department, and 
that is what we aim to deliver.”167 Rosenstein's statement could very well have been taken 
out of “The Minority Report.” What renders these suspects “dangerous” is their 
potentiality of danger that has already been actualized as a possibility. In the paranoid 
temporal structure, while the threat that they pose is located in the future, it gets folded 
into the present: by virtue of being “pre-criminals,” they are already criminals. The 
practice of “catching dangerous suspects before they strike,” the idea that Precrime was 
built on, is one that is premised on the paranoiac imperative “there cannot be bad 
surprises,” therefore the “surprise” must always already be known (and thereby is not a 
166 Ibid, 26.
167 U.S. Attorney's Office, “Maryland Man Pleads Guilty to Attempted Use of a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center,” January 26, 2012. Accessed: July 21, 
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surprise at all). Moreover, Rosenstein asserts that this practice “maximizes the liberty and 
security of law-abiding citizens,” thus suggesting a natural link between paranoiac 
practices and security (and liberty!), despite the fact that no data exist that could 
corroborate such link. While this link is not evinced by facts, it is perhaps suggested by a 
feeling or a spectacle of security, a putative epistemology that recognizes no alternative to 
the politics of paranoia when it comes to security.
It is evidently the possibility, and not probability, of crime that drives these 
operations, much like in “The Minority Report.” Yet these practices demonstrate the 
Bureau's threat assessments to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the very logic of paranoid temporality found in the world of “The 
Minority Report” is now implemented in contemporary police work. Just as Anderton 
had to kill Kaplan in order to make “the prophecy” come true, the FBI agents provide 
their targets with all the means, the plot, weapons, equipment, and sometimes even cash, 
for a terror attack, in order to make their threat assessments come true. In an interview 
with Aaronson, the retired FBI special agent Peter Ahearn, who directed the Western New 
York Joint Terrorism Task Force, states: “Real people don't say, 'Yeah, let's go bomb that 
place.' Real people call the cops,”168 despite the fact that most of the targets of these sting 
operations are susceptible individuals living in poverty and suffering from mental health 
issues. Just as the question of whether the majority report may very well be wrong – and 
it would have been wrong unless Anderton made a conscious decision to kill Kaplan only 
to prove it right – gets sidetracked in the story, the same question about the validity of the 
threat assessments is pushed aside by Ahearn in this statement. The question whether 
these individuals would have ever been approached by terrorist groups is rendered 
168 Aaronson, The Terror Factory, 28.
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irrelevant, given that the sting operations prove that if they were, they would have been 
terrorists, and that possibility is all that matters. A future possibility is thus folded into the 
present or better, the future is created in the present, through a process that does not 
understand itself as one of “creation,” but instead as one of “exposure.” In fact, echoing 
Lisa who questions the legitimacy of Precrime by suggesting that perhaps these people 
would never have committed the crime if only they were told about the possibility ahead 
of time, just like Anderton, Joseph Balter, a federal public defender, told the judge in 
Martinez's sentence hearing, “that the entire case could have been avoided had the FBI 
counseled, rather than encouraged, Martinez.”169 Yet the FBI, much like Anderton, would 
most likely suggest that the risk would have been too high; as putting people away rather 
than offering them help is not only easier perhaps, but it is also seen as the necessary 
solution within the framework of a politics of paranoia irrevocably committed to the 
elimination of threats.
Just as practices of surveillance today hinge on piles and piles of data that are 
used to render the decision making process more “scientific” (despite the fact that many 
of these decisions come down to questions of biopower about whose lives matter and 
who counts as human as I argued in the previous chapter), we see in “The Minority 
Report” an intricate setup of processing “data” received from the precogs, who, at the end 
of the day, simply see different possibilities in the future that are yet to actualize: “Ahead 
of them rose impressive banks of equipment – the data-receptors, and the computing 
mechanisms that studied and restructured the incoming material. And beyond the 
machinery sat the three precogs, almost lost to view in the maze of wiring.”170 The piling 
169 Ibid, 23.
170 Dick, “The Minority Report,” 225.
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of data and the use of algorithms and high-tech equipment make the “prophesying” 
process seem very calculative and scientific. Yet, as Amoore makes clear, these practices 
“hold out the promise of managing uncertainty and making an unknowable and 
indeterminate future knowable and calculable,”171 thereby serving the important role of 
mitigating anxiety elicited by uncertainty, indeterminacy, and unknowability. They serve 
a much needed role, a comforting illusion of being in total control, in the face of 
overwhelming anxiety. As the politics of paranoia involves a particular affective and 
cognitive relation to the future (one that seeks to eliminate bad surprises), the algorithms 
used for security fulfill precisely the function of annihilating threats before they actualize. 
Operating within and deeply attached to a framework of paranoia, Anderton is not willing 
to admit that detaining “possible” murderers may not be justified, for not detaining them 
would be “too great a risk.” The priority is given to the elimination of threats, and no 
other alternative is considered. This denial involves a foregoing of responsibility, a 
refusal to recognize that preemption very much involves decision and is not a simple 
function of the “[s]ecurity techniques, algorithmic technologies, and knowledges” that are 
designed to “identify future events before they take place,”172 of what comes out the 
machine. There is a denial of agency that is particularly problematic in these cases, which 
leads to a destructive attitude of indifference.
Foucault underlines this “indifference,” which I perhaps understand rather 
differently than the way he did, in his account of the apparatuses of security that emerged 
under liberalism, that simply “let things happen,” as opposed to discipline, which “allows 
nothing to escape.” He writes: “The basic function of discipline is to prevent everything, 
171 Amoore, The Politics of Possibility, 7.
172 Ibid, 17.
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even and above all the detail. The function of security is to rely on details that are not 
valued as good or evil in themselves, that are taken to be necessary, inevitable processes, 
as natural processes in the broad sense, and it relies on these details, which are what they 
are, but which are not considered to be pertinent in themselves, in order to obtain 
something that is considered to be pertinent in itself because situated at the level of the 
population.”173 In other words, security is ultimately indifferent toward the possibilities 
that it seeks to fold into the present, as long as it achieves the actualization of the future 
possibilities in the present. The possibilities in themselves, in other words, ultimately do 
not matter. What security attends to here, instead, is the threat of terrorism, which in its 
absence ought to be created. If in moral terms, the status of security is ultimately marked 
by indifference, if, in these practices, a moral attitude of indifference is paired with 
affective and cognitive dispositions that are paranoiac, the question of responsibility must 
be at the center of this discussion, which the rhetoric of necessity and inevitability denies.
The sting operations are marked by indifference as those who undertake them 
simply see themselves to be allowing future possibilities to take place, rather than 
exercising agency in any way: “The preemptive temporality of derivative forms of risk 
does not seek to predict or prevent a particular future, as in systems of pattern recognition 
that track forward from past data, for example, because it is precisely indifferent to 
whether a particular event occurs or not. What matters instead is the capacity to act in the 
face of uncertainty, to render the gaps in what can be collected or known actionably.”174 It 
is this self-understanding that grounds the legitimacy of the FBI's stings operations, a 
legitimacy that holds up in court time and again, that is left unquestioned. It is through 
173 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (New York: Picador, 2007a), 45.
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this deceptive self-understanding that the former FBI special agent insists that “real 
people call the cops,” perhaps willfully forgetting that the men they target are already 
troubled, susceptible individuals, who do not have the means themselves to carry out an 
act of terror.
Moreover, as “the inductive incorporation of suspicion, imagination, and 
preemption”175 into practices of securitization very much guides (and is guided by) racial 
profiling, even though not discussed by Amoore, the question of responsibility is again 
brought to the fore. Aaronson's account shows that prior to the Boston Marathon 
bombings, although Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who planted the bombs at the Boston Marathon 
with his brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, had been on the Bureau's radar, the agents had 
focused instead on “another potential 'terrorist' – a naïve, easily influenced, likely 
mentally ill man named Rezwan Ferdaus, whom they had ensnared in one of their 
informant-led sting operations,”176 and who, unlike the Tsarnaev brothers, was of South 
Asian descent.177 Upon receiving an inquiry by Russian intelligence officers about 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev in January 2011, the Bureau conducted a threat assessment and 
“determined that Tsarnaev wasn't linked to foreign or domestic terrorists, and thus wasn't 
a threat to national security.”178 Yet, in the case of the Bangladeshi Ferdaus, on whom the 
Bureau conducted a threat assessment the very same month that they conducted one on 
Tsarnaev, the FBI was convinced that he constituted a threat, despite the fact that by that 
point Ferdaus's mental health had worsened and as his father reports, he began wearing 
diapers.179 “On September 28, 2011, at the end of a nine-month sting operation,” 
175 Ibid, 13.
176 Aaronson, The Terror Factory, 23.
177 Ferdaus was of Bangladeshi descent. The Tsarnaev brothers were half-Chechen and half-Avar.
178 Aaronson, The Terror Factory, 238.
179 Ibid, 241.
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Aaronson reports, “the FBI delivered 'explosives' to Ferdaus – twenty-five pounds of fake 
C-4 and three inert grenades. Agents then rushed in and arrested Ferdaus, charging him 
with, among other offenses, attempting to destroy a federal building and providing 
material support to terrorists.”180 Threat assessment, here, seems to be no more than a 
subterfuge for racial profiling, given that the FBI is known to target specifically men of 
Middle Eastern and South Asian origin in the War on Terror, as evident from the data I 
surveyed in the previous chapter on the arbitrary detainment and deportation of 
individuals after the September 11 attacks. The terrorist is profiled as a “brown” man – a 
category created by lumping together those with Middle Eastern and South Asian 
heritage. Aaronson reports that the FBI's profile of a potential terrorist is a lone wolf, a 
single male between the ages of sixteen to thirty-five; yet it is often men of color who are 
named terrorists. Meanwhile, the white male mass shooters like Robert Lewis Dear, who 
often fit this profile, are seldom named a terrorist. The terrorist, therefore, is a racial 
category.
While we do not have direct access to the algorithms used for threat assessment 
and thus do not know how exactly they work, it is safe to say that the objectivity or 
impartiality claimed by these assessments serve to overshadow other important variables 
that are evidently at play, as in the case of racial profiling. The important function 
fulfilled by the use of algorithms, more so than their “objective” assessment, is their 
capacity to release the agents of all responsibility and to legitimate indifference and 
thoughtlessness as prerogatives. Securitization in a paranoiac framework, thus, urges us 
to consider the ethical question of responsibility. Amoore notes: “While contemporary 
security techniques work hard to annex judgment from politics – to replace visual 
180 Ibid, 241.
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profiling with algorithmic profiling or to evacuate the touch of the pat-down search with 
whole body imaging, for example – they deny the politics of all decision. Rather as the 
actions taken on the basis of possibility eviscerate all potentiality, so the automated 
decision is equipped to make judgments but never to decide.”181 Nobody takes 
responsibility for the devastating results that these practices yield because the 
accountability supposedly lies in the data, the algorithms , calculations, and not the moral 
agents who act based on these. In this sense, they take themselves to be agents that are 
devoid of agency, as they are “simply doing their jobs.” As Amoore states: “On the 
surface of the sovereign decision there is an appeal to the objective and impartial logics 
of mathematics, computer science, and business consulting. Beneath that glossy surface 
there are layers upon layers of incompleteness, multiple moments of intuition and proxy 
judgment, whose political effects are scarcely seen.”182 So long as the machinery of 
securitization is in place and up and running, no one has to burden themselves with 
assuming responsibility for the consequences of these practices where lives (that 
apparently do not count as lives in the current biopolitical order) are at stake.
Sara Ahmed's recounting of her experience at the airport attests to the pretense 
under which “agents without agency” operate:
I arrive in New York, clutching my British passport. I hand it over. The 
airport official looks at me, and then looks at my passport. I know what 
questions will follow. “Where are you from?” My passport indicates my 
place of birth. “Britain,” I say. I feel like adding, “Can't you read. I was 
born in Salford,” but I stop myself. He looks down at my passport, not me. 
181 Ibid, 163-4. Emphasis added. 
182 Ibid, 54.
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“Where is your father from?” It was the same last time I arrived in New 
York. It is the question I get asked now, which seems to locate what is 
suspect not in my body but as that which has been passed down the family 
line, almost like a bad inheritance. “Pakistan,” I say, slowly. “Do you have 
a Pakistani passport?” “No,” I say. Eventually, he lets me through. The 
name “Ahmed,” a Muslim name, slows me down. It blocks my passage, 
even if only temporarily. I get stuck, and then move on. When I fly out of 
New York later that week, I am held up again. This time it is a friendlier 
encounter. I find out I am now on the “no fly list,” and they have to ring to 
get permission to let me through. It takes time, of course. “Don't worry,” 
the officer says, “my mother is on it too.” I feel some strange comradeship 
with his mother. I know what he is saying: he means “anyone” could be on 
this list, almost as if to say “even my mother,” whose innocence of course 
would be beyond doubt. I know it is a way of saying, “It's not about you. 
Don't take it personally.” It isn't about me, of course. And yet it involves 
me. My name names me after all. It might not be personal but neither is it 
about “anyone.” It is my name that slows me down.183
One pretends that getting held up has nothing to do with one's last name, that it 
could have been “anyone” who was held up, including the officer's mother. Yet it is not 
anyone but a woman with a Pakistani name. One pretends that threat assessments have 
nothing to do with race, yet the majority of those targeted by the FBI's sting operations 
are men of color. One pretends that these sting operations catch “terrorists” before they 
183 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 140.
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have a chance to act, yet providing helpless men living in the fringes of society with all 
the means to carry out an attack, the FBI does no less than to create terrorists. As 
Aaronson writes: “Since 9/11, the FBI and the Justice Department have labeled as 
terrorists a mentally troubled man who worked at Walmart, a video game store clerk 
whose only valuable possession was a set of stereo speakers, a university student who 
was about to be evicted from his apartment, and a window washer who had dropped out 
of college, among others. All of these men were involved in FBI terrorism stings in which 
an informant came up with the idea and provided the necessary means and opportunity 
for the terrorist plot. While we have captured a few terrorists since 9/11, we have 
manufactured many more.”184 Yet as the FBI refuses to take responsibility for “creating” 
these terrorists, they would never call this process “manufacturing,” but instead a way to 
allow the threatening possibilities to materialize. As Amoore puts it, “The political 
decision to prevent someone from boarding a plane, to detain them at a border or a 
railway station, to deport them on suspicion of posing a threat, to freeze their assets is 
increasingly obscured in a computational judgment that is ever more possibilistic and 
difficult to challenge.”185 When contemplating alternatives to the politics of paranoia or 
the preemptive practices that it entails, one must place the question of responsibility at 
the very center. One must recognize that far from relieving the moral agents of the burden 
to make a decision, the anticipatory disposition of preemptive practices “produce[s] a 
particular economy of decision.”186 How does one assume responsibility for not only 
what one lets happen, but also what one very much makes happen as in the case of these 
sting operations? How do we hold the federal government accountable for sanctioning the 
184 Aaronson, The Terror Factory, 17.
185 Amoore, The Politics of Possibility, 52.
186 Ibid, 18.
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practices of racial profiling under bills like the Patriot Act?  How do we recognize that 
the practices that are undertaken in the name of national security are not inherently 
necessitated by the situation, but rather, decisions are made not only to implement them, 
but also to not question their legitimacy? How do we face the fact that fear does not in 
and of itself legitimate violence and that violence is always a decision? How does one 
assume responsibility for all the decisions made under the pretense of necessity, which 
are yet to be recognized as decisions? And ultimately, how do we assume responsibility 
for a collective future that is ultimately unknowable in the midst of panic and anxiety?
In an attempt to tackle these questions, I turn to some viable alternatives to a 
paranoid relation to the future and the possibility of their political implementation in the 
next section. I argue that while hope offers an alternative, it brings with it a set of 
problems that call for caution. I then call for a resistant hope in struggles against the 
politics of paranoia that can at once be critical and transformative.
3.2 A Critical Analysis of the Politics of Hope
Insofar as paranoid temporality entails a foreclosing of a relation to the future based
on openness and surprise, what is needed is a different relation to futurity – one that does 
not seek to define it solely in terms of the threats it poses, but attends to the possibilities it 
bears for social and political change. In Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir Puar gives a brief 
reading of paranoid temporality as a machinery for producing more of the same to no end. 
She writes: “Paranoid temporality is...embedded in a risk economy that attempts to ensure 
against future catastrophe. This is a temporality of negative exuberance – for we are never 
safe enough, never healthy enough, never prepared enough – driven by imitation (repetition
of the same or in the service of maintaining the same) rather than innovation (openness to 
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disruption of the same, calling out to the new)...A paranoid temporality therefore produces 
a suppression of critical creative politics.”187 The paranoid temporality that underlies 
preemptive politics, thereby, not only obscures the question of responsibility by making 
recourse to necessity, but it also undermines the possibility of the emergence of the new or 
forecloses the possibility for exercising what Puar calls “critical creative politics” that may 
bring about such emergence. Its insistence that paranoia provides the only tenable relation 
to the future, the necessary one, and does violence to other possible temporal modes.
What other relations to the future are available for political practice that are more 
amenable to what Puar calls “critical creative politics”? In her hermeneutical account, 
Sedgwick contrasts paranoid reading with an alternative practice she names, borrowing 
from Klein, 'reparative reading': 
To recognize in paranoia a distinctively rigid relation to temporality, at once
anticipatory and retroactive, averse above all to surprise, is also to glimpse 
the lineaments of other possibilities...to read from a reparative position is to 
surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, 
however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new; to a 
reparatively positioned reader, it can seem realistic and necessary to 
experience surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there 
can also be good ones. Hope, often a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to 
experience, is among the energies by which the reparatively positioned 
reader tries to organize the fragments and part-objects she encounters or 
creates. Because the reader has room to realize that the future may be 
187 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, xx.
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different from the present, it is also possible for her to entertain such 
profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial possibilities as 
that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it 
actually did.188 
In contrast to the rigidity of paranoid temporality that seeks to identify future 
threats, hope offers an alternative affective mode marked by an openness to unforeseen 
possibilities and the unpredictability of the future. Moreover, it echoes a transformative 
sentiment, insofar as in the sense of openness that hope fosters, one develops a sensibility 
that the future will not simply be the repetition of the same (as in the case of paranoid 
temporality) as well as an understanding that the past and the present could also have been 
otherwise. That is to say, rather than committing to a sense of necessity, hope is instead 
very much tied to a sense of contingency. What would, then, a politics of hope look like, if 
we were to apply hope, an affective textual relation in Sedgwick's articulation, to the 
political? Sara Ahmed's recounting of coming into feminism through a range of emotions 
can serve as a guide in the political articulation of hope:
One can reflect on the role of emotions in the politicisation of subjects. 
When I think of my relationship to feminism, for example, I can rewrite 
my coming into being as a feminist subject in terms of different emotions, 
or in terms of how my emotions have involved particular readings of the 
worlds I have inhabited. The anger, the anger that I felt about how being a 
girl seemed to be about what you shouldn't do; the pain, the pain that I felt 
as an effect of forms of violence; the love, the love for my mother and for 
188 Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” 146. Emphasis in the original.
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all the women whose capacity for giving has given me life; the wonder, 
the wonder I felt at the way in which the world came to be organised the 
way that it is, a wonder that feels the ordinary as surprising; the joy, the 
joy I felt as I began to make different kinds of connections with others and 
realise that the world was alive and could take new shapes and forms; and 
the hope, the hope that guides every moment of refusal and that structures 
the desire for change with the trembling that comes from an opening up of 
the future, as an opening up of what is possible.189
Hope, in its political application, would then seem to involve, in this case, an 
openness and desire to change, an attitude that accompanies acts of resistance as well as 
the interrogation of the limits of the possible. It is, in other words, an affective attunement 
of a political imaginary that recognizes injustice and suffering, and demands a safe, just, 
and equal world. In contrast to the logic of paranoid temporality that mimics and repeats, 
folding the future possibilities into the present, that is, making the future the same as the 
present, a politics of hope would not only long for a different, better future, it would 
undertake the labor of bringing that future into reality. As Amy Billingsley puts it, “When 
I am hopeful, my anticipation is cast out toward a future that resounds with positive 
potential, offering possibilities for amelioration, renewal, or survival that otherwise 
would seem distant.”190
Far from constituting a passive relation to future possibilities, hope lies at the 
heart of activism. Jean-Pierre Reed's account of the role of emotions in the Nicaraguan 
revolution shows that affects like hope and moral outrage comprise “emotional climates 
189 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004), 171. Emphasis added.
190 Amy Billingsley, “Hope in a Vice: Carole Pateman, Judith Butler, and Suspicious Hope,” Hypatia 30, 
no. 3 (2015): 600.
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through which revolutionary participation is coalesced.”191 Hope, in this way, acts as what 
Reed calls a “revolutionary accelator,” providing an appropriate emotional climate for 
revolution. I argued elsewhere192 that the shifts in the public affective makeup may act as 
catalysts to bring about social change, as in the case of the 2013 protests in Turkey where 
the atmosphere of hope, love, camaraderie, and humor that came about has not only 
provided the conditions for the continuation of a thriving movement of resistance against 
police brutality, but also led to forms of community building that may have long lasting, 
albeit not immediate, results. Hope, in this way, does not denote blind optimism or passive 
waiting, but rather serves as a driving force for social movements that demand and 
collectively work toward a better future, however that may be defined.
Consider Deb Gould's analysis of the role of hope in the ACT UP movement. She 
suggests that “common feelings in the realm of activism, like rage, anger, indignation, 
hope, pride, and solidarity” are  “fundamental to political life,” as “ there is an affective 
dimension to the processes and practices that make up 'the political', broadly defined.”193 
“In addition to filling our lives with intensity and a sense of meaning and purpose,” she 
reports, “the exciting swirl of ACT UP’s protest actions and meetings allowed us to 
reinvent ourselves, to carve out a place where we could be angry, oppositional, defiant, 
hopeful, sexual, and happy, a place where we could engage in collective projects of 
world-making.”194 As the AIDS pandemic continued to grow, ACT UP's meetings, 
protests, and calls for legislation, research, and treatment, generated an atmosphere of 
191 Jean-Pierre Reed, “Emotions in Context: Revolutionary Accelators, Hope, Moral Outrage, and Other 
Emotions in the Making of Nicaragua's Revolution,” Theory and Society 33. no. 6 (2004): 656.
192 Ibrahimhakkioglu, “Demolishing the Empire of Fear: Affective Transformations, Queer Trajectories,   
and Eroticism in 2013 Protests in Turkey,” presented at NASSP Conference, July 2014, Ashland, OR.
193 Deb Gould, Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight Against AIDS (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 3.
194 Ibid, 210.
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hope and solidarity amongst the activists, that resulted in a thriving social movement. In 
fact, it is only when the activists began to lose hope, Gould notes, that ACT UP began to 
falter: “Despair destroyed ACT UP...Scholars and activists alike tend to put movement 
and hope in one basket and demobilization and despair in another. And in the moment of 
ACT UP’s decline, there was certainly reason to despair. Even amid striking victories, 
more and more ACT UP members were dying. The death toll was staggering.”195 She 
urges us, however, to not simply consider hope in terms of mobilization and despair in 
terms of immobilization, since the political possibilities opened up by each one of these 
affective modes may differ: “Despair sometimes flattens political possibilities, 
exacerbating a sense of political inefficacy and hopelessness and generating apathy and 
withdrawal, but it also sometimes works to open new political horizons, alternative 
visions of what is to be done and how to do it. The period when the direct-action AIDS 
movement emerged illustrates the latter; the period of its decline illustrates how despair 
and its companions sometimes do paralyze and demobilize. We need to explore why and 
under what conditions despair and its companions have the one effect rather than the 
other. Those engaged in fighting for a more just, equitable, and joyous world have an 
urgent need to reckon with the pervasiveness of feelings of powerlessness, political 
inefficacy, apathy, and despair, and to explore how such sentiments influence struggles 
for social change.”196 Thus, it would be an oversimplification to assume that hope is the 
only viable attitude for social movements, since the lack of hope could possibly open up 
new forms of activism. Furthermore, there is nothing inherent in hope that makes it 




instance, suggests that “real hope” which must be “grounded in a particularly messy 
struggle” could be “betrayed by naïve projections of a better future that ignore the 
necessity of doing the real work.”197 Hope, then, could have a distracting effect, one of 
hollow optimism that may take one even further from, rather than leading to, where one 
wants to go. 
Hope can also be misleading. The famous “Hope” poster of the 2008 Barack 
Obama campaign implied fundamental social change; yet in the last eight years, Obama 
embraced national security “as a central tenet of his presidency.”198 Both outside the 
United States, from the substantial increase in the drone strikes in Pakistan during his 
presidency to the secret wars in Somalia and Yemen, and within, from the increase in the 
frequency of the FBI's sting operations as well as surveillance practices to ordering “six 
prosecutions under the 1917 Espionage Act involving leaks of government documents – 
double the number of Espionage Act prosecutions under all previous presidents 
combined,” Obama, as Aaronson puts it, “has been an aggressive president,” despite the 
Nobel Peace Prize he received in 2009.199 These show that the “Hope” campaign was no 
more than a guise for “more of the same,” for the continuation of preemptive practices 
and mechanisms of exclusion, for a politics of paranoia sequel, rather than bringing about 
fundamental social change that a politics of hope would demand. While hope could 
certainly be revolutionary, it could also very well be misleadingly used in a presidential 
campaign for a president who has centralized national security by way of embracing and 
further developing a politics of paranoia, for pragmatic purposes or otherwise.200
197 West, Hope on a Tightrope, 6.
198 Aaronson, The Terror Factory, 33.
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In her articulation of radical democracy, Judith Butler develops an account of an 
alternative relation to futurity that is outside of the framework of a politics of paranoia: 
To assume responsibility for a future...is not to know its direction fully in 
advance, since the future, especially the future with and for others, requires 
a certain openness and unknowingness; it implies becoming part of a 
process the outcome of which no one subject can surely 
predict...Democracy does not speak in unison; its tunes are dissonant, and 
necessarily so. It is not a predictable process; it must be undergone, like a 
passion must be undergone. It may also be that life itself becomes 
foreclosed when the right way is decided in advance, when we impose what
is right for everyone and without finding a way to enter into community, 
and to discover there the 'right' in the midst of cultural translation. It may be
that what is right and what is good consists in staying open to the tensions 
that beset the most fundamental categories we require, in knowing 
unknowingness at the core of what we know, and what we need, and in 
recognizing the sign of life in what we undergo without certainty about 
what will come.201
Here Butler makes clear that a lot is at stake when politics cannot cope with a certain level 
of unknowability that the future necessarily involves and makes attempts to determine that 
future. In the context of indifference elicited by reliance on a preemptive framework, 
bringing responsibility back into politics entails the recognition of a fundamental 
unknowability necessarily built into a democratic order. Yet such unknowability does not 
during his first years in office, and public opinion polls during his fourth year as president showed that 
most Americans gave him high marks on national security” (The Terror Factory, 34).
201 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 39.
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revoke responsibility, on the contrary, it makes it more important if not burdensome. Not 
only does Butler suggest that  maintaining the unknowability of the future is an integral 
part of the democratic process, she also  offers an understanding of futurity in terms of an 
attitude of openness as opposed to the determinism that a politics of paranoia would entail. 
Yet this temporal understanding should be differentiated from certain versions of the 
politics of hope, which not only involve the aforementioned pitfalls (hollow optimism or a 
guise) but also relies on a myth of linearity in its understanding of progress. 
I now turn to two critiques of the liberal politics of hope, one by Lee Edelman, who 
suggests that the political obsession with the future demarcates the limits of politics as 
thoroughly heteronormative, and another one by decolonial thinkers like Aníbal Quijano 
and Enrique Dussel, who show that future-orientation is often embedded in the history of 
colonialism and capitalism and relies on a progressive, teleological narrative that equates 
the non-western with inferiority. Through engaging with these critiques, I hope to show that
the underlying problem is less of a matter of future-orientation, than of an implicit 
commitment to a linear understanding of temporality, whose futurity yields nothing but 
“more of the same.” The future, in this (paranoiac) model, serves as a mirror of the past. In 
this way, the politics of hope in its linear temporal formulations often does nothing but 
conceal the politics of paranoia that is otherwise operative. Yet, going back to Butler's 
formulation, if democracy is like a “passion” that “must be undergone,” then what she is 
gesturing toward by placing unknowability at the heart of politics is not merely the 
reproduction of the same, but is instead a non-linear process that could only be 
characterized as an experiment. I end this section with a discussion of the forms that this 
experiment can take in resisting, subverting, and dismantling the politics of paranoia.
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According to Edelman, political discourse is marked precisely by what he calls 
“reproductive futurism,” which poses “an ideological limit on political discourse as such” 
through the image of the Child that signifies the future.202 The image of the Child, he 
writes, “invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought.”203 
The image of the Child, not to be confused with living, breathing children, is the figure that
not only “serves to regulate political discourse – to prescribe what will count as political 
discourse,”204 but also “marks the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity.”205 In this way, 
the liberal obsession with future is nothing more than “an erotically charged investment in 
the rigid sameness of identity that is central to the compulsory narrative of reproductive 
futurism”206 that fundamentally excludes queerness which marks the end of children and 
childhood. Ultimately providing a cop-out for progressive politics as “an always about-to-
be-realized identity,”207 the figure of the Child and the futurity it represents colonizes our 
entire political imaginary to its very fabric of being: “[W]e are no more able to conceive of 
a politics without a fantasy of the future than we are able to conceive of a future without the
figure of the Child.”208 Yet, for the sake of queer politics, Edelman argues that the Child “as
futurity's emblem must die” and we must acknowledge that “the future is mere repetition 
and just as lethal as the past.”209
The futurity that grounds Edelman's criticism of liberalism, however, is one that is 
thoroughly paranoiac. It is the kind of future that never ultimately brings about anything 










new, but merely reproduces the same, as a reproduction of the heteronormative order 
sanctioned through the sanctity of the figure of the Child whose sacralization “necessitates 
the sacrifice of the queer.”210 “And so what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and 
queerest despite us,” he concludes, “is this willingness to insist intransitively – to insist that
the future stop here.”211 It is not clear, however, why Edelman sees no alternative to the 
paranoid temporality that undergirds liberalism, other than the outright rejection of any 
sense of futurity. It is also not clear what queer politics would look like without any sort of 
recourse to the future. It seems as if Edelman mistakes the implied inevitability of paranoid 
temporality for actual inevitability, leaving politics forever stuck in a Groundhog Day-
esque universe of heteronormativity, with Sex Pistols' “God Save the Queen” endlessly 
playing in the background, whose closing refrain phrase “No Future” ironically became the
icon of the thoroughly commercialized band to whom Edelman pledges allegiance. Yet 
what gets us out of the loop of paranoid temporality is precisely the understanding that 
things could have been otherwise, that is, allowing for a sense of contingency that replaces 
necessity. Sedgwick notes that the logic that underlies paranoid temporality is in fact “a 
generational narrative that's characterized by a distinctly Oedipal regularity and 
repetitiveness”212: “it happened to my father's father, it happened to my father, it is 
happening to me, it will happen to my son, and it will happen to my son's son” is ultimately
no different than “[t]he dogged, defensive narrative stiffness of a paranoid temporality...in 
which yesterday can't be allowed to have differed from today and tomorrow must be even 
more so.”213 But it is precisely “a feature of queer possibility,” a feature of a politics of 
210 Ibid, 28.
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hope, that “our generational relations don't always proceed in this lockstep.”214 The work of
queer politics, then, for Sedgwick, takes place precisely at this conceptual space of 
contingency, where the inevitability of the repetition of the same is shown to be nothing but
illusion. Future, after all, bears the possibility of change; change that is not necessarily 
“more of the same.”
`Much like the figure of the Child in our political imaginary, who eventually grows 
up, becomes a productive citizen, gets married, and has children of their own (that is, 
reproduces the very heteronormative order they are destined to reproduce), “the future” 
denotes in decolonial thought, a magical realm where the underdeveloped countries finally 
become “like Europe.” Quijano writes that as a result of colonialism, “history was 
conceived as a evolutionary continuum from the primitive to the civilized; from the 
traditional to the modern; from the savage to the rational; from pro-capitalism to capitalism,
etc. And Europe thought of itself as the mirror of the future of all the other societies and 
cultures; as the advanced form of the history of the entire species. What does not cease to 
surprise, however, is that Europe succeeded in imposing that ‘mirage’ upon the practical 
totality of the cultures that it colonized; and, much more, that this chimera is still so 
attractive to so many.”215 The notion of linear progress that underlies Modernity is premised
on not only an understanding of western superiority but also the erasure of alterity and 
difference. The west denotes the only possible future for any non-western context that 
supposedly is “behind on things.” Moreover, the “underdeveloped” nations are often 
construed as “the past” of Europe, a sentiment often expressed by its western visitors via 
statements such as “It is like going back in time!” Dussel aims to rethink modernity not as a
214 Ibid.
215 Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” 176.
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property of Europe, but attends to the world history in order to show that while 
“undoubtedly a European occurrence,” it also “originates in a dialectical relation with non-
Europe.”216 He writes: “Modernity is a world phenomenon, commencing with the 
simultaneous constitution of Spain with reference to its periphery, Amerindia, including the
Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru. At the same time, Europe, with diachronic precedents in 
Renaissance Italy and Portugal, proceeds to establish itself as the center managing a 
growing periphery...When one conceives modernity as part of a center-periphery system 
instead of an independent European phenomenon, the meanings of modernity, its origin, 
development, present crisis, and its postmodern antithesis change.”217 He replaces, in other 
words, the linear temporal understanding that sets up Europe as the universal goal with that
of simultaneity which accounts for both intercultural exchange (that takes place within a 
context of domination) and alterity (that is systematically eradicated through colonization). 
The linear sense of history that comprises the ideas of progress is often understood in terms
of colonial/capitalist expansion and growth. Dussel's project of situating this narrative in 
history and showing its dependence on the “discovery, conquest, colonization, and 
integration of Amerindia – all of which give [Europe] an advantage over the Arab world, 
India, and China”218 allows a sense of historical contingency and opens up futurity to other 
possibilities. Europe is not a mirror for the future of the rest of the world and neither is the 
past for the future. Just as Beauvoir proclaims “biology is not destiny,” one may find solace
in the idea that neither is capitalism. It is time we dissociate the future from a paranoid 
temporal framework that understands progress in terms of imitation or the repetition of the 
same.
216 Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas (New York: Continuum, 1995), 9.
217 Ibid, 11. Emphasis in the original.
218 Ibid.
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Yet one must admit that this teleology of linear progress is quite a powerful 
narrative that is widely believed. The hegemonic relations set up by this history are not 
only overwhelming, but also seem all-encompassing, allowing for the exercise of no other 
alternative, thereby making hope seem like an indefensible joke that has no genuine place 
in the political. The kind of hope I see as politically relevant, however, is not a naïve, 
misguided attitude that leads to nowhere but to wishful thinking. It is a kind of vigilant, 
resistant hope that is attentive to all of these pitfalls associated with a politics of hope: that 
it can be misleading, useless, distracting, and so on. It is the kind of hope that accompanies 
the awareness that notions of hope have historically been used at the service of sanctioning 
the heteronormative order (as Edelman shows) as well as to establish and naturalize 
western superiority and non-western inferiority (as Quijano and Dussel show). It is not 
necessarily the opposite of despair, but indicates, perhaps, a persisting will to continue in 
the face of despair. It is perhaps the opposite of cynicism instead, which simply gives in to 
the order that it supposedly critiques, much like Edelman. And perhaps most importantly, it 
is the kind of hope that is committed to action; committed to an understanding that the 
future can be otherwise and collective action can make that happen. It is critical, defiant, 
irreverent. It is experimental and has a revolutionary impulse. It seeks not to distract, 
silence, manipulate, neutralize or to promote conformism. Its relation to the future is 
through imagining and seeking out better alternatives and bringing them into fruition. 
While paranoia is a totalizing mode that hinges on the foreclosure of surprise, 
suspicion, insofar as it is linked to critical possibilities for resistance, offers another 
alternative. As Billingsley suggests, hope can very well coexist with suspicion,219 and often 
times necessarily so at the service of liberatory politics. As Foucault puts it, his “point is 
219 Billingsley, “Hope in a Vice.”
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not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous.”220 Despite Sedgwick's 
contention that Foucault is “stuck in the paranoid logic of repression-liberation,”221 Lauren 
Guilmette's re-reading of Foucault as an affectively complex thinker suggests that he is a 
suspicious but not a paranoid thinker, precisely because, as Foucault puts it, “[i]f 
everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.”222 Foucault's genealogies 
are not intended to map out systems, structures or totalities of power, but instead document 
the development of certain techniques and procedures that serve particular functions and 
offer particular mechanisms for the practice of power. To say that there is always something
to do is quite a different disposition than that of the paranoid's, whose relation to the future 
is deterministic rather than open. While both attitudes may said to be concerned with future
possibilities, they involve different dispositions toward those possibilities: while the former
is one of control, the latter seeks critical possibilities for resistance. Hence I employ a 
Foucaultian method in my own thinking (and activism) as I take it to be a non-paranoid 
(and even an anti-paranoid) model, where suspicion is employed only as instrumental for a 
critical analysis used at the service of resistance. Foucault states: “So my position leads not 
to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.”223 It is my contention that we are in 
need of a revolutionary politics of hope that is both vigilant and critical, one that actively 
resists paranoid practices and seeks to imagine and create alternatives to rethink and 
transform politics. As Angela Davis notes, borrowing from Gramsci, pessimism of the 
intellect must be accompanied by the optimism of the will. “It is in collectivities,” she 
suggests, and not in individualistic thinking, “that we find reservoirs of hope and 
220 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 343.
221 Lauren Guilmette, “In What We Tend to Feel is Without History: Foucault, Affect, and the Ethics of 
Curiosity,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28, no. 3 (2014): 288.
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Resistant hope entails an attitude of openness, of wonder in the act of imagining 
alternatives, and a will to bring about change. Without hope, without the understanding that
things could have been otherwise, that is, a commitment to contingency rather than 
necessity (which need not be a metaphysical commitment, but a political one), there is no 
critique. Foucaultian critique which suspends judgment seeks not to evaluate but, as Judith 
Butler puts it, “to bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself.”225 Critique, 
Foucault writes, “is an instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor 
happen to be, it oversees a domain it would want to police and is unable to regulate.”226 The
question that critique traces for Foucault is “how not to be governed like that, by that, in the
name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such 
procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them.”227 In this way, the critical attitude is one
that is accompanied by a certain kind of hope, insofar as critique seeks to reveal “the limits 
of that epistemological horizon itself, making the contours of the horizon appear, as it 
were, for the first time, we might say, in relation to its own limit”228 in order to identify its 
points of fragility, tenuousness, and transformability. Butler writes: “One does not drive 
to the limits for a thrill experience, or because limits are dangerous and sexy, or because 
it brings us into a titillating proximity with evil. One asks about the limits of ways of 
knowing because one has already run up against a crisis within the epistemological field 
in which one lives.”229 There is, in other words, a sense of urgency involved in the work 
224 Angela Davis, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a 
Movement (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 49.
225 Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault's Virtue,” eipcp.net. Accessed: June 5, 2016. 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0806/butler/en
226 Foucault, “What is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007b), 42.
227 Ibid, 44.
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of critique which shows that “our reigning discourses have produced an impasse.”230 As 
resistant hope involves an attitude of openness and a revolutionary will, it guides critique 
in the task of facing these limits in an effort to map out “how not to be governed like 
that” and to create the conditions for the undoing of those discourses that sustain and 
uphold the practices of governance. Critique, in this context, as “the art of voluntary 
insubordination, that of reflected intractability”231 takes as its goal political transformation, 
and resistant hope embodies this commitment.
3.3 Conclusion: The Minority Report of Masculinity
In this chapter, I argued that preemptive practices around national security rely on 
a paranoid temporality which is committed to the elimination of all possible threats in the 
future, at times by making these “threats” actualize. No responsibility is assumed for 
actualization within this framework. That is to say, the agents of the politics of paranoia 
often deny the politics of decision, as they insist on the status of objectivity, necessity, 
and the inevitability of their practices. I suggested that these dynamics closely resemble 
the problematics we see in “The Minority Report.”
There is, however, another pertinent dimension in this short story that is in need 
of explication. The protagonist John A. Anderton is an aging man distressed in his 
anticipation that he will soon get replaced by his new assistant, Witwer. The story begins 
with the following words: “The first thought Anderton had when he saw the young man 
was: I'm getting bald. Bald and fat and old. But he didn't say it aloud. Instead, he pushed 
back his chair, got to his feet, and came resolutely around the side of his desk, his right 
hand rigidly extended. Smiling with forced amiability, he shook hands with the young 
230 Ibid.
231 Foucault, “What Is Critique?,” 47.
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man.”232 In this way, “The Minority Report” could be said to perform the Oedipal 
anxieties and the fear of emasculation of an aging man as he dreads the idea of getting 
older and unavoidably being replaced by a younger, more virile man. Upon receiving the 
card with his name as a “would-be” murderer, Anderton is convinced that he is being 
framed by Witwer, who is clearly determined to be the next head of Precrime. It is 
precisely through his anxieties around his masculinity that Anderton is looking at the 
situation. He suspects that his wife Lisa and Witwer are working together to frame him: 
“Warily, Anderton introduced his new associate. Lisa smiled in friendly greeting. Did a 
covert awareness pass between them? He couldn't tell. God, he was beginning to suspect 
everybody – not only his wife and Witwer, but a dozen members of his staff.”233 He even 
suspects that Witwer might be sleeping with his wife, as the fear of emasculation takes 
over: “Startled, Anderton backed off. What were the chances of his wife's friendliness 
being benign, accidental? Witwer would be present the balance of the evening, and would 
now have an excuse to trail along to Anderton's private residence. Profoundly disturbed, 
he turned impulsively, and moved toward the door.”234 “The Minority Report,” in this 
sense, is not only a story that explores the temporal paradox of predictive policing (that 
is, the question whether these detainees are criminals if they have not yet committed a 
crime), but it is also a story about masculinity, or more precisely, a crisis in masculinity. 
The kind of paranoia traced throughout the story by way of exploring the psyche of 
Anderton is one that is triggered by perceived threats against his sense of masculinity. 
“The Minority Report,” thereby, links paranoid thoughts and feelings, a paranoid sense of 
temporality and the preemptive practices that ensue, and masculinity itself, by offering a 




fictional account of a politics of paranoia as masculinist politics. In fact, at the end of the 
story, Anderton redeems his masculinity by sacrificing himself for the Precrime system, 
thereby becoming a hero. While his worst fear in the beginning was getting replaced by 
Witwer, he hands Precrime over to Witwer willingly, upon figuring out that what is at 
danger is not simply himself but his brilliant, life-long creation of a system that catches 
and imprisons people before they commit a crime. The next chapter examines the politics 
of paranoia as masculinist politics, by suggesting that the paranoid obsession with the 
future comes from an understanding of past laden with harm and trauma, which offers a 




The events that followed the September 11 attacks indicate a vindictive, 
militarized response to loss and trauma, marking the beginning of a global war on 
terrorism. On September 21, 2001, George Bush remarks during his State of the Union 
address: “Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief 
and anger we have found our mission and our moment.”235 The “mission” that emerges 
out of grief and anger elicited by such victimization, he explains, is waging a war on 
terror, without resting until every terrorist group in the world is annihilated: “Our war on 
terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”236 His rhetoric relays a 
sense of heroism, self-assuredness, and commitment that accompanies a discourse around 
victimization, much like in the Hollywood action movies of the 1980s that feature an 
indestructible powerful male figure who overcomes all the difficulties and always wins in 
the end, no matter how impossible the circumstances may seem. In fact, some of his 
statements could very well have been directly taken out of one of these movies that 
reflect the Cold War anxieties of the era and the construction of the figure of a powerful 
American hero who would mitigate those anxieties: “Whether we bring our enemies to 
justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done...Our nation – this generation 
– will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the 
world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and 
we will not fail.”237





Justice, in this context, is retributive: it is about making those who are responsible 
pay. Retributive justice is offered as the necessary or natural outcome of the linking of a 
victimization discourse to American exceptionalism, highlighting loss and harm whilst 
illustrating a picture of a heroic nation, the guarantor of world's freedom, that brings its 
enemies to its knees. For many national security states (which non-coincidentally also 
happen to be heavily militarized states), the notion of retributive justice embodied in the 
linking between the victimization discourse and recourse to sovereignty (the supreme 
power that the state holds) is commonplace. Much of the rhetoric around counter-terrorism 
measures undertaken in different parts of the world attests to this phenomenon, and in 
particular, the discursive practices around the global war on terrorism employed by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Turkey. The justifications offered for the 
Israeli control and occupation of Gaza, which Noam Chomsky has called “the world's 
largest open-air prison, where some 1.5 million people on a roughly 140-square-mile strip 
of land are subject to random terror and arbitrary punishment, with no purpose other than to
humiliate and degrade,”238 offers one such example. Binyamin Netanyahu's recent proposal 
that the families of Palestinian attackers to be expelled to Gaza as part of preemptive 
measures that would “lead to a significant decrease in terrorist attacks”239 (which closely 
resembles the logic behind the arbitrary post-9/11 deportations of Muslims) is also 
indicative of this linking. Another recent example includes Turkey's criminalization of the 
group Academics for Peace, which issued a statement entitled “We Will Not Be a Party to 
This Crime,” condemning the war in southeast Turkey and demanding that the state of 
238 Noam Chomsky, “The World's Largest Open Air Prison,” Truth Out, November 9, 2012. Accessed: July 
22, 2016. http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/12635-noam-chomsky-my-visit-to-gaza-the-worlds-
largest-open-air-prison
239 “Netanyahu calls for expulsion of the Palestinian attackers' families to Gaza,” The Guardian, March 3, 
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Turkey abandons “its deliberate massacre and deportation of Kurdish and other peoples 
in the region.”240 This criminalization has taken place by way of charging the group with 
“lending support to terrorism,” as the statement condemns only state violence and not the 
violence perpetuated by “terrorists.” Held accountable for what they did not state, many 
of the signatories of this statement have been fired, suspended, arrested, sued, and are 
subjected to investigation or disciplinary action. The Turkish state claimed to have been 
victimized by this statement, this call for peace, and sought justice retributively, while the 
AKP administration responded to the recent terror attacks in Turkey (seven to be exact, 
since June 2015) by escalating the retaliatory military operations, which have been shown 
only to result in more terror attacks and civilian deaths. All of these measures are 
indicative of an underlying political rationality encompassed by the notion I have called a 
politics of paranoia. They are cut from the same cloth, in that the justificatory 
mechanisms for each bespeak a violent response to harm (real or perceived) that is taken 
to be necessary. Retributive justice, in this way, constitutes a tenet of the politics of 
paranoia, grounding the practices around securitization.
Thus far, I have given an analysis this logic of securitization by examining its 
relation to the processes of racialization as linked to an assemblage of biopower and 
sovereign power. These practices, however, are also gendered: underlying this logic is a 
particular understanding of masculinity, equated to power and formulated in conjunction 
with militarism. In this chapter, I argue that not only the political response to harm (a 
vindictive, violent response, a response through militarization), but also the way in which 
trauma is experienced as well as the language through which that experience is articulated 
240 Academicians for Peace, “We Will Not Be a Party to This Crime!,” Europe Solidaire, January 10, 2016. 
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is gendered, pointing to a masculinist framework that undergirds political discourse and 
practice. In the context of the September 11 attacks, Vaheed Ramazani writes: “Whether 
or not one wishes to accord any significance to the phallic iconicity of the World Trade 
Center, it is obvious from the administration's pronouncements following the attacks that 
the collapse of the Towers was experienced as emasculating.”241 While the press has 
preferred to use the term “humiliating” “to describe the sudden wound to our national 
pride,”242  as Ramazani puts it, the wound is experienced as “emasculating” insofar as the 
masculine identification of the nation, understood in terms of impermeability, is called 
into question. Ramazani's reading of mainstream political discourse yields that in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, healing requires sex reassignment surgery, 
whereby the nation is turned “from  the passive (female) recipient of a violating 
aggression into the virile progenitor of world solidarity.”243 Retributive justice that 
grounds the War on Terror is situated precisely within this gendered political framework, 
which resembles, as Ramazani points out, “the Hollywood revenge plot,”244 which 
frequently makes use of a hypermasculine hero figure to save the day.
Drawing from the historical production of hegemonic masculinity and extending 
that onto the level of the nation, Bush is the embodiment of  a distinctively American 
understanding of manhood in that he conjoins a “1950s cowboy rhetoric”245 with good old 
fashioned white saviorism that has led to a borderless, never-ending war whereby the 
nation not only assumed the position of a hero who, in his words, “will lift a dark threat 
241 Vaheed Ramazani, “September 11: Masculinity, Justice, and the Politics of Empathy,” Comparative 
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of violence,” but also of a hero who is set out to save “the damsels-in-distress” (i.e 
Afghan women). The historical account of masculinity provided by Michael Kimmel 
shows that the development of capitalism in the United States from the nineteenth 
century on has rendered masculinity fragile and that the economic insecurity brought onto 
American men paired with the growing disillusionment with the status of power that 
masculinity supposedly denotes has created a new phase in the hegemonic form of 
masculinity where it is produced as threatened and thereby in need of constant 
affirmation: “Beginning in the early part of the nineteenth century, the idea of testing and 
proving one's manhood became one of the defining experiences in American men's 
lives.”246 In this context, the events that followed the September 11 attacks reflect these 
anxieties that emanate from the condition of masculinity as that which is fragile, yet 
whose survival depends on the denial of that very fragility. The sovereign nation which 
“builds itself on the conceit of its own inviolability”247 draws from this paradoxical 
formulation of masculinity and seeks retribution in an attempt to reassert its status, a 
status of power understood as domination. 
Yet the masculine identification of the nation and retribution as a gendered model 
of justice are hardly peculiar to the United States, given that the War on Terror has 
become globalized, and relatedly, securitization as directly or indirectly linked to 
militarization has been on the rise. Bush's macho “charm” continues to reign in other 
parts of the world today, most notably in Putin's Russia and Erdogan's Turkey, a “charm” 
that is the epitome of masculinist politics strongly upholding the operations of a politics 




specific, but also plural, and accordingly, the specific formulations of national 
masculinity that describes a gendered identity that the nation-state assumes may vary, one 
must also note that within the context of global militarization, where the political 
rationality of the politics of paranoia are embraced by many nation-states, certain 
meanings of masculinity as linked to securitization and militarization exceed national 
borders and are carried over onto different contexts. There is, in other words, a “spilling” 
of masculinity taking place, wherein masculinity is (re)formulated in conjunction with 
securitization/militarization. At the intersection of militarism and masculinity, there is an 
economy of desire at work that has resulted in a tripartite alignment: an equation of 
political power with masculinity, masculinity with domination, and power with 
domination. In many cases, the figure of the militarized masculine constitutes a metonym 
for the nation-state: the all-powerful, yet wounded; strong, yet hurt; sovereign, yet 
compromised. What gets carried over transnationally is this paradoxical formulation of 
masculinity as inviolable yet violated that stands for the nation-state, a nation-state for 
which the measures to be taken in the name of securitization have become necessary, 
unavoidable, and inevitable. The figure of the militarized masculine is grounded in a 
masculinist political framework that offers retributive justice as the only viable option, 
foreclosing any other possibilities. Militarized masculinity is vindictive, in that it relies 
on the necessity of violence in responding to harm, despite the devastating effects that 
follow. He is the man of “at all costs,” standing for a sovereign nation-state of “by all 
means necessary.”
I investigate the transnational resonance of this figure in three different moments, 
each offering a spectacle on militarized masculinity: the (re)production of the post-9/11 
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paranoiac masculinity in the television series American Dad!, the aestheticization of 
violence through the narrativization of militarized masculinity in the photographs from 
Turkey's very own War on Terror, and a Daesh militant's testimony. Each of these 
performances offer a linkage between masculinity and militarism, a linkage that is 
presented as necessary, inevitable, and also desirable. My argument is not that the 
operations of militarized masculinity are one and the same regardless of the context. I 
instead attend to the complex interconnectivities between these different moments and the 
interesting ways in which they echo one another, suggesting a crisscrossing, rather than a 
unified global structure. Each of the examples that I take up offer a discourse around an 
experience of a “wound,” of harm and trauma, that brings about a crisis of masculinity, 
against which masculinity must be restored through the infliction of violence. These 
instances thereby reveal militarized masculinity to be a paranoiac formulation in that its 
self-identity is linked to a threat that it seeks to annihilate through violence. What it 
wages a war against is the very limits to its own inviolability, the limits that have become 
much salient and impossible to ignore. There is, furthermore, a masculinist economy of 
desire at work politically that legitimizes, and even celebrates, these practices of 
retributive justice, where the infliction of violence is aligned with power and domination. 
By drawing these connections, I do not wish to erase the particular and culturally specific 
ways in which militarized masculinity operates nor do I wish to essentialize it by 
suggesting a necessary or natural link between masculinity and militarism. On the 
contrary, I wish to problematize and denaturalize such links, offering this analysis as an 
invitation to consider the similar logics in which militarized masculinities work in 
different contexts, as they uphold the operations of a politics of paranoia.
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4.1 The Wounded Male Ego: Victimization and Retributive Justice
In responding to the September 11 attacks, Bush's victimization discourse has 
served as a legitimating ground for military action. Judith Butler writes: “We now see that 
the national border was more permeable than we thought. Our general response is 
anxiety, rage; a radical desire for security, a shoring-up of the borders against what is 
perceived as alien; a heightened surveillance of Arab peoples and anyone who looks 
vaguely Arab in the dominant racial imaginary.”248 This “radical desire for security” and 
the practices that followed, including surveillance, detention, deportation, and war, are 
linked to a desire to restore sovereignty, understood in a gendered fashion. These 
practices are situated in the history of the nation-state as marked by masculinity, wherein 
masculinity and sovereignty are both understood in terms of a  denial of violability. 
Accounts by Susan Faludi and Michael Kimmel show an overlap between hegemonic 
masculinity in the aftermath of the World War II as that which constantly needs to be 
tested and proven and the self-identification of the nation-state. Kimmel writes: “We 
cannot understand manhood without understanding American history. But I believe we 
also cannot fully understand American history without understanding masculinity. How 
has American history been shaped by the efforts to test and prove manhood – the wars we 
Americans have waged, the frontier we have tamed, the work we have done, the leaders 
we admire?”249 Kimmel's account of masculinity shows that the will to dominate arises as 
a compensation for the fear that emerges when masculinity is threatened. In these 
moments of crisis, masculinity is that which needs to be secured, asserted, and reclaimed. 
Masculinity, at this historical juncture, is a paranoiac achievement insofar as it is marked 
248 Butler, “Indefinite Detention,” 39.
249 Michael Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2.
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by a threat that in turn constitutes it. Although this achievement is based on a denial of 
vulnerability, it remains ever vulnerable, for it is haunted by a constant endangerment that 
makes up its conditions of possibility. The paradox of the wounded male ego is in its 
claim to imperviousness despite its inherent fragility. Its weakness, in other words, lies in 
the denial of its weakness and the inability to cope with the fact of its own vulnerability. 
Yet this is not simply a psychological state from which men suffer under patriarchy. We 
see this operate politically when events such as 9/11 produce a crisis of masculinity 
which calls for the reassertion of dominance through militarized means.
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to show that securitization works 
through racialization in efforts to affirm and consolidate a biopolitical order. These 
practices (of expulsion) also serve to gender the nation, in that they are linked to a 
masculine national identification, whereby “sovereign masculinity,” to borrow from 
Bonnie Mann, seeks to deny “its own constitutive injurability” and attempts to “relocate 
injurability in the other.”250 While this phenomenon, the paradoxical formulation of the 
inviolable yet wounded masculinity, has largely been explored in its framing of the 
political within the United States,251 I would like to suggest that it finds resonance outside 
of the United States as well, especially in other militarized contexts. The linkage between 
sovereignty and masculinity has farther implications that are manifested transnationally, 
such that the political gets marked by masculinity seen as power seen as domination in 
the context of militarization. There is, in other words, a transnational import of the trope 
of the wounded male ego that resonates beyond the confines of national borders, as it 
serves as a ground of justification for retributive justice through militarized action. 
250 Mann citing Judith Butler: Sovereign Masculinity, 3-4.
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109
Such import can be observed in Israel's use of the victimization discourse to 
justify its military operations in Gaza, including “carrying out extensive air attacks...and 
authorizing a major call-up of army reserves for an extended campaign against 
militants.”252 We are led to believe, as Waleed Ahmeed ironically puts, that “[t]he peace-
loving nation of Israel is yet again at the brink of an existential annihilation due to home 
made rocket attacks from Gaza.”253 In 2014, during a period of escalation of the conflict, 
Israel's Minister of Justice Tzipi Livni stated that although Israel is reluctant to carry out 
a ground operation, they are prepared to do so if necessary. She stated: “If Hamas does 
not allow Israelis to live in peace, and then we too will be forced to carry out actions that 
we don't fundamentally wish to perform, and that are not our primary goal.”254 Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu stated in response to the rocket fires: “Hamas will pay a heavy 
price for firing on Israeli citizens...Our army is strong, the home-front is firm, and our 
people are united. That combination is our answer to the terrorist organizations that want 
to harm us...We are all united in the aim of hitting the terrorist organizations and restoring 
the quiet.”255 Here, again, a recourse to sovereignty accompanies a victimization 
discourse, where Israel's self-victimization serves as the legitimating ground for military 
action despite the important asymmetries between Israel and Hamas (while Israel 
receives $3.1 billion in aid from the United States – almost all of which is in the form of 
military assistance – Hamas has a budget of $70 million, most of which is devoted to 
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social services). Simona Sharoni's account in Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
shows that hegemonic masculinity in Israel is heavily militarized and closely linked to a 
sense of nationalism. Insofar as the critical components of militarized masculinity in the 
context of Israel are comprised of “emotional toughness” and “readiness to sacrifice one's 
life for the homeland,”256 one may suggest that such formulation of masculinity intersects 
with an understanding of sovereignty as expressed in Netanyahu's statement by way of 
alluding to military power, presenting, again, the tripartite equation of masculinity-
power-domination.257
Similarly, the exploitation and manipulation of grief through the figure of “the 
weeping mother” and the spectacle of mourning for the soldiers who died during the 
military operations against the Kurdish liberation movement PKK in southeast Turkey 
poses a comparable situation. While these spectacles of mourning are used as a basis to 
justify further military operations, which would result in more casualties, the discourse 
around “martyrdom” in Turkey serves as a form of emotional manipulation to misplace 
the burden of responsibility. Mourning, in other words, serves to justify violence, even 
though the cause of mourning is nothing other than violence. It is the state that must 
assume responsibility for these deaths as they refuse to continue peace negotiations and 
choose instead to sacrifice uneducated, low income young men who are unable to buy 
their way out of the compulsory military service. Accompanying such victimization 
discourse is often a rhetoric of nationalism about the greatness of the Turkish nation, 
256 Simona Sharoni, Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 44.
257 The Queer BDS group Pinkwatching Israel's attempts at problematizing the pinkwashing of Israel (that 
is, in their words, the efforts to “transform public perception of Israel from an Apartheid settler state to a 
harmless, liberal, gay-friendly playground by juxtaposing this false image with a portrayal of 
Palestinian and Arab societies as backwards, repressive and intolerant”) show the importance of 
recognizing this link between (hetero)masculinity and sovereignty, and resisting the allure of 
homonationalism. For more information, please see: http://www.pinkwatchingisrael.com/about-us/
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understood in a gendered fashion.258 In the third section of this chapter, I explore this 
conjunction further as is manifest in the aesthetic production of militarized masculinity in 
the ongoing war in Turkey.
The use of the victimization discourse in order to legitimate violence through a 
linkage of sovereignty and masculinity is not peculiar to nation-states either. In the 
documentary Vice News released on Daesh, we see a former resident of Belgium who 
joined Daesh, asking his very young son: “Who is over there [in Belgium],” to which his 
son answers, “Infidels.” He asks again, “Why do we kill the infidels? What have infidels 
done?” His son responds:“They kill Muslims.” The man then turns to the camera: “God 
willing the Caliphate has been established, and we are going to invade you as you 
invaded us. We will capture your women as you captured our women. We will orphan 
your children as you orphaned our children.” When he is uttering the words “as you 
orphaned our children,” his voice cracks and he begins crying. He continues: “I swear to 
God my brothers, we are living in joy that I can't describe.”
Other Daesh militants seem to share this vindictive sentiment given that many of 
them came from Europe to join Daesh, where they lived in segregated Muslim 
communities in the face of growing Islamophobia. Of course, the report the United Nations
released last year shows that Daesh has killed far more Muslims than any other group, as 
the fundamentalist Wahhabi doctrine that they propagate dictates that the apostates (those 
who diverged from “true Islam”) be executed.259 But these contradictions aside, this 
258 For a historical account of the gendering of the Turkish nation, please see: Ibrahimhakkioglu, “Beyond 
the Modern/Religious Dichotomy: The Veil and Feminist Solidarity in Contemporary Turkey,” 
Philosophical Topics 41. no. 2 (2013): 131-156.
259 For statistics, please see: “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July-10 
September 2014,” Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and United 




particular reclaiming of power not only resonates with the Bush administration's response 
to the September 11 attacks (which in some sense had led to the Daesh's unforeseen success
in the region over a decade later when they got a hold of the weaponry left in Iraq by the 
United States), but it also embodies the trope of wounded masculinity, which in turns need 
to be reasserted through militarized means. In this case, marginalization has translated into 
a sense of emasculation where masculinity/sovereignty needs to be restored. This man 
understands his mission to be one of resistance, justified by his prior victimization. The 
victimization discourse, laying the ground for the necessity of retributive justice, serves to 
perpetuate the vicious cycle of violence. Derrida writes: 
[A]ll terrorism presents itself as a response in a situation that continues to 
escalate. It amounts to saying, 'I am resorting to terrorism as a last resort, 
because the other is more terrorist than I am; I am defending myself, 
counterattacking; the real terrorist, the worst, is the one who will have 
deprived me of every other means of responding before presenting 
himself, the first aggressor, as a victim.' It is in this way that the United 
States, Israel, wealthy nations, and colonial or imperialist powers are 
accused of practicing state terrorism and thus of being 'more terrorist' than 
the terrorists of whom they say they are the victims.260
While Derrida pinpoints the danger of the victimization discourse that serves to 
justify retributive justice, one must recognize that masculinity is central to these practices 
and thereby key to their undoing as well. Masculinity, in these instances, is claimed as a 
compensation for a loss. It promises empowerment in the face of powerlessness. Of 
course, there are important differences in these two cases. The U.S. enjoys a privileged 
260 Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, 107. Emphasis in the original.
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position as the world's superpower, whose violability was unfathomable before the 
September 11 attacks. The hegemonic masculine identity it assumes had been based on a 
blindness to its own permeability, where it has built itself “on the conceit of its own 
inviolability.”261 The securitization measures in this sense also serve as an attempt, a wish 
perhaps, to go back to this original blissful state of ignorance, while perpetually 
reminding us of the loss of that state and the impossibility of going back. While in the 
case of Daesh, the militants do not speak from a lost position of privilege that they seek 
to restore, but instead from a position of subjugation for which they seek revenge. There 
is no symmetry here. While the recounting of the sense of violation and the experience of 
permeability display important differences, visibility offers another point of divergence: 
the trauma that the September 11 attacks caused is also linked to the sudden, disruptive 
visibility of that which had been previously unfathomable. For the Daesh militants who 
recount their stories in the documentary, there was nothing invisible about their 
permeability, it was made clear to them on a daily basis. Based on these testimonies, the 
discourse is marked by a sense of powerlessness, in the face of which power is sought, as 
opposed to the discourse offered by Bush, in which the rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism is conjoined with an account of victimization. Even though both accounts 
seem to be marked by a sense of masculine pride, the repudiation of vulnerability takes 
place on a different register in each case: while this repudiation serves as an attempt to 
reassert an irresistible position of dominance in the case of the United States, the claiming 
of masculinity coincides with laying claim to power from a place of powerlessness in the 
case of Daesh. Militarization in both cases serves to establish what Mann calls “sovereign 
masculinity” by way of banishing vulnerability, which in turn is relocated in the body of the
261 Mann, Sovereign Masculinity, 3.
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Other. This paranoiac formulation of masculinity comprises the framework that undergirds 
militarization as well as other practices of expulsion. Both cases suggest a political 
deployment of a paranoiac formulation of masculinity, as an abjection of vulnerability and 
its violent projection onto the Other.
Despite the fact that Daesh militants justify their cause as a response to 
oppression, perhaps even as an anti-colonial project of sorts (though not quite in these 
words), the power to which they lay claim is of course false and misguided as they 
continue their massacres in efforts to destroy what is perhaps the only viable alternative 
to western imperialism and capitalism in the region, the democratic confederate structure 
in Rojava. By attempting to dismantle the master's house with the master's tools, to 
borrow from Audre Lorde, this project that is implicitly formulated as anti-colonial is 
anything but decolonial. As Daesh continues its invasion, occupation, and colonial 
expansion in the region by destroying various communities, they are very much caught 
up within the capitalist/imperialist machinery against which they supposedly wage a war. 
As Gloria Anzaldúa suggests, “We need a new masculinity and the new man needs a 
movement.”262 As the crisis that comes out of wounded masculinity continues to bring 
about more destruction, retributive justice is in need of a replacement by better 
alternatives that can undo its rhetorical force and bring about global justice. As the 
linkage of masculinity and sovereignty saturates the political field on a transnational level 
and comprises the horizon through which political practices attain their meaning and 
legitimacy, the political is in dire need of being divested from the paranoiac formulations 
of masculinity that uphold the workings of a politics of paranoia.
In the next section, I examine the particular formulations of paranoiac masculinity 
262 Ibid, 106.
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in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States through an analysis of 
the television series American Dad!. By engaging with Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-
Oedipus, I suggest that there is an economy of desire at work that valorizes a particular 
kind of masculinity politically, and it is through such economy that paranoiac masculinity 
attains its political legitimacy and desirability.
4.2 American Dad! and the Post-9/11 Paranoiac Masculinity
Suggesting that paranoia today has become synonymous with theory itself, where 
the male paranoiac in particular is seen as the embodiment of a great thinker, Sianne Ngai 
writes: “[T]he male conspiracy theorist seems to have become an exemplary model for 
the late twentieth-century theorist in general, and conspiracy theory a viable synecdoche 
for 'theory' itself.”263 In a similar vein, one may suggest that in the context of ever-
expanding securitization, the political too is in danger of becoming synonymous with 
paranoiac masculinism. While the figure of the paranoiac male is ubiquitous within 
popular culture in television series like The X Files and 24 (and now with the more recent 
series Homeland Security it is a woman who occupies this position), nowhere does it 
become more salient, perhaps, than in the animated television series American Dad!. The 
protagonist Stan Smith, the “American Dad,” is a satirical embodiment of post-9/11 
paranoiac masculinity. The series also takes up the theme of paranoia by paying homage 
to many established conspiracy theories, like the existence of aliens (Stan Smith lives 
with an alien named Roger whom he rescued from Area 51) and top secret, bizarre CIA 
experiments (including memory erasure and switching the brain of an East German ski-
jumper with that of a goldfish so that East Germany would not win the 1986 Winter 




Stan is a hypermasculine, neoconservative Republican CIA agent, living with his 
wife and two children. He is portrayed as a thoughtless, inconsiderate man who does not 
shy away from getting what he wants by coercing others at gunpoint. Although his 
overbearing personality is often the cause of contention between him and his family 
members, his disposition is also shown as what makes him a great CIA agent and a strong 
role model for his son. Stan takes pride in his virility, which is depicted in terms of 
physical perfection, specialized skills, relentless suspicion, deep voice, and emotional 
detachment. In the episode “Rodger Codger,”  he informs his son Steve who is taken 
aback by his father's lack of emotions upon the death of a dear friend: “Son, feelings are 
what women have. They come from their ovaries.” It is common for Stan to make such 
sexist remarks as his performance of excessive, aggressive masculinity is often contrasted 
with the sensible role that his wife Francine plays in their marriage. By the end of that 
same episode, it is revealed that Stan was simply repressing his feelings in order not to be 
ridiculed by his co-workers, who later mock him for being “a lady” when he gets 
emotional during a therapy session. On the show, masculinity is often shown to be a 
performance or “a guise,” to borrow from Jackson Katz, which is rendered humorous: 
“Sorry I'm late,” Stan Smith says in the same episode as he walks into a meeting, “I was 
getting a piping hot cup of coffee. It's far too hot to drink, but luckily my leathery man 
mouth can take it.” Parody and humor, in this sense, work to denaturalize masculinity, as 
it is rendered ridiculous to the point of meaninglessness. Yet masculnity is also valorized 
and made desirable in other ways, as Stan never manages to completely overcome his 
macho tendencies. Even when Stan's hegemonic masculinity is ironized – like in the Pilot 
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episode when Stan attempts to help his son impress a girl by stealing her purse so his son 
can catch him and save the day, but gets carried away and starts tackling everyone on his 
way, bursting through a window after performing some incredible acrobatic moves, 
landing on a car and finally running off to leave Steve behind (in the next scene, he 
admits, “Okay, I got a little carried away,” with a bunch of glass stuck on his face) – he is 
still depicted as an exceptional man with an incredible set of skills and abilities, albeit a 
little too ardent perhaps. Although Stan's character is a parody of paranoiac masculinity, it 
is much less a critique of it in the true sense of the word, in that his heroism is shown to 
be undeniable in the narrative. 
Stan is also a self-proclaimed patriot who would do anything for his country and 
is obsessed with his mission of catching terrorists. This obsession instigates his incessant 
paranoia where he always anticipates a terror attack to take place particularly in his 
suburban neighborhood. He suspects even his own daughter Haley in the pilot episode, 
who unlike her father holds left-wing views, tackling her to the ground when the alarm 
sounds as she walks into their house. He finds an unidentified object upon frisking her, 
which Haley informs him is just a pack of gum. He runs outside, throws the pack of gum 
really far, holds his ears, waiting for an explosion, which never comes. “Alright, it is 
gum,” he says, finally convinced. The show often depicts the ridiculousness of the 
measures taken in the name of securitization, thereby problematizing the logic of 
inevitability and necessity that often accompany these. Moreover, the narrative often 
links these measures fittingly to Stan's sense of masculinity, as Stan feels like a “real 
man” only insofar as he can keep his family and his country safe. Stan's sense of 
manhood, in other words, is very much linked to his commitment to the mission of 
118
national security and its securitizing measures. He takes this mission very seriously and 
often to the point of excess, as he is prone to get carried away with his delusions. A 
stereotypical white cis heterosexual male CIA agent, he is also depicted as a racist and as 
completely ignorant and politically incorrect, though, again, in a tongue-in-cheek fashion. 
In the episode “Homeland Insecurity,” convinced that the Iranian couple who live on his 
street are terrorists, he turns his backyard into a detention center for all the neighbors 
living on his block. “So, what part of Islam do you hail from?,” he asks his neighbor. 
“My parents were from Iran, I was born in Cleveland,” his neighbor answers. Stan 
responds: “We also have a Cleveland here in America. It'd be super if you didn't blow it 
up.” Parodying the “guilty until proven innocent” rule that Homeland Security adopted 
after the September 11 attacks with respect to the Muslim communities living in the 
United States (a principle that was sanctioned by legislation like the Patriot Act), he poses 
the following rhetorical question to Haley who tells him that what he is doing is racial 
profiling: “They're trying to destroy us and you want proof?” 
Stan's paranoiac masculinity is not only tied to his racist prejudice, but also his 
sexist remarks. “Check out what I bought online,” Stan urges his coworker in the Pilot 
episode, “It’s a pencil, and the eraser is stuck up Bin Laden's pooper. Best 40 bucks I ever 
spent.” While the audience laughs at his silliness and immaturity, it is worth noting that 
this remark also brings to mind all the sexualized ways that the U.S. soldiers tortured 
prisoners as shown by the leaked Abu Ghraib prison photographs (as well as the 
prisoners' testimonies), all the while cheerfully smiling and giving thumbs up to the 
camera, apparently amused by the pain and humiliation that they are inflicting. The 
laughter, in this context, partakes in that violence; it is complicit in cruelty. While humor 
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can be used to problematize and deconstruct, it can also be used to normalize, obscure or 
cover up, and in this case, it serves to trivialize the violence by disburdening it of its 
ethical weight. American Dad! serves as no more than a comical relief to the severe 
consequences of securitization and the War on Terror borne by others, thereby 
perpetuating the violence it supposedly parodies. 
However, while various forms of paranoiac masculinity are by and large valorized 
in popular culture, in this particular satirical production, Stan Smith is hardly your typical 
invincible hero. On the contrary, he often becomes the butt of the joke whenever he acts 
on his delusions. He is almost always wrong in his suspicions and often makes a fool of 
himself in the process (he is, after all, supposed to be the incarnation of a Bush-esque 
type of masculinity, the masculine embodiment of George Bush's “Mission 
Accomplished”). Toward the end of the episode “Homeland Insecurity,” for instance, he 
is convinced that he is the terrorist and begins torturing himself in order to extract 
information. He is often depicted as a ridiculous character whose suspicions lack any 
sense. “Francine, you be careful when out there today,” he warns his wife in the pilot, 
“we're at terror alert orange! Which means something could go down somewhere in some 
way at some point in time, so look sharp!” Shortly thereafter, the toasts are ready in the 
toaster, and the popping sound sets Stan off, who immediately takes out his gun and 
begins shooting the toaster, the entire family is taken aback and staring at him in shock. 
“It's just toast, dad,” his daughter proclaims, to which he responds, “This time it was 
toast, Haley...This time!” 
In the world of Stan, anything can go down anywhere at any point, and one needs 
to be prepared. Of course it is rather unclear what 'being prepared' entails other than a 
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particular affective disposition that renders everything suspect – as my friends asked me 
when I told them to be safe after the latest terror attack in Ankara, “how, exactly?” Yet 
from where Stan stands, far from constituting a ridiculous act, shooting the toaster was an 
act of necessity, for what if it wasn't just toast, but an actual threat? The possibility of 
threat renders the entirety of the world threatening. While we saw how this logic is 
operative in preemptive practices in Chapter 2, we also saw that this type of reasoning 
holds up in court, legitimizing the sting operations as an essential part of securitization, 
despite the fact that no data exist to back up this claim. Yet here, in this scene in 
particular (and many others throughout the series), the absurdity of such logic is shown in 
Stan's exclamation, “This time it was toast!” This constitutes a moment of critical 
political commentary, a depiction of how ill-founded and ridiculous paranoiac reasoning 
in actuality is. (Although, I must note, again, the violence involved in these practices is 
often severely downplayed in the show, to the point where this downplaying becomes a 
form of violence).
Of course, one must remember that Stan Smith is a parody – the real Stan Smiths 
of the world are much less delusional paranoiacs who shoot at everything (I guess 
sometimes they can be) than bureaucrats simply going about “business as usual” in a 
paranoiac political order. What Stan Smith parodies is not the individual disposition of 
agents working for the CIA or any other governmental institution for that matter which 
concerns itself with matters of national security, but rather the logic beneath the rhetoric 
around national security and the practices that follow. Although his point of view is often 
delegitimized as he is forced to face his own delusions as the events unfold, he still 
continues to hold much authority simply by virtue of being a strong, capable man and a 
121
silly, lovable character. In this sense, one may very well read Stan Smith as situated 
within the historical lineage of post-Cold War American heroes in Hollywood 
productions, the characters that are played by Arnold Schwarzenegger, Jean Claude van 
Damme, Sylvester Stallone, who embody the epitome of masculinity as men who are able 
to “get the job done.” Stan too “gets the job done” and performs grandeur displays of 
virility albeit in a tongue-in-cheek fashion, like in the Pilot episode when he is shown to 
be admiring his perfect physique in the mirror, flexing in his white underpants. While he 
is not necessarily a respectable character in the traditional sense, he is still valorized by 
virtue of being a capable agent who performs his duties and in the end, manages to save 
the day, much like the 1980s American heroes, with the addition of being almost always 
wrong about everything. Yet, as J. Halberstam points out, “Though we both punish and 
naturalize female stupidity, we not only forgive stupidity in white men, but we often 
cannot recognize it as such since white maleness is the identity construct most often 
associated with mastery, wisdom, and grand narratives.”264 Stan's stupidity, far from 
suggesting an epistemic illegitimacy, often gets folded into his masculine mastery 
whereby he emerges as heroic. Richard Butsch's analysis of  the depictions of working-
class men on network television family series from 1946 to 2004 shows that Stan's 
position is far from peculiar. While these men were shown to be “typically well 
intentioned, even lovable,” they were also “dumb, immature, irresponsible, and lacking in 
common sense.”265 In this sense, even though Stan as a parody of paranoiac masculinity 
offers some critical moments for the challenging of some of the ideals of masculinity and 
their political import, overall, his characterization hardly deconstructs these narratives 
264 J. Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 55.
265 Richard Butsch, “Ralph, Fred, Archie, Homer, and the King of Queens: Why Television Keeps Re-
Creating the Male Working-Class Buffoon,” Gender, Race, and Class in Media: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Gail Dines and Jean M. Humez. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011), 101.
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that not only grant epistemic legitimacy (if not authority) to white male stupidity, he also 
makes it charming and adorable. 
The danger that is involved in this rendering can be observed in the massive 
support such figures who embody white male stupidity receive. George Bush's observed 
failures as a masculine figure and perceived stupidity existed alongside his atrocious 
political approach that accompanied his macho cowboyisms. A similar association can 
also be observed in the presumptive GOP nominee Donald Trump's 2016 presidential 
campaign, throughout which he has continuously made sexist, racist, and ableist remarks 
as he was defending border security and anti-immigration policies, all the while, of 
course, talking about his penis size and how “hot” his daughter is on national television. 
The figure of the wall-building billionaire hero keeping the nation secure no doubt is a 
strong selling point for millions of U.S. Americans who find this foul-mouthed, 
aggressive man who often seems to have no idea what he is doing to be charming, 
powerful, and accessible. What this form of masculinity relays is a sense of power. While 
Linda Alcoff has attributed the strong showing of Trump to the epistemology of 
ignorance as one of the tenets of whiteness266 (which is going to be central to the 
discussion around affect in the next chapter), there is also a certain economy of desire at 
work that is linked to the valorization of masculinity, and in this case, the valorization of 
white male stupidity, in particular. What a presidential candidate who embodies this 
epistemic ideal promises is a sense of empowerment, in a context where power is linked 
to (racial) domination. One might say that in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, 
the politics around securitization has become closely linked to masculinity where this link 
266 Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Why Trump is Still Here,” The Philosophical Salon, February 8, 2016. 
Accessed: May 24, 2016. http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/why-trump-is-still-here/.
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now serves as a selling point in electoral politics. While Trump is seen as a joke by many 
– and he is, though a deadly serious one, – Maria Alekhina of the Russian feminist punk 
rock collective Pussy Riot stated: “When Putin came to his first term or second term, 
nobody [in Russia] actually thought that this is serious. Everybody was joking about it. 
And nobody could imagine that after five, six years, we would have a war in Ukraine, 
annexation of Crimea, and these problems in Syria...Everybody [is] joking about Donald 
Trump now, but it's a very short way from joke to sad reality when you have a really 
crazy president speaking about breaking every moral and logic norm.”267 As Alcoff 
suggests, within the context of the epistemic dominance of white ignorance, Bernie 
Sanders offers a counterexample to whiteness: 
When activists from Black Lives Matter presumptively attacked him from 
the floor of one of his stump speeches last summer; he let them speak. He 
invited them for further conversations. He hired them into his campaign, 
not just to knock on doors, but to help lead strategy and develop agenda. 
He sat down for a five hour videotaped interview with Killer Mike, the 
brilliant Hip Hop artist and cultural analyst, filmed in Mike’s barbershop 
in Atlanta. In other words, Sanders admitted there were things he didn’t 
know, and he sought knowledge from the people who did. This is a true 
political revolution.268 
We may add, however, that Sanders also offers a counterexample to white 
masculinity, one that is not linked to stupidity, entitlement, and aggression as in the case 
267 Lance Gould, “Pussy Riot on Trump: We Laughed When Vladimir Putin Rose to Power, Too,” The 
Huffington Post December 18, 2015. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/pussy-riot-donald-trump-
vladimir_putin_us_56741df9e4b0b958f65644d0
268 Alcoff, “Why Trump is Still Here.” http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/why-trump-is-still-here/
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of Stan Smith, George Bush, and Donald Trump, but rather to receptivity, listening, 
responsibility, coalitional thinking, and allyship. While the former serves to perpetuate 
the ideals around the valorization of a certain kind of toxic masculinity, the latter 
challenges and seeks to replace these ideals with better alternatives. The epistemic 
arrogance that the former puts forth thereby is replaced by the epistemic humility that the 
latter propels.
The large support that the former kind of masculinity receives from the masses is 
an important indicator not only of a widespread uncritical outlook on masculinity but also 
of a serious problem of desire that is politically at work. It would be inadequate to 
presume that Trump's supporters are simply ignorant, stupid or duped, for they are also 
very much invested in and intimately attached to a racist, sexist framework that carries 
with it a certain sense of empowerment, however misguided. They desire what that white 
masculine ideal stands for; they feel affirmed by it; they find it exhilarating. As Deleuze 
and Guattari put it, “when subjects, individuals, or groups act manifestly counter to their 
class interests – when they rally to the interests and ideals of a class that their own 
objective situation should lead them to combat – it is not enough to say: they were fooled, 
the masses have been fooled. It is not an ideological problem, a problem of failing to 
recognize, or of being subject to, an illusion. It is a problem of desire, and desire is part 
of the infrastructure.”269 Masculinity, in this sense, offers a sense for empowerment, by 
way of aligning oneself with the power of the state (a state that has been historically 
racist). Here, the practices around securitization are linked to a masculinist economy of 
desire whereby the nation itself takes on a masculine identity by laying claim to power 
269 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: Continuum, 
2004), 114.
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defined as domination. 
The gendering of the nation as such takes place through the practices around 
racialization, just as sovereignty relies on systematic expulsions as discussed in the first 
chapter. This points to an intermeshing of racism and sexism. In the linking of security 
and masculinity in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, what one observes is the 
valorization of a particular type of hegemonic masculinity that is built on white 
supremacy. Within the context of securitization, the masculinist economy of desire 
involves an enmeshment of racism and sexism.
While this is enmeshment is visible in the kind of representation of political 
masculinity (i.e. paranoiac masculinity) as offered by Donald Trump, George Bush, and 
Stan Smith as discussed above, such linking between racism and sexism as operative in a 
masculinist economy of desire can also be observed in the counter-terrorism efforts of 
nation-states other than the United States. In the next section, I focus on the aesthetic 
(re)production of such linkage in the context of Turkey, whereby militarized masculinity 
is offered as a discursive assemblage of nationalism, militarism, and masculinity.
 The displays of militarized masculinity, the alignment they propose between 
masculinity, power, and domination, not only present a distorted view of reality, but also 
involve a perversion of desire, where desire is “made to desire its own repression.”270  
Nowhere does this problem of desire become more visible than in the aestheticization of 
violence, which seeks to excite, provoke, and fascinate desire. What social change would 
entail, then, is the transformation of desire, by way of creating alternative circuits of 
desire. These alternative circuits would be liberatory insofar as are divested from, situated 
against, and subversive to the framework of masculinist politics. As Foucault famously 
270 Ibid, 115.
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puts it in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, “the major enemy” being 
the “fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes 
us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us,”271 how do we 
get rid of the fascist within; how do we transform ourselves to “rid our speech and our 
acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism?”272 Following Walter Benjamin's 
suggestion that against the aestheticization of violence, “communism responds by 
politicizing art,” I look at the critical, creative language that emerges out of the art and 
activism of women's peace movements as an example of the politicization of art that can 
potentially subvert the racist/masculinist desiring production of the state.
4.3 Turkey's War on Terror: Aestheticizing War, Desiring Masculinity
After a two year long peace negotiations to resolve the ongoing conflict since 
1978 between the Republic of Turkey and insurgent Kurdish groups, Turkey announced, 
on July 24, 2015, a military operation against PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or 
Kurdistan Workers' Party) targets. As the operations continued, the images from the 
ongoing war in southeast Turkey began circulating in the social media. One Twitter page 
in particular has become notorious for sharing gruesome, uncensored photographs of 
tortured, disfigured bodies with sardonic, chauvinistic commentary. The screen name for 
this page is JITEM, taken after the controversial secret governmental organization, 
Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele or Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-
Terrorism infamous for extra-judicial killings of around seventeen thousand people, 
alongside the kidnapping and torture of those affiliated with PKK since 1987. The user 
name they picked, @BeyazToroscular (“the white Torossers”), refers to the white Renault 




12 Toros automobiles, the official vehicle for the police and gendarmerie under military 
rule in Turkey in the 1980s, driven by officers for the purposes of surveillance, 
intimidation, and detaining suspects for “questioning” (i.e. torture). Reclaiming this 
horrifying history and purposefully aligning the ongoing military operations with it, the 
page receives a lot of support from thousands in its celebration and exaltation of a 
militaristic, nationalistic, racist formulations of masculinity, consolidated through the 
displays of the torture, humiliation, and extermination of Kurdish bodies. There is, 
undoubtedly a link, both historically and ideologically, between the ongoing operations 
and this history that is shamelessly being reclaimed by this act of self-naming. That link, 
in contrast to the intent of this page, is precisely what renders this war indefensible, 
putrid, and criminal. In the context of the United States, an analogous act would be to 
open up a Twitter account with the name COINTELPRO and sharing photographs of the 
killings of people of color at the hands of police and vigilantes, whilst celebrating these 
atrocities. While the page in question serves as a tactic of psychological warfare of 
intimidation and suppression, creating the impression that the sovereignty of the nation-
state cannot (and ought not) be questioned or challenged, it also propels to fulfill another 
purpose. 
The spectacle of violence serves as a discursive site for the reproduction of 
militarized masculinity at the intersection of racial and gender oppression. Attesting to 
the masculinist investment within the practices of securitization in conjunction with 
militarization, this discursive reproduction is primarily an aesthetic one, hinging on the 
aestheticization of violence.These aggrandized displays of militarized masculinity serve 
to produce a tripartite alignment of masculinity-power-domination. Many of these images 
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feature soldiers273 in heavy military gear, wielding assault weaponry that serves as a 
phallic surrogate in the fashioning of militarized masculinity. Many of them also include 
messages written by the soldiers, through which they seem to be seeking to amuse their 
audience, while intimidating the resistance movement. In one of the most controversial 
photographs from this war that has been circulating on the social media, we see a soldier 
who had entered somebody's home and into their bedroom. He is in his military uniform, 
holding a machine gun, lodged in front of the bedroom mirror, on which he wrote with 
red lipstick, “Aşk Yüksekova'da Başka Yaşanıyor,” or in English, “Love in Yüksekova [a 
county of the city of Hakkari] is unique.” He drew a heart around this message, signing 
not with his name, but with his hometown, “From Beyşehir, Konya.” The photograph not 
only portrays an invasion, but also intimates that this invasion be understood in terms of 
“love,” a euphemism for rape in this case, figuratively and perhaps also literally. The use 
of red lipstick mimics the notes lovers leave for each other on the mirror in popular music 
videos broadcasted in Turkey in the 1990s, yet it is also resonant of the message the 
psychopath leaves on the mirror for its victims in horror movies. Encompassing this 
double meaning, the term “love” stands for a threat. The message of “love” conveys the 
idea of invasion, not only of one's home but also one's body; the idea of being “owned,” 
of domination. If love here signifies rape, it does so through the suggestion that the 
opponent is completely overpowered. This is what makes “love” so “unique” in 
Yüksekova: the total domination of Kurds at the hands of the Turkish military. 
Yet if “love” relays “domination” here as part of the psychological warfare, it is 
only because of the gendered meaning that the message purports. It is the domination of 
273 The counter-terrorism divisions of the police are also involved in this war. Since the police in this 
context are heavily militarized, I use “soldiers” here to refer to both military officials and police 
officers, for the sake of brevity. 
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the feminized Kurdish enemy by the Turkish soldier who claims a masculine identity 
precisely through that domination. Some other photographs, not as popularized as the 
aforementioned, depict police officers and soldiers who wrote similar messages on walls 
which discursively seek to establish domination by way of the feminization of the 
Kurdish liberation movement and thereby its degradation. In these photographs, the 
soldiers are anonymous, their faces are covered. They never sign their messages with 
their own name, but either with their division's name or their hometown, such that their 
individual identity has been subsumed under the militaristic nationalism that their 
uniform stands for. In one photograph, we see a soldier who wrote in red in the 
background, “Bahar'da Tanga Giydircem Size,” or “This Spring, I'll make ya wear a 
thong.” Another photograph features a rocket that is insinuated to be an American made 
M40, which is “an 106mm breech-loaded, single-shot, man-portable, crew-served 
recoilless rifle,”274 as described by GlobalSecurity.org, a website devoted to providing 
military information. We see a man's hand holding the rocket on which he wrote, 
“HAVAN KİME FİSTANLI GÜZEL '106 mm' :),” or “Who are you sassing, the beauty in
fistan? '106 mm' :),” taking catcalling to a whole new level in the context of war. “Fistan” 
is a traditional woman's dress, but it also refers to the kilt-type garment traditionally worn 
by Greek, Scottish, and Albanian men. The use of “fistan” in this way serves to conflate 
all these cultures together and the Kurdish culture, which has little historical connection 
to the rest (if at all), in a xenophobic manner that is also sexist, in that the move seeks to 
degrade by way of feminization. Enacting a willful xenophobic ignorance, the statement 
insinuates that the particular identity of the enemy does not matter, whether they are 
274 “M40 106mm Recoilless Rifle,” Global Security. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m40rclr.htm
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Greeks, with whom the Turkish state historically has had contentious relations, or Kurds, 
given that they are all fistan-wearers, all inferior to the virile Turkish man. The 
modification of what is traditionally a catcall in Turkey, “Havan kime, güzelim?” or, 
“Who are you sassing, beautiful?,” also suggests an important connection between 
everyday gender violence that serves to discipline women as they navigate the public 
space and the context of war wherein the enemy is being “catcalled” as they are bombed. 
The violence here operates on multiple levels: physically, ideologically, discursively... 
Much like the interpellation that Althusser describes in the calling of the individual on the 
street by the policeman through which Althusser examines the relation between ideology 
and subjectivity, the message written on the rocket is a fatal “hey you!” directed at the 
Kurdish rebel, seeking to eradicate both the physical and the ideological presence of the 
bodies that partake in the resistance movement. Given that Althusser's description 
attempts to show that ideology denotes a situation whereby the individual is “always 
already interpellated” by the state, that is, s/he is always already the subject of the state 
(yet, we may add, in differential ways by virtue of one's social location), the exclamation, 
“Who are you sassing, beautiful?” is linked to the particular subjectivation of the Kurdish 
population in relation to the state. “Sassing” is resisting delegitimized because it is 
feminized. It insinuates a (mis)recognition whereby the existence of the resisting subject 
is acknowledged yet ridiculed by way of feminization. Within the sex/gender system that 
is imposed and enforced, it is traditionally women who wear a dress and who are sassy, 
thereby not to be taken seriously, frivolous and weak. It is not only women, but 
particularly “sluts” who wear a thong, thereby the statement, “I'll make ya wear a thong” 
not only feminizes the Kurdish fighters by way of threatening them, but also sexualizes 
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and slut-shames them. These significations are indicative of a masculinist economy of 
desire at work that gets projected onto “the enemy.” The militarized aesthetics draws 
from and aggrandizes the everyday hostility that toxic masculinity breeds by carrying it 
onto the context of war. In this way, it not only enacts violence against women, but 
connects that to the violence against marginalized ethnic groups. The racialization of 
Kurds here takes place through the marginalization of women as militarized masculinity 
serves a racist and sexist function at once as an apparatus of the state.
In another photograph, a police officer, holding a Turkish flag in one hand and 
doing a “wolf sign” with the other (which symbolizes Turkish nationalism), is standing in 
front of writing on the wall that reads: “Aşk Bodrumda Yaşanıyor Güzelim :) PÖH :),” or, 
“The basement is where the love is at, darling” with two smiley faces, signed with the 
acronym for Police Special Action (Polis Özel Harekat), a division of law enforcement 
for counter-terrorism. Below the writing, there is a stain on the wall that resembles a 
blood splatter. The basement in question refers to the basement that many of those who 
had been wounded by the attacks had turned into a refuge, which the Turkish army and 
the police blew up last February, killing over sixty people. The operation was particularly 
controversial as the wounded had been denied medical care for days before they were 
executed and some sources report that civilians were also hiding in the basement.275  If 
the basement is “where the love is at,” love signifies nothing but torture and 
extermination, victoriously celebrated by the Turkish soldiers. Not only is the state 
massacring these people, but it is also mocking them for being massacred and eroticizing 
the massacre. Given that being a woman is shameful and humiliating in and of itself 




within the masculinist framework in which the state operates, feminization serves as the 
primary psychological weapon against “the enemy.” Being called a woman is the worst 
insult.
I suggest that while the messages accompanying these grand displays of 
militarized masculinity comprise a tactic of intimidation and suppression, they also 
indicate something larger and perhaps more significant. When Foucault discusses the 
deployment of sexuality in the context of the history of its “invention,” as it were, he 
notes that while sex by itself constituted “a political ordering of life,” what was at stake 
was rather “the self-affirmation of one class [the bourgeoisie] rather than the 
enslavement of another [the proletariat]: a defense, a protection, a strengthening, and an 
exaltation that were eventually extended to others – at the cost of different 
transformations – as a means of social control and political subjugation.”276 Similarly, I 
argue that while these images seek to intimidate and humiliate the Kurdish rebels by 
feminizing them (many of whom, one must note, are women), their primary purpose is 
rather to consolidate a masculine identity for the Turkish nation. Such consolidation takes 
place through a performance of militarized masculinity whereby the exaltation and 
valorization of masculinity at the intertwinement of militarism, sexism, and racism 
constitutes a self-affirming move: it establishes a positive self-understanding for the 
nation-state as masculine, rather than simply seeking the repression of the enemy. 
Militarized masculinity and its proud display becomes the very embodiment of this 
masculine national identity.
These images constitute a discursive production of militarized masculinity taken 
on as the identity for the nation. Militarized masculinity as a discursive production entails 
276 Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol. 1, 123. Emphasis added.
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what Foucault describes as the “displacement, intensification, reorientation, and 
modification of desire itself.”277 These displays of militarized masculinity are linked to a 
particular shaping of desire, an economy of desire which constitutes the valorization of 
masculinity on a national level and its equation to power. In the context of Turkey, where 
military service remains compulsory for men, but optional for those who can afford to 
“buy out,” the soldiers featured in these images are most likely uneducated men from 
urban lower class and rural backgrounds. The allure of masculinist nationalism is that it 
offers (an illusion of) power in the face of powerlessness. Much like the “phallic 
appropriation” described by Carol Clover through the picking up of a gun by young 
women in horror movies, an act through which they shed their victimhood, there is a 
phallic appropriation of lower class men taking place once they put on the military gear: 
they are no longer vulnerable and powerless; but heroic and inviolable. The reality of 
class oppression is mitigated and overcome through becoming the seamless embodiment 
of militarized masculine domination, despite the fact that, to borrow from Audre Lorde 
once again, “the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house.” Even though the 
victimization discourse is not explicitly present here (though I must note that it is very 
much present in the discourse the state uses to justify these operations), victimhood is 
operative in the background, the overcoming of which hinges on the embodiment of this 
national masculine ideal. Militarized masculinity, in this sense, offers an opportunity to 
assume the position of the oppressor in an effort to no longer be in the position of the 
oppressed – and this is quite similar to the move we saw offered by the Daesh militant's 
testimony. Yet this is primarily a move of desire and not necessarily of self-interest – for 
there is no real empowerment here. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “For it is a matter of 
277 Ibid, 23.
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flows, of stocks, of breaks in and fluctuations of flows; desire is present wherever 
something flows and runs, carrying along with it interested subjects – but also drunken or 
slumbering subjects – toward lethal destinations.”278
In their representations of militarized masculinity, as the kind of masculinity that 
dominates and violates, the kind that is desirable and sublime, these photographs attest to 
the phenomenon Walter Benjamin famously called the aestheticization of violence. The 
supporters of the Twitter page JITEM are overjoyed by these images, lending support to 
the “courageous” soldiers. Violence is aestheticized; war is rendered beautiful, desirable, 
and naturally linked to the masculine body that serves as a metonym for the nation at 
large. Benjamin famously states: “This is the situation of politics which Fascism is 
rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.”279 
4.4 Politicizing Art Against Vindictive Masculinity
The politicization of art constitutes a rallying point to combat the economy of 
desire around masculinist nationalism. Out of art, of politicized, critical art, which could 
offer a retraining of sensibilities, new economies of desire can emerge.280 In response to 
the leaked photographs circulating in the social media of the exposed, naked body of a 
guerrilla woman, Ekin Wan (also known as Kevser Eltürk), who was killed by the 
Turkish forces in August 2015 in Varto, Muş, a demonstration was staged in front of the 
Swedish parliament in Stockholm, along with others (including a sit-in protest at the 
historical square in Cologne, Germany and a gathering in Varto of women's rights 
activists from all over Turkey, where Wan was killed and tortured). The demonstration in 
278 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 115.
279 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Marxists.org. Accessed: 
May 24, 2016, https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm. 
280 I explore the question of art and social change in more detail in the next chapter through an account of 
decolonial feminist poetry.
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Stockholm featured a woman lying naked on her stomach in tan underpants and with red 
paint smeared all over her back, to mimic the photographs. She is surrounded by the 
photographs of killed guerillas and the ruins left from war. The sources report that she lay 
in front of the parliament for an hour, then the others covered her body with a white 
sheet. This event was not only a protest against war, but also resembled a funeral. The 
gathering served as an opportunity to publicly mourn for Ekin Wan and many others, to 
hold a funeral that would not otherwise have been held. 
The photographs that were leaked were meant to humiliate and dishonor the 
resistance movement by exposing the naked body of a guerrilla woman. They were meant 
to delight those who support the state's counter-terrorism warfare (and they did) and 
normalize the monopoly of violence assumed by the state (and they continue to do so). 
Yet these gatherings for protest not only bring attention to these war crimes, but also 
perform in a subversive manner and thereby resignify the very violence inflicted by the 
Turkish state, playing it against itself. This mimesis has a different effect than that of the 
original photographs. It shocks and unsettles. It disturbs and provokes. It performs a 
refusal to aestheticize politics (which the photographs seek to accomplish) and instead 
politicizes aesthetics. Refusing to share the original photograph of the stripped naked 
dead body of Ekin Wan, many news outlets had used an illustration by the artist Serpil 
Odabaşı, which memorializes Wan. In Nusaybin, Mardin, a group of Kurdish activists 
wrote on a banner: “Ekin Wan is the most naked phase of our struggle.” In this way, the 
exposed body of Wan has become a site of resistance, and not of degradation, 
humiliation, and shame as was intended. In Varto, the civil rights activist group Peace 
Mothers “threw off their white scarves at the place [where Ekin Wan was tortured, killed 
136
and stripped naked],”281 Ruken Işık reports. “Throwing off the scarf has a symbolic 
meaning in Kurdish culture,” she notes, “where women can stop the fighting by throwing 
the scarf to the ground.”282 
While Peace Mothers have not been able to stop this war at this moment in time 
by throwing off their scarves, it is such organized action that is going to bring an end to it 
as the public refuses to buy into the aestheticization of violence. The politicization of art 
intimidates the state. Nine activists were detained by the police in Izmir, Turkey on May 
11, 2016 during a photography exhibit entitled “Where is the war?” depicting scenes 
from Kurdistan, as part of the events for celebrating the International Day on 
Conscientious Objection. An officer reportedly stated, “What is happening there is no 
war, it's cleaning.”283 As the state persistently holds onto this rhetoric of “weeding out” 
the terrorists, and glorifies these acts through the displays of militarized masculinity, the 
activists respond by showing this war for what it is. While the term the officer used 
“cleaning” is meant to convey the meaning of the elimination of threats, it is also 
resonant of ethnic cleansing. One must remember that Turkey continues to be haunted by 
a history of genocide and ethnic cleansing, with the systematic extermination and 
displacement of Armenians, Christian Assyrians, Syrians, Chaldeans, and Greeks in 1915, 
the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey in 1923, and the mob attacks 
fueled by the governing party against the Greek minorities living in Istanbul in 1955 (also 
known as the Istanbul pogrom). The resonances of these events continue to be felt today, 
281 Isik Ruken, “From Memories to Pictures: The War in Kurdistan,” The Kurdish Question, August 22, 
2015. Accessed: May 24, 2016, http://kurdishquestion.com/oldsite/index.php/kurdistan/north-
kurdistan/ekin-wan-from-memories-to-pictures/1081-ekin-wan-from-memories-to-pictures.htm
282 Ibid.
283 “Izmir'de Vicdani Ret Haftasi'na polis mudahalesi: 9 aktivist gozaltina alindi,” Vicdani Ret Dernegi 
May 11, 2016. Accessed: July 14, 2016. http://vicdaniret.org/izmirde-vicdani-ret-haftasina-polis-
mudahalesi-9-aktivist-gozaltinda/
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as the state continues to define the nation through the homogenous category of “the 
Turkish race.” Militarized masculinity embodies these exclusions and enacts them as it 
racializes by way of gendering. It serves as a tool for homogenizing the nation. 
Politicizing art, in this context, involves an intervention to and a transformation of the 
established economies of desire whereby masculinity has become synonymous with 
power (as domination) and the nation. In her powerful piece entitled “Your Body is My 
Life,” Gülfer Akkaya notes that while guerilla men too are tortured (like Hacı Lokman 
Birlik, whose body was tied to a police vehicle and dragged for several feet), these 
actions are not undertaken with “sexist rage,” but instead with “malice toward the 
enemy,” as “revenge.” Yet women's bodies are subject to methods of torture that are 
sexualized in nature, that are specific to women's bodies. She writes: “What we have here 
is not a clash of enemies as seen in standard wars, but a male brutality used in the 
struggle between the genders.”284 While Akkaya assiduously points out that the treatment 
of guerilla women is gender specific and particularly reflective of a culture of misogyny, 
I would like to add that the politics of gender is also very much at work in the violation of 
the bodies of men. As the commentary on the Twitter page JITEM shows, the degradation 
of women takes place not only by virtue of the gender-specific ways in which women's 
bodies are violated, the misogynistic practices of the state or the sexist commentary 
directed at women in particular, but also through the feminization of men, the 
feminization of “the enemy” at large, in an attempt to discredit the movement. This is 
indicative of the masculine identification of the nation through the degradation of the 
feminine: the nation-state establishes its masculine authority through a fundamental 
284 Gulfer Akkaya, “Senin Bedenin Benim Canimdir,” Siyasi Haber, August 24, 2015. Accessed: May 24, 
2016. http://siyasihaber3.org/senin-bedenin-benim-canimdir-gulfer-akkaya.
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exclusion of women. Rape as a weapon of war operates in a similar fashion, as something 
that not only violates and degrades, but also feminizes while affirming and consolidating 
masculinity, where masculinity is tied to domination. The leaked photographs from the 
Abu Ghraib prison upon the invasion of Iraq similarly demonstrate the intertwinement of 
racialization and gendering in practices of torture, suggesting that such practices of 
feminizing the racialized enemy in an effort to humiliate and torture comprise a rather 
commonplace military tactic. Similar practices are also employed by the Israeli 
authorities toward Palestinian rebels. Julie Peteet notes that while imprisonment and 
physical violence inflicted by Israeli authorities have generated and empowered a new 
generation of Palestinian men involved in resistance as these practices have come to 
serve as a rite of passage to manhood, the tactics have since been changed as sexualized 
forms of violence are introduced to break the sense of masculinity of these men and 
thereby to break the resistance: “One cannot return from prison and describe forms of 
torture that violate the most intimate realm of gendered selfhood. If knowledge of such 
sexual tortures circulates widely, violence and detention will be diluted of their power to 
contribute to a gendered sense of self informing political agency.”285 In such cases, 
violence serves as a practice of gendering, which has direct bearing on both political and 
individual senses of agency. What these practices show is the state operates through the 
established meanings and hierarchies of gender and has a stake in their violent 
perpetuation. As Angela Davis stated in a speech she gave at the University of Oregon on 
May 11, 2016, “State violence relies on intimate violence and intimate violence 
285 Julie Peteet, “Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in Palestinian 'Intifada': A Cultural Politics of 
Violence,” American Ethnologist 21, no. 1 (1994): 45.
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reproduces state violence.” Gender violence, in this way, serves as a hinge between state 
violence and intimate violence, as it is operative in both. 
Such a logic of gendering through violence often exceeds military settings, 
saturating the political field as a whole. In the context of Turkey, even those who are 
critical of the actions of the government tend to use similar masculinist language. After a 
Russian bomber aircraft was shot by a Turkish jet near the Turkey-Syrian border due to 
border violations, the social media was flooded with various photographs of Putin 
depicting his virile masculinity, some of which were photoshopped by Turkish users 
(probably the most popular photoshopped image was Putin riding a bear shared with the 
commentary, “Putin rides a BEAR. Erdogan can't even ride a horse,” referring to the time 
when Erdogan fell off a horse). In the sharing of these images, the political and military 
power that Russia had has been equated with Putin's masculinity, which is contrasted with 
the perceived failure of Erdogan's masculinity. It is clear based on this equation that in the 
social imaginary, it is commonplace to equate political power with masculinity, and 
masculinity with domination. The dominant social imaginary, in other words, has been 
colonized by these equations through which individuals become invested in masculinist 
politics. Masculinism is prevalent in politics because it sells; it is desired. As Deleuze and 
Guattari note, “It was not by means of a metaphor, even a paternal metaphor, that Hitler 
was able to sexually arouse the fascists.”286 Similarly, many nationalists in Turkey are 
thrilled by these images depicting gruesome violence circulating in the social media.  
Social change requires a dismantling of this masculinist framework itself, by disrupting 
the circuits of desire that are at work. Art can give rise to the creation of new circuits of 
desire. Having a critical outlook on the politics of masculinity entails paying close 
286 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 114.
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attention to the links between sexism, racism, and militarism that have become 
particularly salient in the representations and practices of militarized masculinity. In her 
piece about the leaked photographs of Ekin Wan's exposed naked body and the history of 
state violence against the Kurds, Ruken Işık writes: “The Kurdish Women's Movement 
has taught women that honor cannot be reduced to women's bodies, honor is struggle, 
honor is not to be ashamed of resistance.”287 This message should find its rightful place in 
the social imaginary, at a moment when gender is seldom a point of discussion in the 
context of this war, despite all the ways in which gender is operative in the forms of 
violence that are inflicted. The role of gender (and of gendering) in this war shows that 
insofar as the dehumanization of women and racialized groups operate through one 
another, our oppressions are bound up together. So will be our liberation.
4.5 Conclusion: Jin, Jîyan, Azadî
While masculinity is a social construct that is historically specific and context-
dependent, there are pertinent connections, crisscrossings if you will, between the kinds 
of masculinity that get conjoined to securitization/militarization transnationally. These 
forms of masculinity often times serve as a site of investment for the racist and sexist 
practices of the state, while constituting an identity for the nation. The resonance of this 
intertwinement between race, gender, and nationality is felt beyond the confines of the 
military, infecting the social imaginary by aligning masculinity with (political) power. In 
the ongoing war in Turkey (which is yet to be recognized as a war, apparently), the body 
of the soldier constitutes a site for the reinscription of the national masculine ideal, the 




majestic Turkish male who slaughters his enemies like he slaughters his women.288 In the 
post-9/11 United States, the figure of the stupid white male has attained an epistemic (and 
political) hegemony, prompting the writer of the dystopia Idiocracy (2003) to remark “I 
never expected [this film] to become a documentary,” in reference to the 2016 
presidential race.289 All the while, the retributive justice sought by the same masculine 
figure is one and the same as the self-proclaimed mission of the terrorist groups he hopes 
to annihilate. In this global war against terrorism, where masculinity often gets folded 
into the narratives about sovereignty, power, and revenge cloaked as justice, both by 
states and jihadists, feminists chant in Kurdish, Jin, Jîyan, Azadî, against state terror, 
against gender violence, racialized violence, and all other forms of violence inflicted in 
the name of justice. Jin, Jîyan, Azadî, this is no justice. Jin, Jîyan, Azadî, power with, not 
power over. Jin, Jîyan, Azadî, people over profit. Jin, Jîyan, Azadî. Woman. Life. 
Freedom.
288 For an account on the prevalence of gender violence in Turkey, please see: Sertan Sanderton, “Domestic 
violence in Turkey reaches boiling point,” DW July 11, 2015. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
http://www.dw.com/en/domestic-violence-in-turkey-reaches-boiling-point/a-18576377
289 Jessica Chasmar, “Etan Cohen, Idiocracy Writer: 'I never expected' movie would 'become a 






“In our very flesh, (r)evolution works out the clash of cultures.”
- Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera
“We recognize that all knowledge is mediated through the body and that feeling is a profound source of
information about our lives”
- Audre Lorde
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the imperative epistemic force of 
paranoia serves as a self-justifying mechanism within contemporary political rationality, 
particularly around practices of securitization. Brian Massumi's analysis of a “toxic 
substance alert” in Montreal attests to such self-justification relayed by a fear-invoked 
sense of urgency. He notes that “[a]ll of the actions that would be taken if the powder 
were anthrax are taken preemptively.”290 Even though the substance found at the airport 
was later revealed to be flour, the incident did not come to be known as “flour alert” 
thereafter. What names the incident is the reality of fear surrounding the substance, rather 
than its actual compound. As Massumi puts it, “Flour has been implicated. It is tainted 
with the fear of anthrax, guilty by association for displaying the threatening qualities of 
whiteness and powderiness.”291 It is, thereby, not only the possibility of that substance 
being toxic that determines the meaning of the situation, but also the affective conditions 
that surround that possibility, namely the fear evoked by an an unidentified powder found 
at an airport. There is, in other words, an affective epistemology at work in that the 
possibility of knowledge is mediated by affects that circumscribe an encounter.
290 Brian Massumi, “The Future Birth of the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of Threat” in The Affect 
Theory Reader ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2010), 57. Emphasis in the original.
291 Ibid, 57-8.
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It is possible to read various practices of securitization through the lens of 
affective epistemology. In this chapter, I turn to affect as a notion that sheds light on the 
lived dimension of the politics of paranoia. I argue that the affective economy of fear put 
forth by a politics of paranoia very much shapes intersubjective relations, that is, it sets 
up the conditions of possibility for relating to the Other and the meaning of that 
encounter. The explosion in the number of hate crimes in the aftermath of the September 
11 attacks that I examined in the first chapter would be a pertinent example here. The 
affective economy of fear, in the context of the politics of paranoia at work in the United 
States, involves a codification of certain bodies as threatening, thereby a determination of 
whose body shall inspire fear. In the first chapter, I took up racialization as that process of 
codification in the practices of the state. Now I turn to the intersubjective dimension of 
this process, where the meaning of the encounter is predetermined by the affective 
economy of fear that codifies particular bodies as threatening. Insofar as affect 
determines the meaning of these encounters, I suggest that there is a particular affective 
epistemology at work where fear is the affective enactment of mistaken knowledge.
Many of scholars who deal with affective investments of a political kind do so in 
a way that is detached from the lived dimensions of these affects and feelings such as 
paranoia, fear, panic, and anxiety, so as not to psychologize them. Breaking away from 
this current in the scholarship, in this chapter, I employ a phenomenological approach to 
examine the affective economy of paranoia that operates intersubjectively, thereby 
bringing phenomenology to bear on the political. In the last section, I discuss how these 
patterns of relationality are disrupted and replaced by alternatives in decolonial feminist 
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poetry, which offers an epistemological intervention to dominant practices of knowing 
whose meanings are taken for granted.
5.1 An Epistemology of Paranoia: Fear, Ignorance, and Entitlement
In his testimony, Darren Wilson, the police officer who shot and killed the 18-
year-old Michael Brown, told the grand jury: “[W]hen I grabbed him, the only way I can 
describe it is I felt like a 5-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan.”292 The same height as 
Wilson, Brown had, as Wilson reports, “the most intense aggressive face. The only way I 
can describe it, it looks like a demon, that's how angry he looked.”293 Based on this 
testimony, Wilson was exonerated (twice!) of any criminal wrongdoing, by a grand jury 
as well as the Department of Justice. A year before Brown was killed, George 
Zimmerman was acquitted of shooting the 17-year-old Trayvon Martin on the grounds 
that it was self-defense. Zimmerman's testimony must have convinced the jury that 
Martin, a hoodie wearing young black man, seemed suspicious and thereby constituted a 
threat. It was Zimmerman's suspicion that not only defined the meaning of that encounter, 
but also served to justify the killing in court, whereas Martin's fear as he was being 
chased by an armed grown man did not seem to count for anything. It was Wilson's fear 
of Brown, who made him feel completely powerless, insignificant, and vulnerable, 
despite the fact that Wilson was an armed police officer whereas Brown was an unarmed 
teenager, which, again, held up in court. Perhaps the jury agreed that they too would have 
been horrified if they had been in Wilson's or Zimmerman's shoes. In a context where 
black masculinity is codified as inherently threatening by virtue of its mere presence, and 
thereby dispensable, it is perhaps easier to empathize with the perpetrators rather than 





imagining the constant harassment faced by young Black men, who seem to inspire fear 
and hostility in others simply by virtue of their bodily presence. In this sense, the fear that 
Wilson's and Zimmerman's testimonies express is hardly peculiar to them, but is instead 
linked to an affective economy of fear whereby the threat gets attached to particular 
bodies.
Affective economies denote, as Agathangelou et al. put it, “the circulation and 
mobilization of feelings of desire, pleasure, fear, and repulsion utilized to seduce all of us 
into the fold of the state – the various ways in which we become invested emotionally, 
libidinally, and erotically in global capitalism's mirages of safety and inclusion.”294 In 
other words, a way in which power operates is through the circulation of affect, whose 
investments shape and situate subjectivity itself. These operations take place on an 
intimate, bodily level, such that these investments are often enacted pre-reflectively, in 
that they need not rely on a reflective consciousness. Wilson characterizes Brown as 
“demonic,” for that is the association that arises for him upon the sight of a young, 
heavyset Black man whom he perceives as threatening. Upon Zimmerman's acquittal, 
Christopher Myers wrote: “Images matter. They linger in our hearts, vast 'image libraries' 
that color our actions and ideas, even if we don’t recognize them on a conscious level. 
The plethora of threatening images of young black people has real-life effects. But if 
people can see us as young dreamers, boys with hopes and doubts and playfulness, 
instead of potential threats or icons of societal ills, perhaps they will feel less inclined to 
kill us.”295 As power works through these affective circuits, the codification of certain 
bodies as dangerous or threatening suggests a reified positionality in a larger system of 
294 Anna Agathangelou, et al., “Intimate Investments: Homonormativity, Global Lockdown, and the 
Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review, no. 100 (2008): 122.
295 Christopher Myers, “Young Dreamers,” The Horn Book, August 6, 2013. Accessed: July 21, 2016. 
http://www.hbook.com/2013/08/opinion/young-dreamers/.
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meaning that in turn amounts to the dispensability of those bodies. These significations, 
as affective investments, colonize these encounters by predetermining their meaning and 
foreclosing other possibilities. Black masculinity becomes that which cannot manifest 
anything but a threat. When Wilson characterizes Brown as “demonic,” his expression is 
tied to these investments that are linked to an affective economy, by which his perception 
has been shaped. The meaning of that encounter was predetermined and his exoneration 
attests to the fact that that meaning is all too self-evident for the court.
The term 'affective economy' suggests that “feelings do not reside in subjects or 
objects, but are produced as effects of circulation.”296 Fear as a cardinal affect of the 
politics of paranoia is lived both personally, in that it is Wilson's fear felt privately in its 
pressing urgency, and impersonally, as an element in a circuit of affect, insofar as it is 
generalized in that it saturates the social field itself, consolidating the misconception that 
fear is the appropriate reaction to the sight of black masculinity. One's fear, in this 
context, is both theirs and not only theirs. Who is to be feared and what shall follow from 
that fear are constituencies of an affective economy of fear. As John Protevi puts it, 
“[A]ffect is concretely the imbrication of the social and the somatic, as our bodies change 
in relation to the changing situations in which they find themselves.”297 
Yet, insofar as affect denotes “a body's capacity to affect and to be affected,”298 it 
highlights relationality or intersubjectivity over subjectivity. Further, since its operation is 
relational, it always takes place within a particular social and political context. It is my 
contention that paranoiac formulations of securitization operate by putting forth fear as a 
296 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 8.
297 John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009), xiv.
298 Melissa Gregg & Gregory J. Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers” in The Affect Theory Reader ed. 
Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.
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prominent affective economy not necessarily in response to a world that has become a 
more dangerous place, but rather because one of the important ways in which 
securitization takes place is through the installment of particular circuits of affect and 
desire. Moreover, while fear serves a self-justifying imperative force, it only does so 
when claimed by particular subjects who hold epistemic authority in that their claim fits 
within the established affective economy. The potency of the affect stems from its ability 
to determine the meaning of a situation or an encounter, yet, again, only when claimed by 
certain subjects.
Just as the incident in Montreal was named a “toxic substance alert” rather than a 
“flour alert” precisely because the fear was so pressing that it defined the situation, 
rendering the actual compound of the substance irrelevant, the killings of young black 
men are not named “murder” in that the fear felt by the shooters trump that of the victims. 
Fear, in this case, serves to define a situation by means of a distortion such that it is not 
only linked to judgment but also epistemic authority. After all, it is not anyone's fear that 
determines the meaning of that encounter. It matters whose fear counts and whose does 
not. For this reason, while fear comprises one of the primary affects put forth by a politics 
of paranoia, its effects must be taken up in conjunction with the epistemic practices with 
which it is bound up. It is only through this connection, through an understanding of fear 
as linked to an affective epistemology, would one be able to analyze the process of 
codification of certain bodies as threatening. The reason I choose to focus on fear in 
particular, despite the fact that by no means do I wish to claim that it is the only affective 
economy linked to a politics of paranoia, is how salient it becomes in intersubjective 
encounters, as opposed to, say, anxiety that may be more subtle and persistent, and not 
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necessarily linked to a particular object. In the following, I look at how the fear of Black 
bodies serves as a self-justifying mechanism for the infliction of violence. I offer a 
phenomenological analysis of white ignorance that manifests itself through the fear of 
racialized bodies. Fear (and the violence that it serves to justify) here is indicative of 
internalized racism based upon a coding of black masculinity as threatening, a coding that 
is historically contingent and with no basis in reality.  As Angela Davis puts it, “[T]he 
development of new ways of thinking about racism requires us not only to understand 
economic, social, and ideological structures, but also collective psychic structures.”299 For 
this purpose, I offer this analysis as an example of how a politics of paranoia operates on 
an intersubjective level by means of an affective economy. The paranoid epistemological 
framework is used here to justify the dispensability of the marked bodies as fear justifies 
violence, as can be seen in the trial of Zimmerman, which hinged on whether “this young 
black boy, with his bag of candy and his iced tea and his sweatshirt, was a threat.”300 
In her famous work Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker explores how suspicion 
operates in epistemic practices. While the question of whose testimony is granted 
credibility is certainly relevant here, I am more interested in looking at the role of affect 
itself in epistemic practices. I suggest that there is an affective epistemology at work in 
the process through which an encounter attains meaning and the determinant affect is that 
which grabs a hold of the subject who holds epistemic authority. Epistemic authority, in 
this case, is linked not only to one's social location but also to where one is positioned 
with regards to an epistemology of ignorance that criminalizes black masculinity. In other 
words, when it comes to epistemic justice, it is not only a matter of whose testimony is 
299 Davis, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle, 89.
300 Myers, “Young Dreamers.” http://www.hbook.com/2013/08/opinion/young-dreamers/#_
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granted credibility, but also a matter of whose affective disposition determines the 
meaning of the encounter, depending on where that disposition fits in the social 
imaginary. 
The imperative force yielded by paranoiac epistemic practices undoubtedly has a 
colonial history, which is decisive in whose fear shall count, whose paranoia shall be 
granted epistemic legitimacy, and whose affect gets to determine the meaning of an 
encounter. The epistemological framework that undergirds the politics of paranoia is still 
very much shaped by what Nelson Maldonado-Torres calls “Manichean misanthropic 
skepticism.” This “permanent suspicion,” born in the sixteenth century,  is “a form of 
questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples.”301 “Misanthropic skepticism,” 
Maldonado-Torres writes, “provides the basis for the preferential option for the ego 
conquiro, which explains why security for some can conceivably be obtained at the 
expense of the lives of others.”302 What underlies the dehumanization and the related 
dispensability of the peoples of darker races, for Maldonado-Torres, is this deep suspicion 
that is decisive in who is dispensable, whose status as human is suspect, who fully counts 
as human, and also, perhaps most relevant for our purposes, whose fear is granted 
legitimacy.
The suspicion and fear that are expressed by the perpetrators (and legitimized by 
the court) in these trials are systemically linked to questions about biopower, about whose 
life counts. As African-Americans are deemed dispensable per Manichean misanthropic 
skepticism, the Black Lives Matter movement emerged as “an ideological and political 
intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for 
301 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the development of a 
concept,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2/3 (2007): 245. Emphasis in the original.
302 Ibid, 246.
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demise,” to celebrate those lives, affirm their humanity, and seek “resilience in the face of 
deadly oppression.”303 While I focus on these two trials in particular, it is worth noting 
that these are by no means isolated instances but are instead indicative of a larger 
structure of anti-Black racism entrenched in and perpetuated by practices of policing. As 
Angela Davis points out, we must, at the same time, attend to “the way in which anti-
Muslim racism has really thrived on the foundation of anti-Black racism,”304 as both of 
which operate through an affective economy of fear that deems particular bodies to be 
threatening and thereby dispensable. It is also worth noting that the police brutality 
against women of color, and especially trans women of color, receives even less attention, 
as the mainstream media often exclusively depicts men as the victims. The Say Her 
Name movement seeks to render visibility for those Black women who are the victims of 
anti-Black police brutality. While police brutality against both Black men and women is 
linked to larger questions about biopower, of whose life matters, who counts as human, 
and who is deemed dispensable, there is a gender difference in that it is often black men 
who are codified as particularly threatening as a justification for their violability. As 
much as I do not wish to erase those women who are the victims of anti-Black violence, 
in the following I focus particularly on the codification of Black masculinity as 
threatening, given that my interest lies in examining the workings of fear as 
demonstrative of an affective epistemology. In this sense, I attend to these killings at the 
intersection of race and gender: Black masculinity as the object of fear within a racialized 
affective economy.
303 “Guiding Principles,” Black Lives Matter. Accessed: July 14, 2016. http://blacklivesmatter.com/guiding-
principles/
304 Davis, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle, 39.
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In the case of Martin, it was the hoodie that he wore paired with his black skin 
that rendered him suspicious in the eyes of Zimmerman. Though it would be a 
worthwhile effort to give a genealogical account of the hoodie as an article of clothing 
that came to be associated with dangerous black masculinity, I am more interested in how 
that signification persists in the social imaginary such that it serves as a justification of 
violence. There is an epistemology of ignorance at work in that a myth (the myth of the 
dangerous black man with a hoodie) passes for knowledge. Zimmerman's suspicion and 
fear are indicative of a larger system of meaning in which black masculinity is codified as 
threatening and thereby must be annihilated. Even though that codification itself is based 
on myth rather than reality, it continues to serve as justification for the killing of young 
black men. Charles Mills's account of the epistemology of ignorance is pertinent here, yet 
one must consider it as a kind of epistemology that is linked to an affective economy (of 
fear, in particular) – in other words, an affective epistemology. Mills argues that 
ignorance is a “structural group-based miscognition.”305 It is understood not simply as an 
epistemic gap or a lack, but rather a mechanism that reproduces and sustains the 
oppression of marginalized groups. In this sense, ignorance is systematic, socially 
sanctioned, and productive.306 It is invested with power in that it both conceals and 
upholds the privileges of dominating groups, as well as the oppression of marginalized 
groups. White ignorance, like other “group-based cognitive handicap(s)”307 is productive 
insofar as it passes for knowledge in creating an epistemic hegemony based on “white 
misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to 
305 Charles Mills, “White Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon Sullivan and 
Nancy Tuana (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 13.
306  Systematic and socially sanctioned, because ignorance is both backed up and practiced on a structural 
level; and productive, because it produces and reproduces racism as well as its subjects.
307  Mills, “White Ignorance,” 15.
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race.”308 While Zimmerman identifies as Latino, this does not make him immune to this 
epistemic hegemony, for “white ignorance” does not take its name by virtue of the fact 
that all those who subscribe to it are white, but because it is the product of a social order 
whose beneficiaries are whites as a group. While not all those who suffer from this 
“miscognition” are whites, not all whites suffer from it either. Regardless, the term white 
ignorance refers to a condition that is structurally sustained where distortions on matters 
surrounding race serve as a knowledge, as this takes place in a white supremacist political 
context.
Ignorance, in this way, denotes an epistemic hegemony based on appropriation of 
facts through various means including willful misinterpretation, evasion, distortion, and 
shrouding. It is an outcome of the Europeanization of epistemic norms, a process whose 
roots can be traced back to colonialism, whereby the forms of knowing that do not fit into 
European standards are marginalized, if not completely eliminated.309 It is the case, then, 
that the white epistemic norm not only establishes mass hallucination on matters of race 
by way of obscuring facts, but also entails a violent omission of non-European ways of 
knowing. Further, ignorance of this kind, far from indicating mere naïveté on part of the 
members of the dominant groups, names an integral part of white subjectivity today.
In this sense, ignorance may represent something more expansive than a mere 
cognitive handicap, as subjects act on, abide by, and live their lives by virtue of the kind 
of ignorance that passes for knowledge under the epistemic hegemony. Ignorance could 
be further scrutinized as a constitutive component of white subjectivities. My purpose 
here is to offer an analysis of ignorance as not only a cognitive phenomenon, but an 
308  Mills, The Racial Contract, 19. Emphasis in the original.
309  See the third section for an elaborate account of this.
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embodied practice. Ignorance as a systemically sustained condition that endorses white 
domination is repeatedly enacted on the world by agents of knowledge and perception in 
the form of mistaken knowledge, whereby it establishes its full meaning in embodied 
practices and shapes the agents’ embodied subjectivity. 
Mills characterizes the epistemology of ignorance as “an inverted 
epistemology”310 that relies on a distorted moral psychology, or as he puts it, “white moral 
cognitive dysfunction.”311 As such, ignorance and the “moral cognitive distortion” it 
involves “can potentially be studied by the new research program of cognitive science.”312
Thus, for Mills, white ignorance is, first and foremost, “a cognitive phenomenon.”313 
Subjects of racism, then, are taken up as “cognizers,” and the dysfunctions of their 
perception, conception, and memory, among other things, are what need to be 
examined.314 However, as Mills’ interlocutors as well as other feminist and anti-racist 
work on ignorance have shown, this cognitive based approach does not exhaust the 
meaning of ignorance.315 In order to grasp the extent to which ignorance of this kind 
achieves its full meaning, the ways in which it finds entrenchment in the body as a part of 
bodily knowing within a racist social context must be explored. Such investigation will 
shed light on not only the ways in which ignorance is embodied or rather, embedded in 
the body, but also how ignorance becomes a constituent of white subjectivity, precisely in 
this very embodiment. Since ignorance denotes a specific way of knowing (that is 
310  Mills, The Racial Contract, 19.
311  Ibid, 95.
312  Ibid.
313  Mills, “White Ignorance,” 20.
314  This is what Mills undertakes in his article “White Ignorance.”
315 See: Alison Bailey, “Strategic Ignorance” in Race & Epistemologies of Ignorance ed. Nancy Tuana & 
Shannon Sullivan (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007); Mariana Ortega, “Being Lovingly, Knowingly 
Ignorant,” Hypatia 21, no. 3 (2006): 56-74; Cynthia Townley, “Toward a Reevaluation of Ignorance”; 
Shannon Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).
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distorted, skewed, or false) and acts as “knowledge” under the given truth regime, 
“knowledge” which is in fact ignorance will be indicated in quotation marks in the rest of 
this chapter.
The question of the body has a special place in matters of race and gender, for it is 
the racially marked and the feminine body that is subjugated. Perhaps when Merleau-
Ponty announced, ‘I am my body’, he overlooked the condition that some of us are more 
his or her body than others, and that this is by no means a pleasant or a liberating 
experience, but rather a thoroughly violent one, under the normative white/male gaze. As 
many feminist and antiracist works have shown, the aesthetic dimension, how the body is
seen by others, has everything to do with how the body is lived and can be lived. (The 
black body is lived, for example, according to Lewis Gordon, “as a form of human 
deficiency.”316) As the body is objectified under the white/male gaze,317 it becomes a 
thing, from which one is distanced.318 It is this experience of objectification Fanon had in 
mind when he wrote: “I came into this world anxious to uncover the meaning of things, 
my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world, and here I am an object among other 
objects.”319 The body under the white/male gaze is the racially marked, sexually deviant, 
or the feminized body, always overdetermined and impeded in its objectification. The 
marked subject seeking transcendence is distanced from h/er body which s/he 
experiences as a burden whereby h/er status as a constituting subject is rendered 
problematic as s/he lives her subjectivity as always already restricted. Whereas the 
316  Lewis Gordon, Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1999), 101.
317  White and male here does not necessarily denote white or male bodies or identities. The gaze can be 
employed by different agents, yet it is tied to the systems of oppression that privilege whiteness and 
masculinity.
318  See: George Yancy’s Black Bodies, White Gazes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), 2008: 15.
319  Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 89. Emphasis added.
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unmarked subject experiences no discrepancy between how his body is seen and lived, 
thereby his status as “the origin of the world” eludes any sort of problematization.
One's embodiment becomes an issue precisely when one's body is marked. Thus, 
it makes sense for us to take the body as a site of political contestation, as so many times 
one's capabilities as a human being are reduced to one's body, or rather what that body 
signifies. Further, many feminists and antiracists have made the point that we not only 
are our marked bodies, but we become them in perpetually adopting and inhabiting the 
meanings that our bodies carry. This is demonstrated by Iris Young in her examination of 
the physical timidity of feminine bodily comportment: 
Typically, the feminine body underuses its real capacity, both as the potentiality 
of its physical size and strength and as the real skills and coordination which 
are available to it. Feminine bodily existence is an inhibited intentionality, 
which simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ and 
withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed ‘I cannot.’320
The feminine body learns to be timid through its interaction with the world, and it 
“knows” that it is “a thing which exists as looked at and acted upon”321 as opposed to a 
fully capable agent of action. Hence the feminine body becomes a fragile body through 
habituation, and enacts the fragility that it became. The “knowledge” that the feminine 
body acquires (that it is weak and fragile) is a piece of knowledge that interferes with the 
achievement of the full potentiality of that body.
When thinking about white ignorance, the issue lies more within the embodiment 
of the privileged than the oppressed, in other words, within those who are unburdened by 
320  Iris Marion Young, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, 
Motility, and Spatiality” Human Studies 3. no. 2 (1980): 146.
321  Ibid, 148.
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a body that carries with it the mark of inferiority. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the body 
as the primary site of subjectivity can offer a way to understand white subjectivities as 
they are bound up with ignorance. Merleau-Ponty writes: “Bodily experience forces us to 
acknowledge an imposition of meaning, which is not the work of a universal-constituting 
consciousness, a meaning which clings to certain contents.”322 This imposed meaning is 
an accumulation of the body’s interaction with the environment, through which the body 
learns. Thus, based on this give-and-take relation, one may characterize this interaction 
as some sort of transaction with the world, a process through which the world comes to 
inhabit the body as much as the body inhabits the world. In his famous phantom limb 
example, Merleau-Ponty explains that the patient still acts as if she is not missing a limb, 
even though she is perfectly aware on a conscious level that she cannot perform certain 
tasks in the way she used to be able to. She attempts to open the door by way of turning 
the doorknob, yet the doorknob cannot be turned as she is missing her arm. From this, we 
can infer that her “habitual body” involves the knowledge that one is to turn a doorknob 
in order to open the door. The habitual body is comprised of the sedimentation of such 
knowledge whereby the body acts on the environment based on that knowledge, with no 
necessary awareness on a conscious level. As the conditions of sedimentation change (as 
in the case of losing a limb), the ways in which the body acts on the world will gradually 
change (that is, the subject will eventually develop new habits to adjust to the changing 
circumstances). Thus, the subject can learn to inhabit the world otherwise.
Merleau-Ponty’s insight about the body as the site of knowledge offers a means 
through which we can examine the sedimentation of ignorance in the body. As white 
subjectivities are shaped through bodily interactions with a racist world, the accumulation 
322  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 46.
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of “knowledge” that gets sedimented in one’s habitual body will involve the kind of 
“knowledge” that is wrong, deceiving, and detrimental. Taken alongside Mills’s account 
of epistemology of ignorance, this suggests that the body knows, yet what it knows is the 
ignore-ance of white privilege which gets passed on as knowledge under the current truth 
regime. The codification of the black (and brown) masculine bodies as threatening is 
precisely linked to this process of sedimentation, where the body reacts in fear in that 
encounter, regardless of whether or not there is real threat.
What the body knows, the body takes for granted. No awareness need be directed 
toward that “knowledge,” nonetheless the “knowledge” itself is enacted continuously. If 
we were to take this up as a way of accounting for white subjectivities whose racial 
experience is not marked (thereby the body is not lived as a burden), we can see the ways 
in which ignorance is acquired through bodily habituation and sedimentation, and in turn 
enacted without conscious awareness. Such ignorance that is embedded in one’s body and 
enacted in one’s bodily engagements with the world is a critical component of the 
epistemology of ignorance.
In order to see how this plays out in a racialized context, one may consider 
Fanon’s account of the body schema. The implicit knowledge that is sedimented in the 
body is at play in Fanon’s depiction of reaching for cigarettes as well. If he wants to 
smoke, all he needs to do is to stretch his arm to pick up the pack of cigarettes at the other 
end of the table. And to light the cigarette, he would need to open the drawer where the 
matches are. He suggests that he performs these moves by virtue of an “implicit 
knowledge,”323 as his body moves around space based on this very knowledge that it 
acquired over time. What Merleau-Ponty calls “habitual body,” then, is linked with 
323  Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 90.
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Fanon’s “body schema,” which he defines as “[a] slow construction of myself as a body 
in a spatial and temporal world.”324 Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the habitual 
body, the body schema in this context denotes a free transaction between the body and the 
world, a transaction that Fanon calls “a genuine dialectic,”325 through which “a definitive 
structuring of myself and the world” takes place.326 Yet, beneath this body schema, 
according to Fanon, there emerges a “historical-racial schema,” whereby the racially 
marked body is “woven...out of a thousand details, anecdotes, and stories,”327 which 
interrupts and indeed renders impossible a free transaction between a racist world and a 
racially marked subject. The historical-racial schema is marked by a violent imposition 
whereby “white people’s racist perceptions of [Fanon] as a savage subperson”328 (i.e. 
white ignorance) are demanded to be incorporated into the body schema. This marks a 
break down in the free flow of the body schema, instead “giving way to an epidermal 
racial schema.”329 In the context of racism, then, a race-neutral330 body schema is 
shattered and superseded by the historical-racial schema, which debases and restrains the 
racially marked body in substantial ways.
Shannon Sullivan sums up this situation in the following way: “In a world infused 
with white privilege, a black person’s bodily comportment is always being constituted by 
324 Ibid, 91.
325 Fanon explains genuineness as the absence of “imposition.” Even though there is imposition in 
Merleau-Ponty’s account, it is important to note that Fanon and Merleau-Ponty uses “imposition” in a 
different way. For Fanon, it denotes the world “determining” the body, whereas for Merleau-Ponty there 
is no such determination, but instead a set of constraints imposed onto the body.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 102.
329 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 91.
330 Even though this is how Fanon puts it, we may question what racially neutral means in this context 
(especially in the all-pervasiveness of racism), and whether the historical-racial schema is, as it were, 
superimposed. We may also ask whether this free-flow, or true dialectic, is in fact a real condition, 
granted that our embodiment is always already constrained in different ways by virtue of being shaped 
through the world. For example, what Fanon takes to be a neutral, standard body schema may very well 
be a masculine one, taking itself to be natural and concealing its own history achieved through 
masculine entitlement.
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the raced and racist space in which he or she lives.”331 By implication, the white body 
schema is taken as “normal,” as that which eludes or remains uninterrupted by the 
detrimental effects of the historical-racial schema. However, this is problematic, for the 
white body schema that is shaped by racism is not “normal” or “standard” by any means, 
but normative and standardized, and one may even add, pathological.332 Sullivan attempts 
to mitigate this problem by explaining that “the lack of racialized obstacles to the 
formation of white person’s body schema exists precisely because of the historico-racial 
schema that privileges whiteness,” whereby “[t]he same historico-racial schema 
described by Fanon both disrupts the black person’s and enables the white person’s 
composition of their bodily schemas.”333 Thus, for instance, white cleanliness/purity and 
black dangerousness/criminality are established in the same move when whites 
immediately lock their car doors upon the sight of a Black person approaching.334
Even though this approach to the white body schema/black historical-racial 
schema as bound up with each other is helpful in understanding racially differentiated 
forms of lived bodily experience, it lacks precision in its failure to specify modes of racist 
embodiment, as white embodiment is simply seen in terms of a lack of impediment. Yet, 
if we are to take up ignorance as a positive notion that is productive of subjectivity, we 
are compelled to address the specific modes in which it is embodied. Only then these 
modes can be de-naturalized by exposing how the white body schema is a function of a 
system of racial oppression. In other words, it is not that the white body schema is simply 
uninhibited and the non-white body schema is, but rather that they are both impacted by 
331 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 103.
332 Pathological insofar as the uninhibited, entitled white body schema is enabled by the historical-racial 
(racist?) schema. That is to say, it is pathologically racist. 
333 Ibid.
334 Yancy, Look, a White! (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012), 31.
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the historical-racial schema. If we were to make an analogy, we could say that the 
uninhibited masculine body cannot be understood as a simple diametrical opposition of 
the impeded feminine body as explicated by Young, but rather it involves its own modes 
of motility and comportment. Looking back on my own experience of going to junior 
high school in Turkey where it was mandatory to wear uniforms (skirts for girls, and 
pants for boys, of course), this differentiation in bodily comportment becomes clear. Girls 
tend keep their legs closed, have a modest posture, they hunch over to hide their breasts, 
and so on. Boys, on the other hand, have a much more “expansive” posture as they 
stretch their legs, keep their shoulders up, and move around and fidget. It would be wrong 
to assume that the masculine comportment, in this case, is natural or ideal, whereas the 
feminine comportment is simply its impediment, as we very well know that not all 
aspects of this expansive comportment is desirable or ideal (for instance, bullying, or 
even just crowding others). The question, then, is whether one can pinpoint an analogue 
of these feminine/masculine modes of embodiment as inhabitation of gender in white 
embodiment of ignorance.
Racialized modes of ignorance, I would like to suggest, are the functions of 
sedimented “knowledge” of bodies. What the body “knows” and enacts based on that 
“knowledge,” in this model, is white ignorance. While it is not only white bodies that 
enact that “knowledge,” whose schema is shaped by the sedimentation of ignorance as 
mistaken knowledge, that “knowledge” that is enacted itself is situated in a white 
supremacist social context. In this sense, regardless of one's particular subjective 
position, there is a certain complicity, an internalization of whiteness as it were, at work 
in the enactment of that “knowledge.” However, given that I am interested in bringing out 
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the peculiarity of that which is rendered invisible in its universality, normativity, and 
unmarked status, I shall work with the specific example of the white body in order to map 
the impact of historical-racial schema onto the white body schema. In this sense, this 
project is similar to that of Peggy McIntosh's in her essay “White Privilege,” where she 
enumerates the ways in which whites are privileged, yet at the same time are blind to 
those privileges. Once pinned down, the unthought dimension of the body may be 
transformed.
Caroline Knowles’s account of race as “made through corporeality and 
comportment, through bodily movement and intersections with space”335 may prove 
helpful to map out the ways in which whiteness is made as a specific mode of 
corporeality and comportment. She notes that the “[t]echniques of the body, posture, 
attitude, movements and habits are also performances of ethnicity, race and hybridised 
cultural practices which lend their (orchestrated) mobile character to the architecture of 
the streets.”336 Thus, by looking at “how people comport themselves,” one can gain 
insight into “both enactment and composition of (raced) subjectivity.”337 This way, modes 
of embodiment that are marked by whiteness do not go unnoticed. She notes, “[r]outine 
corporeality and comportment also intersect with entitlement and territory,” as whites 
“walk with a sense of (historical) entitlement, an unchallengeable right to be there” in 
cities and towns where whites historically have resided.338 White entitlement, here, 
corresponds to feeling of discomfort, fear, and vigilance on the part of non-whites. 
According to Sara Ahmed, this territorialization is linked to “the regulation of bodies in 
335  Caroline Knowles, “Theorising Race and Ethnicity: Contemporary Paradigms and Perspectives,” in 
The SAGE Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies, ed. Patricia Hill Collins & John Solomos (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2010), 31.
336  Ibid.
337  Ibid.
338  Ibid, 32.
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space through the uneven distribution of fear.”339 Thus, spaces that become territories are 
“claimed as rights by some bodies and not others.”340 As the public spaces are 
territorialized as masculine, for example, Elizabeth Stanko explains that feminine bodies 
are produced as fearful and restricted mobility.341 Vulnerability, then, far from being “an 
inherent characteristic of women’s bodies,” is “an effect that works to secure femininity 
as a delimitation of movement in the public, and over-inhabitance in the private.”342 
This dyadic affective economy of entitlement/fear transforms the body schema so 
that the social space is arranged in a certain manner. Fear, Ahmed notes, “involves 
shrinking the body” 343 so that the body takes up less space, turns inward, tightens up, 
seals onto itself. Entitlement, on the other hand, is lived as uninhibited “movement or 
expansion,” causing the Other to feel fear as a restricted body.344 Just as masculine 
entitlement is bound up with feminine fear and vulnerability, white entitlement (not as 
mere lack of inhibition but as expansion) precipitates fear and vulnerability in those who 
are not white, and thus are not welcome in white spaces.345
Yet, one may suggest that whites do not always experience their bodies as 
expansive, entitled bodies in relation to disadvantaged non-whites. What about, one may 
ask, when whites find themselves fearful, in what they perceive as a dangerous situation 
in their encounter with non-whites, for instance, sitting in their car in a black 
339  Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004), 70.
340  Ibid.
341  Elizabeth Stanko, Everyday Violence: How Women and Men Experience Sexual and Physical Danger 
(London: Pandora, 1990).
342  Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 70.
343  Ibid, 69.
344  Ibid.
345 Jackson Katz gives an account of how masculinity offers a sense of empowerment to men of color in his 
reading of the media depictions of masculinity in his documentary Tough Guise. This offers an 
interesting way to think about how racial domination and gender domination are linked.
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neighborhood? What does fear do, in such cases? Does it involve a shrinking of the body 
to give way to uninhibited black expansion?
White vulnerability, in such cases, operates as an oppressive mechanism against 
non-whites in its consolidation of white purity and innocence, for white purity and 
innocence are established only in relation to black criminality. There is an insidious 
feeling of entitlement at work in white fear. We must ask who gets to fear, whose fear is 
legitimized, under what conditions, and at the expense of whom. In one of the very first 
scenes of the provocative 2005 film Crash, in which racial dynamics in Los Angeles are 
explored, a white woman holds her husband tight upon the sight of two black men. This 
is noticed by one of these men who goes on to tell his friend: 
Man, look around you, man. You couldn’t find a whiter, safer, better lit 
part of the city right now. But yet this white woman sees two black guys 
who look like UCLA students strolling down the sidewalk and her reaction 
is blind fear? I mean, look at us dog, are we dressed like gangbangers? 
Huh? No. Do we look threatening? No. Fact: if anybody should be scared 
around here, it’s us. We’re the only two black faces surrounded by a sea of 
over-caffeinated white people, patrolled by the triggerhappy LAPD. So 
you tell me: Why aren’t we scared?346
Affective economy of fear operates in such a way that renders irrational, racist 
fear of whites legitimate. This kind of fear reinforces “the stability of white identity qua 
normative,”347 while consolidating the black identity as the dangerous, inferior Other. 
346 It must be noted that right after giving this speech, this man goes on to pull out a gun and hijack a car. It 
later becomes clear that he sees his own criminality not simply as a reproduction of a stereotype, but 
instead an act of resistance in the face of racism. The movie was clearly going for the shock value with 
this scene.
347  Yancy, Look, a White!, 31.
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White fear, then, is linked to entitlement insofar as whites are entitled to feel fear, even 
when they are in a safe white space, i.e. white territory, whereas non-whites have to deal 
with the consequences of this fear.348 Fear is also a bodily expression, a symptom, of 
white ignorance. It enacts a certain knowledge claim, or a series of knowledge claims that 
not only permeate one’s cognitive states, but are also operative in one’s bodily 
comportment, in that one’s comportment is shaped through fear. Thus, upon the sight of a 
black (or brown) man, white people act upon this “knowledge” (“Black is dangerous,” 
“Black is criminal,” “The Black is going to kill me,” “The Black is going to rob me,” and 
so on) that is sedimented in their habitual body. In reacting with fear, the body “knows” 
black criminality, and responds immediately based on that “knowledge.”
White fear, then, is not a kind of fear that shrinks the white body, but instead, it 
shrinks the black body. This is not only because the white body shames, degrades, and 
expels the black body in fearing, but also because white fear becomes a real, and 
sometimes fatal, threat. White fear not only violates and degrades, but also kills black 
bodies which it takes as its object. Hence, vulnerability is displaced: a black body is the 
truly vulnerable body when confronted with an entitled, fearful white body. Ahmed notes 
that while affect involves “readings of openness of bodies to being affected,” fear in 
particular “reads that openness as the possibility of danger or pain,” as opposed to hope, 
which “reads that openness as the possibility of desire or joy.”349 This particular reading 
projected onto black masculinity that anticipates harm is linked to an affective 
epistemology wherein fear performs white ignorance, in the form of mistaken knowledge. 
Ahmed writes: “These readings reshape bodies. Whilst fear may shrink the body in 
348  In fact, toward the end of the film, one of these men gets killed as a result of a white man’s fear.
349 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 185.
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anticipation of injury, hope may expand the contours of bodies, as they reach towards 
what is possible.”350 Yet this particular economy of fear, in contrast, expands the body that 
is positioned vis-à-vis black masculinity in its anticipation of injury. This expansion takes 
place both in the infliction of violence and the legitimization of that violence within 
juridicial settings. The fearing body may experience oneself as vulnerable, as the to-be 
victim. That experience, and not that of the actual victim, is what counts in trial. That 
possibility of harm, that perception of danger is decidedly the sole perspective through 
which adjudication takes place, where a racialized logic of preemption is operative. Fear 
determines the meaning of the encounter in its linked to an affective epistemology of 
ignorance.
In an act of reversal, fear shrinks the racially marked body, while expanding the 
non-marked body. Within the rhetoric of safety,  “We want our streets to be safe” so often 
reads, “We want only good white folks on these streets.” The little boy who thinks that 
Fanon is going to “eat him” is afraid, and his fear reconfigures Fanon’s body by 
reshaping its comportment: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, 
redone, draped in mourning...”351 Fanon begins trembling with fear felt as coldness, 
misread by the little boy as rage. Fanon cannot be trembling with fear, as Blacks do not 
fear: fear is a privilege reserved to whites; it is a white prerogative to fear a Black man 
and end his life on the basis of that fear.  Whites are entitled to be vulnerable, in their 
enactment of ignorance, which operates through fear as an embodied “knowledge” that 
“Blacks are dangerous.” This very “knowledge” that fear conveys establishes white 
subjectivity in the form of purity.
350 Ibid.
351  Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 93.
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Ahmed notes that “[f]ear’s relation to the object has an important temporal 
dimension.”352 As a felt intensity in the present, fear “projects us from the present into a 
future,” through “an anticipation of hurt of injury.”353 That very anticipation rests on an 
overdetermination of the fear’s object (“Black as evil,” “Black as dangerous”), rather 
than a felt anxiety that comes from uncertainty (“What is that stranger going to do to 
me?”). There is a paranoiac epistemology at work as the encounter is overdetermined by 
the possibility of injury. There is a presumption on the part of the subject of fear that s/he 
is going to be hurt, or harmed in some way. This presumption is linked to bodily 
ignorance, insofar as the overdetermination that is imposed on the fear object is that 
which the body “knows.” In this sense, fear is not only a projection of the present into the 
future by way of anticipating hurt, but a culmination of the past sedimented knowledge of 
the body which make up that very anticipation. The temporal continuum of fear thereby 
shows that fear is not a “natural” reaction of the body, but is linked to the epistemology of 
ignorance that one embodies. Fear, then, is the performance of that ignorance, and as 
such, it involves a certain disclosure: it is the disclosing of one’s own status as an 
oppressor to oneself. It is this disclosure that we do not find in the undisrupted modes of 
white embodiment354 whereby ignorance prevails. Yet in the disruption of the body 
schema by the previously concealed historical-racial schema emerges the very possibility 
to undo that “whiteliness,” to borrow from Marilyn Frye, in the form of white ignorance. 
It is important to note that fear is not the only affect through which white 
ignorance is expressed, but there are milder forms that are just as expressive, as will be 
shown through a reading of an episode of the situational comedy television series, The 
352  Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 65.
353  Ibid, 65.
354  For instance, comfort, complacency, and entitlement that comes with “whiteliness,” to borrow from 
Marilyn Frye.
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New Adventures of Old Christine. These include distress, anxiety, discomfort, unease, 
apprehension, among others, all of which are tied to racial entitlement in varying degrees.
The New Adventures of Old Christine is a television series that ran from 2006 to 
2010. It is a comedy about the life of a white single mother Christine (Julia Louis-
Dreyfus) after her divorce. She owns a gym with her best friend/business partner Barb 
(Wanda Sykes). Unlike the majority of white American sitcom characters portrayed as 
“good whites,” Christine’s whiteness and egalitarian commitments are repeatedly 
problematized throughout the show. Numerous episodes expose and deal with Christine’s 
ignorant progressivism, and one in particular (“White Like Me”) takes up Christine’s 
insidious racism lurking behind her self-proclaimed colorblindness. In this episode, Barb 
gets featured in a business journal about Black women, hoping to get new members in the 
gym. As soon as the interview is published, Christine finds that the gym gets crowded 
with new members, all of whom are Black women. Upon her brother and ex-husband’s 
visit, she looks unusually busy and stressed out. Her brother, amused by the change in the 
demographics of the clientele, comments, “You own a black gym!” to which Christine 
responds, “What? Where did you get that?” and goes on to say that of course she has not 
noticed that everyone in the gym is black, because she is “a Democrat.” “What does that 
mean?” her ex-husband asks, to which she responds: “I drive a Prius. I don’t see color.”
Christine’s self-proclaimed colorblindness is in direct conflict with her feelings of 
discomfort around the new black female members of the gym. Her responses to her 
brother’s and ex-husband’s questions regarding this are short and dismissive. She looks 
highly tense and uncomfortable, as her ex-husband and her brother continue asking her 
questions. “What color is your Prius?” her brother asks, mocking her “colorblindness.” 
168
Christine responds: “No idea. I’m not a racist.” When her ex-husband tries to explain that 
it does not make her a racist to notice that somebody is black, she snaps and says that she 
does not want to talk about this anymore. As her brother asks, “What’s wrong with you, 
you’re so stressed out, it’s like the muscles in your jaw are so tight, you’re developing a 
tick,” the camera turns to Christine whose eye started twitching.
What causes Christine’s unusual stress is not revealed, at least until the next day. 
Barb, having been overwhelmed by having to deal with everything by herself asks Ali 
(the socially awkward white gym worker who seems to be rather enjoying the change in 
the gym as she is dancing to the stereotypically black music) where Christine is. Ali 
points at Christine’s office, where we see Christine staring through the glass door at the 
new members with an uneasy look on her face. Barb gets Christine to come out and help 
out with the signing up process for two new members. As Christine is introduced to them, 
her comportment gives away that she feels very uncomfortable. As they carry on an 
awkward conversation in which Christine makes little sense, Christine’s eye starts 
twitching again. When Barb asks, “What’s going on with your face,” Christine responds, 
“Equality... Hope…” She cannot wait to flee the situation. She finally says, “Now if you 
will just excuse me, I will pop black into my office.” She pauses, embarrassed because of 
her slip of the tongue, and corrects herself, “Back. Not black,” nervously laughing. She 
goes on to make things worse saying, “So if you’ll excuse me, I will be white black.”
Christine’s feelings of unease are precipitated by her close proximity to black 
women, which makes absolutely no sense to her. Her middle class suburban life style and 
egalitarian values (such as driving an environment-friendly car, sending her son to a posh 
private school, always being surrounded by white people, etc.) hitherto had been able to 
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mask her white ignorance.355 Her body is signaling something which Christine had been 
ignorant about and is reluctant to face: her own racism. Here we have a case of white 
ignorance exposed through bodily discomfort: twitching, nervous laughter, and slips of 
the tongue. White ignorance can be lived unproblematically insofar as one keeps one’s 
distance from non-whites – which is why my students often tell me, they never really had 
to think about race because there were no people of color in the town where they grew 
up, as if whiteness constitutes a racially “blank slate.” Christine’s body schema, then, is 
enabled precisely by the historical-racial schema: a body unrestricted, entitled, and 
oblivious, unaware that its lack of restriction comes at the expense of others’ suffering.356 
This is revealed by the disruption of her bodily schema, which leaves her feel threatened, 
in distress, and confused.
Christine’s case makes it clear that it is not so much that the white body is 
untouched by the historical-racial schema, but rather, that the modes of its comportment 
are racially differentiated, namely, comfort/discomfort, extension/shrinkage, 
complacency/fear, arrogance/distress… Whereas the first end of the spectrum entails a 
forgetting, denial, and ignore-ance of white privilege (while at the same time benefitting 
from it to the extent of abuse), the second end denotes a problematized state of white 
ignorance whereby the body enacts, consolidates, and discloses its own ignorance. 
Further, the two ends of the spectrum are inherently tied to one other, as white 
complacency, arrogance, and ignorance are bound up with white fear, discomfort, and 
feelings of unease.
355 That is, insofar as she is ignore-ant of her own privileged status precisely by virtue of being ignore-ant 
of others.
356 Various effects of racial marginalization exemplify this suffering. Christine’s body schema (i.e. white 
bodily ignorance) conceal both this marginalization and her own privilege (for she does not have to deal 
with it so long as she holds egalitarian beliefs – yet her body reveals the racism embedded within).
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George Yancy calls the disclosure of one’s own racism (be it through affective 
forms such as fear, or otherwise) enabled by the disruption of white body schema, “white 
ambush.”357 Whiteness, not a physiological trait, but a social becoming for Yancy, entails 
an embodiment of racism in a racist society. The ways in which racism is “embedded 
within one’s embodied habitual engagement with the social world and how it is weaved 
within the unconscious, impacting everyday mundane transactions”358 lead to 
experiencing whiteness as ambush, precisely because one catches oneself off-guard, 
realizes one’s ignorance, and undergoes a certain estrangement and distancing from 
oneself. Yancy suggests that these moments of ambush are manifestations of one’s own 
racism that had gone unnoticed, and they may become the occasion for self-
transformation. If white ignorance is mistaken, racially motivated, skewed knowledge 
that is sedimented in the white habitual body thereby comprising the white body schema, 
the very undoing of that ignorance will involve “performing the body’s racialized 
interactions with the world differently,”359 rather than merely a cognitive shift. 
The necessity for such transformation becomes clear in the case of Christine, 
where Christine does not believe that she is racist or that blacks do not belong in her gym, 
yet her body still reacts to being in close proximity to black women. Attending to her 
feeling of discomfort, Christine admits to Barb, “For the last two days every time I walk 
into this gym, I feel nervous…I just want to hide in my office and not talk to anyone. Do 
you have any idea what it’s like to be a minority?” Barb, of course, as a black woman, 
very well knows “what it’s like to be a minority,” about which Christine is clueless. Yet, 
the issue is neutralized in Barb’s attempt to comfort Christine that she is not a racist by 
357  Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).
358  Ibid, 230.
359  George Yancy, “Elevators, Social Spaces and Racism,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 34. no. 8 (2008):
843.
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saying, “Everyone feels more comfortable when they are surrounded by people who look 
like them. That's why Martha Stewart bought Connecticut.” Except, of course, that white 
discomfort is linked to a very specific history of white racism, and finds embodiment as a 
form of white entitlement. It is not the case that any white person in Christine’s situation 
would feel uncomfortable, either: Christine’s discomfort at the gym contrasts with Ali’s 
enhanced comfort. Rather than dealing with her racist sentiments and looking for ways to 
undo them, Christine decides to “integrate” the gym by getting white people to sign up, 
so that she would feel more comfortable around “people who look like [her].” The 
disruption of her body schema as a disclosure of her whiteliness is suspended as Christine 
goes back to her blissful ignorance and white complacency. Returning to her comfort 
zone, she refuses to attend to her own affective states as symptoms of the problematic 
manner in which she inhabits whiteness. The possibility of inhabiting whiteness 
otherwise is foreclosed upon the decision to ignore her body and bodily ignorance. There 
is, of course, another path to take. Instead of going back to blissful ignorance, one may 
choose to spend time with one’s own distress and retrain one’s body to employ other 
modes in the encounter with the Other, namely, wonder, curiosity, openness, sympathy, 
generosity, and so on. This involves an ethics of self-transformation, which has been 
articulately explicated by a number of scholars.360
In this context, ignorance, conceptualized as a positive notion, is productive of 
white subjectivity, rather than its deficient aftereffect. As seen in the white person’s 
encounter with the Other, fear operates as an oppressive mechanism that not only 
degrades, expels, and shames blackness (and inhibits the black body schema), but also 
360  Including Irigaray, Lugones, and Foucault. Saba Mahmood’s “Positive Ethics and Ritual Conventions” 
in Politics of Piety is also very insightful on this subject.
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establishes white subjectivity as purity, innocence, and moral superiority. In this sense, 
there is an affective economy in which fear partakes whereby white bodily comportment 
is marked by entitlement. When the white subject experiences fear, s/he experiences h/er 
own ignorance as distorted, sedimented, embodied “knowledge.” Fear, then, marks a 
disclosure whereby the white body schema is threatened and disrupted, and this 
disruption can potentially become the occasion for self-transformation as inhabiting 
whiteness otherwise. As seen in the character of Christine, a white woman with 
egalitarian values, one’s body can enact sedimented white ignorance despite one’s own 
personal or political commitments. This experience of one’s ignorance expressed through 
bodily comportment and affectivity offers insight into forms of white ignorance that are 
irreducible to a cognitive framework that prioritizes cognitive states over that of the body. 
By attending to these bodily reactions, the ways in which ignorance is a bodily 
inhabitation can be explored. Such exploration could provide a basis for the 
transformation of the body schema and the affective economy at work in such encounters 
in a racialized context.
The investment of bodies with certain meanings that indicate threat or danger is 
linked to a politics of paranoia. The practices of securitization take place in a racialized 
context where intersubjective relations are colonized by these meanings. While my focus 
here has been on the codification of black masculinity in particular as threatening, it 
should be noted that this codification has a specific genealogy that may overlap with 
others (for instance, how the turban that Sikh men wear has been misconstrued to denote 
Muslim masculinity and thereby terrorism). The affective economy of fear operative in 
these encounters is indicative of a certain epistemological framework. While I explored 
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this link in terms of an epistemology of ignorance, in the next section, I take up 
decolonial feminist poetry's intervention to these practices of knowing that opens up 
other forms of relationality that are not laden with fear, suspicion, and loathing. This 
intervention shows that while an ethics of self-transformation is useful and necessary, a 
broader epistemological shift is needed. I suggest that in order for that shift to be viable, 
we also need social systems that would accommodate for it, as well as uphold and sustain 
those patterns of relationality. The nation-state and the way it is currently situated in 
global capitalism renders this unlikely.
5.2 The Epistemological Intervention of Decolonial Feminist Poetry
Walter Mignolo defines decoloniality in terms of the “struggles to bring into 
intervening existence an-other interpretation that brings forward, on the one hand, a 
silenced view of the event and, on the other, shows the limits of imperial ideology 
disguised as the true (total) interpretation of the events.”361 Decoloniality, in other words, 
entails a project of epistemological decolonization which seeks to undo the effects of the 
epistemology of ignorance whereby unknowing passes for knowledge as previously 
discussed. Decoloniality as an epistemological project, as Aníbal Quijano puts it, “clear[s] 
the way for an interchange of experiences and meanings, as the basis of another rationality 
which may legitimately pretend to some universality.”362 In contemporary poetry, works by 
women of color, which I present here under the heading of “decolonial feminist poetry,” 
offer an epistemological intervention that brings about new ways to think about 
relationality, historicity, and difference. Other kinds of rationality emerge out of these 
works that challenge the paranoiac epistemic framework through which the racialized 
361 Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, 8.
362 Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” 177.
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Other is codified as threatening, deemed to be dispensable, and sought to be expelled. 
Decolonial feminist poetry serves to disrupt the affective economies that are tied to a 
politics of paranoia by way of articulating another way of relating to others, oneself, and 
the world, informed by a politics of healing (as opposed to retribution). In attempting to 
shift these sedimented practices of knowing, decolonial feminist poetry seeks to rectify the 
epistemic violence propelled by the affective economy of fear that permeates the 
intersubjective dimension of the politics of securitization. These poems, in other words, 
entail an epistemological shift through transformative affective circulations.
The contemporary poets that I bring together here under the umbrella term 
“decolonial feminist poetry” are of different national origins, use different themes, and 
employ different styles. One might therefore suggest that perhaps they have little in 
common. Yet I argue that their projects are linked in that they each write from the 
standpoint of identifying as what Cherríe Moraga called “ refugees of a world of fire.”363 
“What if,” Moraga writes, “we declared ourselves perpetual refugees in solidarity with 
all refugees?”364 The work of these poets is not only a practice of solidarity in an abstract 
sense, but they begin from the experience of displacement. For these works, the colonized 
body is a starting point. They are a reflection of the poetic reverberation of suffering, 
fissures, silence, exploitation, trauma, fragmentation, ambivalence, abandonment, self-
love, self-loathing, pain, joy, and countless others, all of which are historically, socially, 
363 Jacqui Alexander takes up this characterization that Moraga employs in her foreword to the second 
edition of This Bridge Called My Back by thinking about what might it mean, for women of color, to 
see ourselves as “refugees of a world on fire.” She writes: “Not citizen. Not naturalized citizen. Not 
immigrant. Not undocumented. Not illegal alien. Not permanent resident. Not resident alien. But 
refugees fleeing some terrible atrocity far too threatening to engage, ejected out of the familiar into 
some unknown, still-to-be-revealed place. Refugees forced to create out of the raw smithy of fire a 
shape different from our inheritance, with no blueprints, no guarantees” (265).
364 Cherríe Moraga, “Refugees of a World on Fire” in This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical 
Women of Color 20th Anniversary Edition, ed. Moraga and Anzaldua (Berkeley: Third Woman Press, 
2002); June Jordan, Affirmative Acts (New York: Anchor Books, 1998), 94.
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and politically grounded. Taking to heart Carol Hanisch's famous formulation that “the 
personal is political,”365 these poets show that the political is also personal. Their poetic 
telling of the colonized body attests to the violence involved in the hegemonic 
epistemological framework and creates a space for its undoing. 
My contention is that this epistemological intervention offered by decolonial 
feminist poetry can bring about a shift in terms of relationality, both in its conceptualization
and practice. It is not knowledge as mastery or conquest or knowledge as ignorance that 
grounds these epistemic practices of alliances across difference. Knowledge itself becomes 
a matter of resistance, a matter of educating oneself about the struggles of others, seeking 
beyond what is presented within the framework of the epistemology of ignorance. This 
serves the epistemological ground for establishing alliances across difference. Following 
Jacqui Alexander's reformulation of Beauvoir's famous phrase, “We are not born women of 
color. We become women of color,” poetry offers a platform for coming to a “woman of 
color consciousness,” which “at the very least...requires collective fluency in our particular 
histories, an understanding of how different, gendered racisms operate, their old 
institutionalized link to the histories of slavery in the United States as well as their newer 
manifestations that partly rely on the 'foreignness' of immigrants who have not been 
socialized into the racial/racist geographies of the United States.”366 Part of this education 
takes place through an affective engagement with the writings of women of color. Poetry, in
this sense, serves as a ground for establishing decolonial feminist alliances. As Alexander 
puts it, “No matter our countries of origin, decolonization is a project for all.”367 
365 Carol Hanisch, “The Personal Is Political,” carolhanisch.org. January 2006. Accessed: July 21, 2016. 
http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html 
366 Jacqui Alexander, “Remembering This Bridge Called My Back, Remembering Ourselves,” in 
Pedagogies of Crossing (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 269.
367 Ibid, 272. Emphasis in the original.
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Decolonial feminist poetry, in short, calls for and brings about an epistemological 
shift by writing the colonized body as a practice of healing. In this practice, it is not the 
abstracted body, but the body in its historical specificity that serves as a ground for the 
articulation of both difference and interconnectedness. The process of healing, in this 
context, does not merely happen on an individual level, as delinked from history or 
sociality. Individual healing takes place on the level of intersubjectivity and within the 
larger context of collective struggles for social transformation. My body, in this context, as 
Judith Butler puts it, “is and is not mine.”368 “[T]o be a body,” Butler writes, “is to be given 
over to others even as a body is, emphatically, 'one's own.'”369 In this sense, writing the 
body is not a solipsistic act nor does it take place in isolation. The body that is the subject 
and the starting point of decolonial feminist poetry is one that is vulnerable and exploited in
its vulnerability, but also one that loves, creates, heals, moves, resists, rejoices, and 
constitutes the locus of political agency in standing in solidarity with others.
Gloria Anzaldúa characterizes writing as “a gesture of the body...a working from 
the inside out.”370 Highlighting the centrality of the body for the practice of writing, 
Anzaldúa writes: “My feminism is grounded not on incorporeal abstraction but on 
corporeal realities. The material body is center, and central. The body is ground of 
thought.”371 We have seen, in the previous section, that the epistemology of ignorance 
operates through the body as unknowing is sedimented in the body schema. Decolonial 
feminist poetry, in this context, is the telling of the story of the colonized body, 
particularly as marked by race and gender, the body that bears the memory of trauma, as 
368 Butler, Undoing Gender, 21.
369 Ibid.




Nayyirah Waheed's poem expresses: “we write from the body. / it remembers 
everything. / - melanin | bone and soil.”372 
It is through this particular lens, this centrality of the colonized body, that one 
may read the work of Rupi Kaur. The poems in her book Milk and Honey are laden with 
sensuousness, where the movement of poetic thought is very much grounded in the body, 
its senses and sensations. It is the body that is broken, bruised, abused, violated, abjected: 
“i don't know why / i split myself open / for others knowing / sewing myself up / hurts 
this much / afterward,”373 “you must have known / you were wrong / when your fingers / 
were dipped inside me / searching for honey that / would not come for you,”374 “you / 
have been / taught your legs / are a pit stop for men / that need a place to rest / a vacant 
body empty enough / for guests but no one / ever comes and is / willing to / stay,”375 “you 
pinned / my legs to / the ground / with your feet / and demanded / i stand up,”376 “the rape 
will / tear you / in half / but it / will not / end you,”377 “he guts her / with his fingers / like 
he's scraping / the inside of a / cantaloupe clean,”378 “our knees / pried open / by cousins / 
and uncles / and men / our bodies touched / by all the wrong people / that even in a bed 
full of safety / we are afraid.”379 It is the body that is in longing or one that has been 
abandoned: “my tongue is sour / from the hunger of / missing you,”380 “i was music / but 
you had your ears cut off,”381 “i am undoing you / from my skin.”382 But it is also the 
body that resists, heals, desires, and flourishes: “your body / is a museum / of natural 
372 Nayyirah Waheed, Salt (San Bernardino: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), 238.











disasters / can you grasp how / stunning that is,”383 “i like the way the stretch marks / on 
my thighs look human and / that we're so soft yet / rough and jungle wild / when we need 
to be / i love that about us / how capable we are of feeling / how unafraid we are of 
breaking / and tend to our wounds with grace / just being a woman / calling myself / a 
woman / makes me utterly whole / and complete,”384 “my issue with what they consider 
beautiful / is their concept of beauty / center around excluding people / I find hair 
beautiful / when a woman wears it / like a garden on her skin / that is the definition of 
beauty / big hooked noses / pointing upward to the sky / like they're rising / to the 
occasion / skin the color of earth / my ancestors planted crops on / to feed a lineage of 
women with / thighs thick as tree trunks / eyes like almonds / deeply hooded with 
conviction / the river of punjab / flow through my bloodstream so / don't tell me my 
women / aren't as beautiful / as the ones in / your country.”385 This book is structured 
much like a notebook or a collection of notes that Kaur kept of her thoughts on hurt, love, 
and healing, occasionally accompanied by scribbled drawings that bear some relevance. 
The poetic language that she employs here is simple yet powerful. The simplicity of the 
language is paired with profundity of thought, performed through corporeal imagery. 
The very first poem in the book reads, “how is it so easy for you / to be kind to 
people he asked / milk and honey dripped / from my lips as i answered / cause people 
have not / been kind to me.”386 Remaining “soft” despite hurt and trauma is underscored in 
the works of decolonial feminist poets. To fight back not with revenge but by cherishing 
life comes to the fore. Kaur's book in particular is a log of survival, yet not simply in an 






solidarity around decoloniality, the abjection of which ties women by way of what 
Alexander calls a woman of color consciousness. The body that is written here therefore 
is also a collective body, the body that connects one to others by way of the sharing of 
suffering. As Kaur writes: “our backs / tell stories /no books have / the spine to / carry / - 
women of color.”387 
The exploration of the colonized body, the body as wounded, exploited, raped, 
and sold, is undertaken by various decolonial feminist poets. Nayyirah Waheed writes: “i 
am a woman of color. / my bones have been / bought and sold every morning. / so, now I 
carry a machete / in my / mouth.”388 The machete that Waheed carries in her mouth is the 
















You lost it all in the fire
that is colonization
so, do not apologize
for owning every piece of you
they could not take, break
and claim as theirs389
387 Ibid, 171.
388 Waheed, Salt, 189.
389 Ijeoma Umebinyuo, Questions for Ada (San Bernardino: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 
2016),154.
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In the articulation of trauma, what decolonial feminist poets put forth is not 
victimization discourse, nor is it call for retribution. The focus is always on healing, on 
embracing life in the face of suffering. Waheed writes: “the wounds have changed me. / i 
am so soft with scars / my skin / breathes and beats stars.”390 Umebinyuo's poem entitled 
“Survival” expresses a similar sentiment of remaining soft despite the wounds: “I have 
always wondered / how women who carry war / inside their bones / still grow flowers / 
between their teeth.”391 While carrying war inside their bones, these women still grow, 
flourish, celebrate life, and continue to remain kind and beautiful, they still “grow flowers 
between their teeth.” Yet this does not mean that suffering is taken lightly. In her 
exploration of how a body carries the pain of war, of displacement and colonization, 
Warsan Shire notes that one becomes “ugly” with the burden of embodying loss. In her 
poem entitled “Ugly,” she writes: 
Your daughter is ugly.
She knows loss intimately,
carries whole cities in her belly.
…
You are her mother.
Why did you not warn her,
hold her like a rotting boat
and tell her that men will not love her
if she is covered in continents,
if her teeth are small colonies,
if her stomach is an island
if her thighs are borders?
What man wants to lie down
and watch the world burn
in his bedroom?
390 Waheed, Salt, 235.
391 Umebinyuo, Questions for Ada, 8.
181
Your daughter's face is a small riot,
her hands are a civil war,
a refugee camp behind each ear,




She knows “loss intimately” as her body is the very site that has endured, and continues 
to sustain, loss. She is the very embodiment of loss in that the war lives in her body, 
which has deemed her “ugly” or undesirable. Yet this “ugliness” is embraced as valuable, 
perhaps even beautiful in its own right for its truthfulness, in Shire's rhetorical question, 
“doesn't she wear the world well?” As Umebinyuo reminds us in a poem, “you are not 
alive / to please the aesthetic / of colonized eye.”393
In contrast to the masculinist rhetoric around retribution and power-over, these 
poems are about healing and solidarity, or power-with: “if we / wanted to. / people of 
color / could / burn the world down. / for what / we have experienced. / are experiencing. / 
but / we don't. / - how stunningly beautiful that our sacred respect for the earth. for life. is 
deeper than our rage.”394 Softness that is presented as a virtue may be said to be 
perpetuating a gender stereotype of traditional femininity, yet this presentation serves to 
valorize softness as a human virtue in the face of suffering, as expressive of strength and 
empowerment: “it is being honest / about / my pain / that makes me invincible / - yield,”395 
“You did not carry yourself / away from pain / to become pain itself. / A little kinder, 
darling. / A little softer, sweetheart,”396 “Where / your soul cracks open / to reveal flaws, / 
392 Shire, Teaching My Mother How to Give Birth, 31-2.
393 Umebinyuo, Questions for Ada, 117.
394 Waheed, Salt, 197.
395 Ibid, 169.
396 Umebinyuo, Questions for Ada, 74.
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plant flowers.”397 The story of the loss of softness, as entailed by hegemonic masculinity, is 
told as a tragedy:  “what / massacre / happens to my son / between / him / living within my 
skin. / drinking my cells. / my water. / my organs. / and / his soft psyche turning cruel. / 
does he not remember / he / is half woman. / - from,”398 “if / a man / can / only show 
vulnerability / for / what is between my legs. / can / only / be / a / heart / during / sex. / if an
orgasm / is / the only way / he / can / weep. / what is his life / but / a cage. / - prison.”399 
What is particularly underscored in the poems of Waheed, Umebinyuo, Shire, and 
others is survival, not merely as a continuation of one's physical presence, but as 
flourishing: “A black woman / can write of / loneliness. / or / love / or softness. / or the 
moon. / you may try valiantly / to cripple her. / but she will still grow flowers in her flesh. / 
- a genocide of flowers.”400 Writing, in this context, is an act of resistance, an act of 
growing flowers in the flesh. In a similar vein, Audre Lorde suggests that the poetic 
exploration of feeling as a form of articulating thought is a liberatory act. She writes: “The 
white fathers told us: I think, therefore I am. The Black mother within each of us – the poet 
– whispers in our dreams: I feel, therefore I can be free. Poetry coins the language to 
express and charter this revolutionary demand, the implementation of that freedom.”401 
According to Lorde, poetry is a place for thinking, for birthing ideas that are already felt, a 
means through which one gives “name to the nameless so it can be thought.”402 In this way, 
poetry cannot be reduced to rhetoric or “sterile word play”403 or an exercise of “imagination
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institutional dehumanization,” she writes, “our feelings were not meant to survive. Kept 
around as unavoidable adjuncts or pleasant pastimes, feelings were expected to kneel to 
men. But women have survived. As poets.”405 As a means of survival, poetry constitutes an 
act of resistance, it offers a site to articulate the workings of oppression on an intimate level
as well as to create a poetic world of survival.
In beginning from the colonized body and its felt reality, decolonial feminist poetry 
constitutes a healing practice. In the process of healing, it taps into what Lorde calls “the 
erotic.” The erotic is defined as “an assertion of the lifeforce of women; of that creative 
energy empowered, the knowledge and use of which we are now reclaiming in our 
language, our dancing, our loving, our work, our lives.”406 The erotic, according to Lorde, 
is a reserve for knowledge and empowerment that lies within, “a considered source of 
power and information within our lives,”407 which is linked to the experience of “the 
fullness of...depth of feeling.”408 Flourishing, or to “grow flowers in [the] flesh,” is tied to 
the exploration and celebration of the erotic. The colonized body, in Lorde's account, serves
as a site of knowledge whose erotic expressions constitute forms of resistance. She writes: 
“Our erotic knowledge empowers us, becomes a lens through which we scrutinize all 
aspects of our existence, forcing us to evaluate those aspects honestly in terms of their 
relative meaning within our lives. And this is a grave responsibility, projected from 
within each of us, not to settle for the convenient, the shoddy, the conventionally 
expected, nor the merely safe.”409 The erotic, then, becomes a guide for healing, rejoicing, 
thriving, and flourishing, which finds expression in the writing of the colonized body. As 
405 Ibid, 39.





we have seen previously, the body also serves as a site for the inscription of ignorance 
that passes for knowledge in the operation of the epistemology of ignorance in 
conjunction with the affective economy of fear. Yet in this case, decolonial feminist 
poetry involves the writing of the subjugated knowledge located in the body, the unheard, 
dismissed, doubted, ignored thought and feeling. Lorde notes that the erotic is a source of 
our “deepest and nonrational” knowledge whose power “we have come to distrust.”410 
She writes: “Beyond the superficial, the considered phrase, 'It feels right to me', 
acknowledges the strength of the erotic into a true knowledge, for what that means is the 
first and most powerful guiding light toward any understanding. And understanding is a 
handmaiden which can only wait upon, or clarify, that knowledge, deeply born. The 
erotic is the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge.”411 While knowledge 
here is that which emerges out of feeling and is turned into an understanding of what is 
already known, poetry is the expression of that knowledge, the very process of its 
articulation; it is knowledge made into understanding. This, again, is a liberatory project, 
a project of resistance and empowerment in that it brings to fore and valorizes subjugated 
knowledge.
The erotic is very much central to Rupi Kaur's poetry in particular. It is the 
writing of a desiring woman, a relentless exploration of sexual agency, of eroticism as a 
creative project, of survival, of self-affirmation: “the very thought of you / has my legs 
spread apart / like an easel with a canvas / begging for art,”412 “my heart quickens at / the 
thought of birthing poems / which is why i will never stop / opening myself up to 
conceive them / the lovemaking / to the words / is so erotic / i am either in love / or in lust 
410 Ibid.
411 Ibid, 56.
412 Kaur, Milk and Honey, 57.
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with / the writing / or both,”413  “i am learning / how to love him / by loving myself”414 
(paired with a scribble of a masturbating woman). Her poems are unabashedly sensual. In 
her writing, she taps into that hidden reserve that is the erotic as a way to empower. 
Embracing the erotic takes place against the backdrop of rape, abuse, and trauma, which 
she recounts in the first part of her book. Aurora Levins Morales calls this process 
“reclaiming the wounded erotic.”415 She writes:
Right here in our bodies, in our defense of our right to experience joy, in 
the refusal to abandon the place where we have been most completely 
invaded and colonized, in our determination to make the bombed and 
defoliated lands flower again and bear fruit, here where we have been 
most shamed is one of the most radical and sacred places from which to 
transform the world. To shamelessly insist that our bodies are for our own 
delight and connection with others clearly defies the predatory 
appropriations of incestuous relatives and rapists; but it also defies the 
poisoning of our food and water and air with chemicals that give us cancer 
and enrich the already obscenely wealthy, the theft of our lives in harsh 
labor, our bodies used up to fill bank accounts already bloated, the massive 
abduction of our young people to be hurled at each other as weapons for 
the defense and expansion of those bank accounts – all the ways in which 
our deep pleasure in living has been cut off so as not to interfere with the 
profitability of our bodies. Because the closer I come to that bright, hot 
center of pleasure and trust, the less I can tolerate its captivity, and the less 
413 Ibid, 200.
414 Ibid, 55.
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afraid I am to be powerful, in a world that is in desperate need of 
unrepentant joy.416
The sexual agency that is reclaimed in decolonial feminist poetry through the 
exploration of the erotic has repercussions that are more far-reaching than individual 
achievements of sexual pleasure, body-positivity, love, and acceptance. This poetic 
practice nurtures a kind of self-love that is not only empowering, but also critical, 
resistant, and subversive to the subjugation, abjection, and exploitation of bodies. “I am 
dripping melanin and honey. / I am black without apology,”417 Upile Chisala writes. The 
embracing of the erotic, in this way, is disruptive to these interlocking systems of 
oppression that not only systematically drain one's life energies, but also deem one to be 
dispensable. The erotic, in this context, serves as an instrument for resistance.  Anna 
Agathangelou's account of the protests and revolutions in the Middle East and North 
Africa traces precisely this liberatory effect of the erotic in poetics. She writes: 
“Emerging revolutionary sexual poetics, I argue, ride the transformative power of the 
erotic while resisting and interrupting tired gendered and universal portrayals of the local-
feminine backward East region and masculine rational forward West-global.”418 She notes 
that the use of poetry is a driving force for transformation. She reads these protests as 
“erotic insurgencies.”419 The revolutionary poetics seeks to coin new language, explore 
new thought, and lead an affective transformation through which new sensibilities and 
relationalities are able to emerge. These practices involve articulations of new ways of 
being and relating that revolve around the celebration of life. As Todd May suggests, 
416 Ibid.
417 Upile Chisala, soft magic (San Bernardino: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015).
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“[T]here can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to 
offer a new form of life-celebration.”420 It is at this conjunction, to celebrate life and to 
change the world, that the work of decolonial feminist poetry takes place. 
Erotic knowing, however, is not some hedonistic exercise where the poet is simply 
following the pleasure principle, as it would have made to be in what Lorde calls “an 
exclusively european-american male tradition”421 that relegates the erotic to the matters of 
sexuality. On the contrary, the poetic exploration of erotic knowledge is often times very 
difficult and painful, much more so than in poetry as “word play” that operates within the 
western masculinist framework. Lorde expresses this in the beginning of her poem 
“Power,” by writing: 
The difference between poetry and rhetoric
is being ready to kill yourself
instead of your children.
In a social context where the children of Black women are systematically 
killed, poetry as “sterile word play” is complicit; it does nothing but contribute to these 
killings in its silence, in its failure to address. Yet the kind of poetry that Lorde calls for 
undertakes precisely this difficult exploration that is painful and burdensome. As Gloria 
Anzaldúa puts it, “'Knowing' is painful because after 'it' happens I can't stay in the same 
place and be comfortable. I am no longer the same person I was before.”422 
Anzaldúa's account of her own process of writing attests to the pain involved in 
the articulation of erotic knowledge. She notes that she gets “physically ill” when she 
does not write down for a while the images that come to her, yet since some of these 
420 Todd May,  “To Change the World, To Celebrate Life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31, no. 5/6 
(2005): 529.
421 Lorde, Uses of the Erotic, 59.
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images are linked to trauma, she gets sick when she does write. She states: “I can't 
stomach it, become nauseous, or burn with fever, worsen. But, in reconstructing the 
traumas behind the images, I make 'sense' of them, and once they have 'meaning' they are 
changed, transformed. It is then that writing heals me, brings me great joy.”423 Here, 
again, Anzaldúa demonstrates the process through which she brings understanding 
through writing to that which is already known on the level of bodily situatedness. The 
experience is erotic insofar as it brings healing and joy, albeit through a difficult process 
of articulating suffering. As a poem by Kaur's goes: “the thing about writing is / I can't 
tell if it's healing / or destroying me.”424 Decolonial feminist poetry, in this way, serves as 
a practice of healing, albeit not in a linear fashion, by way of starting from the colonized 
body. In the articulation of thought and feeling as they emerge out of that bodily 
situatedness, it offers an epistemological intervention, a de-centering of sedimented forms 
of knowing that work through affective economies. 
Yet under the hegemonic epistemological framework, contrary to what Lorde 
suggests, it is not only that feeling is subordinated to thought indiscriminately, but also that 
only certain kinds of affect felt by certain subjects receive recognition. Whether or not an 
affect is granted epistemic legitimacy as a subjective state that is justifiably linked to a 
practice of knowing depends on where it fits within the affective economies that are in 
place. In the previous section, we have seen that the perception of young Black men as 
threatening and the fear that is elicited by this perception has deemed them dispensable. In 
this context, it is not the fear of Michael Brown or Trayvon Martin that counts in their 
encounter with an armed police officer or a vigilante relentlessly chasing him down, but the
423 Ibid, 92.
424 Kaur, Milk and Honey, 148.
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fear of those who kill, which in turn is used to justify the killing. Only a certain kind of fear
is granted recognition within the framework of an epistemology of ignorance that operates 
through an affective economy. In this way, decolonial feminist poetry's intervention entails 
problematizing this unjust asymmetry in terms of whose feelings count, what affects are 
granted legitimacy, and why. Nayyirah Waheed, for instance, writes: “i think one / of the 
most pathological / things i have ever seen / is / stabbing / someone / and / then telling them
that / their / pain and anger / over being stabbed / is / making you sad. / - white guilt.”425 
The poetry of Waheed, and others, in this way, is not only an exploration of feeling from a 
bodily situatedness, from the standpoint of being oppressed or marginalized. Poetry also 
offers a direct critique of the mechanisms through which only certain affects, as linked to 
larger relations of power, are heard and valorized. Poetry as an exploration of feeling then 
becomes a site of resistance in the insistence of these poets that their feelings are not 
merely irrational excess in a context where only certain kinds of feelings are seen as 
justifiable, but rather that they are valuable, legitimate, and lie at the heart of a decolonial 
feminist project. 
Offering a site for an epistemological intervention, poetry also provides a space for 
mourning and for establishing alliances that organize around decoloniality. Mourning, in 
this sense, is an act of solidarity. The Nigerian poet Ijeoma Umebinyuo writes in a poem 
entitled “Summer of lies and blood”: “it seems the cracks / in the pavements / down in 
America / are revealing the bodies / of young black souls.”426 Similarly, Waheed writes: 
“have you ever / heard / a black woman weep over her skinmurdered / child. / it is the 
splitting of atoms. / it it billions / of / voices screaming their children's names / through / 
425 Waheed, Salt., 214.
426 Umebinyuo, Questions for Ada, 181.
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her death wail. / - trayvon martin ii”427 Feeling, in decolonial feminist poetry, is a “feeling-
with,” something that does not take place in isolation but is shared with others. Lorde 
writes that for women, “poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It 
forms the quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams toward 
survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible 
action.”428 While these ideas that are mobilized for tangible action emerge out of “our 
feelings and the honest exploration of them”429 through poetry, this exploration that 
comes out of one's bodily situatedness always takes place in connection to others. 
Decolonial feminist poetry, in this way, is practiced not merely in order to turn inward, 
but to reach outward. The process of the poetic exploration of feeling involves a 
mindfulness that my feelings are never simply mine, but that they are shared and that they 
connect me to others. If in the poetic exploration, one's feelings “become sanctuaries and 
spawning grounds for the most radical and daring of ideas,”430 it is thanks to this capacity 
to “feel-with” that serves as a ground for the practice of solidarity. 
A recent example of how poetry has become an occasion for public mourning and 
the practice of the feeling-with is when the following two poems were shared by thousands 
in the social media in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. The 
first one is a poem by Warsan Shire: “later that night / I held an atlas in my lap / ran my 
fingers across the whole world / and whispered / where does it hurt? / it answered / 
everywhere / everywhere / everywhere.” The second poem is by Karuna Ezara Parikh, a 
blogger from India, written specifically about the trending “Pray for Paris” hashtag that was
popularized on Twitter following the terror attacks: 
427 Ibid, 211.




It is not Paris we should pray for.
It is the world. It is a world in which Beirut,
reeling from bombings two days before Paris,
is not covered in the press.
A world in which a bomb goes off
at a funeral in Baghdad
and not one person's status update says 'Baghdad',
because not one white person died in that fire.
Pray for the world
that blames a refugee crisis for a terrorist attack.
That does not pause to differentiate between the attacker
and the person running from the very same thing you are.
Pray for a world
where people walking across countries for months,
their only belongings upon their backs,
are told they have no place to go.
Say a prayer for Paris by all means,
but pray more,
for the world that does not have a prayer
for those who no longer have a home to defend.
For a world that is falling apart in all corners,
and not simply in the towers and cafes we find so familiar.
These two poems not only offer a means for public mourning, but also problematize
the selective forms in which mourning often takes place and the differential representations
of life and death. Parikh's poem in particular (and Shire's as well, in the context of her 
larger work) raises the question whose life can be mourned, as connected to the question 
whose life counts and whose life is deemed valuable. The epistemology of ignorance can 
be seen to be at work in these practices of mourning, in that these practices take place in a 
racialized context. While the attacks in Lebanon, Iraq, and one may add, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
Libya, Egypt, and Turkey among others, neither receive as much coverage by the western 
media nor lead to public mourning on an international scale, these acts of public mourning 
are practices of solidarity. When the lives in the Third World cannot be mourned, it is 
because violence has become normalized and is seen as something inherent to these places. 
It is seen as expected and inevitable, which decontextualizes violence and the complex 
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histories of colonization that have led to this normalization. Decolonial feminist poets 
challenge this normalization and question the selective and exclusionary practices of 
solidarity. Upile Chisala writes: “when black blood bleeds it is minor / it is commonplace / 
it is expected. / so when black blood bleeds, / a system doesn't cry.”431 
Decolonial feminist poets also underscore the differential ways in which individuals
and communities are tied together by suffering, as those who suffer and those who partake 
in the systematic infliction of suffering onto others, sometimes simultaneously by virtue of 
one's situatedness within global capitalism. Nayyirah Waheed, for instance, writes in a 
poem on decolonization: “decolonization / requires / acknowledging. / that your / needs 
and desires / should / never / come at the expense of another's / life energy. / it is being 
honest / that / you have been spoiled / by a machine / that / is not feeding you freedom / 
but / feeding / you / the milk of pain. / - the release.”432 Rethinking solidarity within 
decolonial feminist poetry involves writing from a place of interdependency and 
interconnectedness where only a small minority has benefited from “advancement” 
understood in economic terms, at the expense of the majority of the world. It entails an 
attentiveness to the global networks of power and what ensues from their operations. In 
this sense, decolonial feminist poetry does not only seek to be educative, but also 
subversive by way of coining a new language, constructing a decolonial feminist 
discourse of poetry, which offers a ground for resistance and transnational alliances for 
solidarity.
The solidarity that decolonial feminist poetry calls for also entails rethinking 
difference. Insofar as poetry concerns itself with differential workings of power and the 
431 Chisala, soft magic.
432 Waheed, Salt., 84.
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entanglement of the colonized body within the larger systems that are at work, it involves 
an exploration of difference. There is no one single colonized body or a single set of 
experience to which these poets speak. Solidarity is not about homogeneity, but rather 
about partaking in alliances across difference. Lorde notes the persisting exclusion of 
women of color in feminist circles in the 1970s and 1980s where the efforts for inclusion 
had gotten no farther than promoting tolerance of difference. Yet difference, Lorde 
asserts, “must not be merely tolerated, but seen as a fund for necessary polarities between 
which our creativity can spark like a dialectic.”433 It is the denial of difference rather than 
difference itself that is the cause of separation, and any feminist politics that attends to 
interdependency must engage difference in a meaningful way. “[I]n a profit economy 
which needs outsiders as surplus people,” Lorde writes, difference continues to be 
“misnamed and misused in the service of separation and confusion.”434 Poetry is a space 
for redefining difference, for rectifying those instances of misnaming and misuse. As the 
affective modes through which we relate to human difference are often laden with fear 
and suspicion (as I explored in the previous section), poetry offers ways to “identify and 
develop new definitions of power and new patterns of relating across difference.”435 
Given that the old definitions and patterns are put to work in order to sustain a 
exploitative social and political system that relies on separation, poetry involves relating 
to difference in empowering ways that recognize our interdependency and 
interconnectedness. “In our world,” Lorde writes, “divide and conquer must become 
define and empower.”436
433 Audre Lorde, “The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,” in Sister Outsider 
(Berkeley: Crossing Press, 2007), 111.
434 Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” in Sister Outsider (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 2007), 115.
435 Ibid, 123.
436 Lorde, “The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,” 112.
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As the poet is the one who works with erotic knowledge, that hidden source of 
power within, which encompasses all that we know on a very intimate, affective level, 
poetry is also the means through which the old patterns of relating to difference can be 
transformed. Lorde writes: “I urge each one of us here to reach down into that deep place 
of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference that lives 
there. See whose face it wears.”437 More than a mere self-reflexive exercise, this is a 
discovery that would enable us to collectively seek better ways to relate to difference, 
some of which are yet to be articulated through poetry that helps fashion a language that 
“does not yet exist.”438 It is a call to recognize how one is implicated in systems of 
oppression, how one replicates the cruelty that she may hope to eradicate in other 
contexts. It is a call to attend to the complexity of the reality of oppression, wherein one 
may find herself in the position of both the oppressed and the oppressor simultaneously. 
This constitutes a starting point for establishing alliances across difference, for thinking 
solidarity in expansive terms.
Lorde calls feminists to “devise ways to use each others' difference to enrich our 
visions and our joint struggles.”439 Alliances across difference would be attentive to the 
intricate ways in which we are all linked together. For Anzaldúa, this is part of “el 
conocimiento” (spiritual knowledge) that “we're connected by invisible fibers to 
everyone on the planet and that each person's actions affect the rest of the world. Putting 
gas in our cars connects us to the Middle East. Take a shower squandering water and 
someone on the planet goes thirsty; waste food and someone starves to death.”440 
437 Ibid, 113. Emphasis in the original.
438 Lorde, “Poetry Is Not a Luxury,” 37.
439 Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” 122.
440 Anzaldúa, Light in the Dark / Luz En Lo Oscuro, 15.
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Decolonial feminist poetry puts that spiritual knowledge into work in offering ways to 
organize around difference whilst exploring our inherent interconnectedness. In 
“Outlines,” an unpublished poem, Lorde writes:
We have chosen each other
and the edge of each others battles
the war is the same
if we lose
someday women's blood will congeal
upon a dead planet
if we win
there is no telling
we seek beyond history
for a new and more possible meeting441
As we have seen in the previous section, the current forms of relationality are 
colonized by paranoiac affective economies. Lorde is particularly attentive to the ways in 
which these affects are promoted structurally as the mode in which one relates to 
difference, as it sustains the racist patriarchal structure of capitalism. The feelings of 
suspicion, fear, loathing, and so on, that comprise our affective relation to difference are 
very much systemic and linked to our epistemic practices. Decolonial feminist poetry 
explores the possibilities for other ways of relating and other forms of knowing that are 
empowering. In the works of these poets, the poetic implementation of a decolonial 
feminist epistemological intervention can be observed. Poetry as “a revelatory distillation 
of experience”442 can potentially disrupt the affective economies around difference (the 
circuits of fear and suspicion) upheld by our social and economic systems.
5.3 Conclusion: Epistemological Shifts and Alternative Forms of Governance
In this chapter, I argued that the logic underlying securitization is linked to 
particular economies of affect and desire. I analyzed fear as an affective economy that 
441 Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex,” 123.
442 Lorde, “Poetry Is Not a Luxury, 37.
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operates through the codification of certain bodies as threatening. I noted that this 
codification is linked to an epistemology of ignorance, where misinformation passes for 
knowledge not only on a cognitive level of belief, but also in terms of the bodily 
enactment of those practices of “knowing.” I suggested that decolonial feminist poetry 
offers an intervention to these affective epistemic practices by rethinking difference and 
exploring forms of relationality that are non-hierarchical and empowering. Yet it is also 
necessary to reconstruct our political and economic systems to uphold and sustain these 
forms. An epistemological shift would only be viable when politically implemented, as is 
the case with coloniality as an epistemological framework that emerged out of the history 
of colonialism and shaped the institutions and the political commitments of the modern 
nation-state. This shift that I traced as put forth by decolonial feminist poets cannot be 
seen simply as a matter of individual enlightenment, but as a ground for liberatory 
political practice.
Some alternative forms of governance that have recently emerged, which stand 
firmly against the interlocking mechanisms of militarism, environmental destruction, and 
global capitalism, thereby challenging the assumed inevitability and necessity of a 
politics of paranoia, rely on this epistemological shift. One such example is the 
autonomous region of Rojava located in Northern Syria, built upon “principles of 
equality and environmental sustainability,” as stated in their official social contract. 443 
Rojava names the cantons Afrin, Jazira, and Kobanê, the latter only recently became 
known in the West as a result of being besieged by Daesh until January 2015. Often 
likened to the Zapatista movement, the roots of the Rojava revolution go back to The 
443 “The Social Contract of Rojava Cantons in Syria.” Accessed: March 22, 2015. https://civiroglu.net/the-
constitution-of-the-rojava-cantons/ 
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Declaration of Democratic Confederalism crafted by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 
leader Abdullah Öcalan in 2005 after his imprisonment by the Turkish state, where he 
calls for a “democratic confederalism of Kurdistan” which is not “a state system, but a 
democratic system of the people without a state.”444 Abdullah Öcalan had been leading an 
armed struggle against the Turkish state since 1978, but in the last decade PKK's form of 
struggle has shifted from guerrilla warfare to a bottom-up transformation by way of 
establishing, securing, and proliferating autonomous zones. Influenced by Murray 
Bookchin's social ecology and his position that the state always and necessarily involves 
hierarchy and institutionalized coercion, the Rojava revolution entails what Alexander 
Kolokotronis (2014) has called a no-state solution. Inasmuch as this region is referred to 
as Kurdistan, this movement was not organized around a single identity (as evident from 
the beginning words of the Rojava Charter, “We, the people of the Democratic 
Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Jazira and Kobanê, a confederation of Kurds, Arabs, 
Syrics, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and solemnly declare and 
establish this Charter”445). It is instead fully committed to “mutual and peaceful 
coexistence” and “the spirit of reconciliation, pluralism and democratic participation” as 
sanctioned by the Charter.446 It replaces hierarchy with horizontality; exclusivism and 
discrimination with inclusion, pluralism, gender and racial equality; representational 
democracy with grassroots democracy; and environmental degradation with 
sustainability. As indicated in the Charter, Rojava is built as “a society free from 
444 Alexander Kolokotronis, “The No State Solution: Institutionalizing Libertarian Socialism in Kurdistan,”
Kurdish Question, February 2015. Accessed: May 24, 2016. 
http://kurdishquestion.com/oldsite/index.php/kurdistan/no-state-solution-libertarian-socialism-
kurdistan.html.




authoritarianism, militarism, centralism and the intervention of religious authority in 
public affairs.”447 As activists from Chiapas stated at the 2005 World Social Forum in 
Brazil, the attempt to combat militarism with more militarism was futile as the state 
always had more guns.448 Hence it is not conflict that drives movements like that of 
Zapatistas' and the Rojava revolution, but rather the collective practice of world-building, 
which Hannah Arendt understood to be the work of freedom. As Andrea Smith writes 
about projects of decolonization in Latin America: “The principle undergirding these 
models is to challenge capital and state power by actually creating the world we want to 
live in now. These groups develop alternative governance systems based on principles of 
horizontality, mutuality, and interrelatedness, rather than hierarchy, domination, and 
control.”449 In building alternative forms of governance from the ground up, these 
movements offer strong alternatives to the models of liberal democracy and capitalism 
that work in tandem with military control in today's world, and thereby challenge the very 
logic of a politics of paranoia premised on control, securitization, preemptive violence, 
and hostility toward difference.
The pluralistic mode in which movements like this operate is on an altogether 
different register than “the tolerance of cultural diversity” that “has become a 'politically 
correct' value in Empire, but only in the sense that diversity is useful for the reproduction 
of capital.”450 The commitment to pluralism in these movements does not involve an 
instrumentalization of diversity for the sake of profit or development, but instead takes it 
as valuable and desirable in itself. It echoes, in this sense, what José Medina calls a 
447 Ibid.
448 Andrea Smith, “Unsettling the Privilege of Self-Reflexivity” in Geographies of Privilege ed. France 
Winddance Twine and Bradley Gardener (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 276.
449 Ibid, 275.
450 Santiago Castro-Gómez, “The Missing Chapter of Empire: Postmodern reorganization of coloniality 
and post-Fordist capitalism,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2&3 (2007): 441.
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kaleidoscopic social sensibility: “We need to move toward a kaleidoscopic (rather than 
merely dual) perspective on racialized identities...what is needed is a kaleidoscopic 
consciousness that remains forever open to being expanded, that is, a subjectivity that is 
always open to acknowledge and engage new perspectives.”451 Diversity, in this way, is 
not blindly celebrated against the background of war, incarceration, and poverty. 
Intersectional and rooted in the particularity of a context, the epistemological shift 
performed in decolonial feminist poetry gives rise to new kinds of political rationality 
and governance that provide alternatives to the paranoiac model that is bound up with 
global capitalism today.
451 José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and 
Resistant Imaginations (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 224.
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CONCLUSION
RESISTANT IMAGINATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL COALITIONS
In The Epistemology of Resistance, José Medina calls for a resistant imagination, 
which is “ready to confront relational possibilities that have been lost, ignored, or that 
remain to be discovered or invented.”452 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that 
the politics of paranoia, operative in the practices around securitization, serves to 
infiltrate the social imaginary by insisting on the necessity and inevitability of a response 
of violence. Normalization (and glorification) of violence in this way requires resistant 
imaginations that are critical, that can envision other possibilities and bring them to 
fruition through a collective work of building the world anew. Even though this collective 
work often begins in the local in response to the injustices that affect a particular 
community, I contend that there is a need to draw connections with other localized 
struggles for building transnational coalitions. Attending to the links between these 
struggles, the local can thereby be connected to the global. As we have seen, the politics 
of paranoia operates across borders and within an established biopolitical order on a 
global scale. Resistance too, therefore, must move beyond the confines of a claimed 
territory.
Intersectionality, which within feminist theory and praxis describes the 
simultaneous operations of different aspects of identity, provides a relevant 
methodological framework here for thinking resistance in terms of transnational 
coalitions. Intersectionality understood not simply in terms of the intersectionality of 
identities, but as Angela Davis puts it, as the “intersectionality of struggles”453 offers a 
452 Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 299.
453 Davis, Freedom Is a Constant Struggle, 144.
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tool for imagining these coalitions. The struggles that situate themselves against the 
workings of a politics of paranoia are interconnected insofar as these differential 
workings are bound up together, both conceptually and in terms of their material 
conditions. Securitization denotes a global network of power relations, where the Israeli 
police train the U.S. police on counterterrorism and crowd control,454 where the gas 
canisters produced by the U.S.-based company Combined Systems, Incorporated are used 
in Egypt, Tunisia,455 Palestine, and Ferguson to quell protests,456 where the U.S. condemns 
the suppression of democratic dissent in Peru and Algeria to which it continues to export 
arms that are used precisely for these purposes.457 It is these connections and the kinds of 
solidarity that can emerge in response to them that I would like to highlight here in my 
conclusion of this analysis that I have given of the politics of paranoia. 
While I have not undertaken a project of reconstruction in this dissertation, I offer 
my analysis as a possible starting point for thinking about coalition building around the 
issues that emerge out of the context in which securitization has become globalized. The 
work of critique, according to Foucault, involves “a historical investigation into the 
events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of 
what we are doing, thinking, saying.”458 Yet this historical investigation is not undertaken 
simply for its own sake. Its primary purpose is to “separate out, from the contingency that 
has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we 
454 Gardner, Justin. “U.S. Police Routinely Travel to Israel to Learn Methods of Brutality and Repression,” 
The Free Thought Project August 30, 2015. Accessed: July 14, 2016. 
http://thefreethoughtproject.com/u-s-police-routinely-travel-israel-learn-methods-brutality-repression/
455 http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/28/egypt.us.tear.gas/
456 Angela Davis writes: “When Palestinian activists noticed these canisters in Ferguson, what they did was 
to tweet advice to Ferguson protesters on how to deal with the tear gas” (Freedom Is a Constant 
Struggle, 140).
457  Zach Toombs and  R. Jeffrey Smith, “Why Is the U.S. Selling Billions in Weapons to Autocrats?,” 
Foreign Policy June 21, 2012. Accessed: July 14, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/21/why-is-
the-u-s-selling-billions-in-weapons-to-autocrats/
458 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 46.
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are, do, or think.”459 Critique, therefore. names an endeavor that seeks transformation by 
opening up a critical space for resistance. The critical space that I have attempted to open 
up here is one that is attentive to the connections between different practices, connections 
that become manifest when studying the political rationality that is at work in these 
practices. A genealogy of the nation-state that I trace in the first chapter shows that the 
detention of Japanese Americans during World War II, the arbitrary deportations of 
Muslim men in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the contemporary political 
discourse around border security both in the United States and in Europe are tied by 
virtue of a logic of expulsion that is at work in these practices, despite the fact that each 
of these examples involve a complex, specific history of racism that may not be collapsed 
into one another. Similarly, in the third chapter, I have shown some ways in which the 
national masculine identity is consolidated through racialization in different cultural 
contexts, which is suggestive of a transnational import of vindictive masculinity within 
the context of global militarization. These connections, I suggest, offer a way to think 
about possible coalitions that may organize around these issues and situate themselves 
against the operations of a politics of paranoia. 
In the context of Oregon where I currently live, some examples that come to mind 
include groups like Cascadia-Rojava Solidarity Network and Cascadian Friends of Cuba 
and Venezuela, both of which are online communities that are devoted to sharing 
information and having discussions about the practice of solidarity and possible courses 
of action. Cascadian Friends of Cuba and Venezuela, for instance, define themselves as 
“[a] group for residents of the Cascadian region to learn about and discuss the ongoing 
people's revolutions in Cuba and Venezuela, as well as to discuss ways of showing 
459 Ibid.
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solidarity and opposing the U.S. government's attempts at subverting the people's 
movements in these countries. It is also hoped that through studying the left-wing 
movements of Cuba, Venezuela, and other parts of the Americas we can learn how to 
better create radical change here in Cascadia. ¡El proceso va pa'lante!”460 As power 
operates across borders, movements of resistance follow suit.
Given that the operations of the politics of paranoia take place both on a national 
and a transnational level, the response must be both situated locally and connected 
globally. Chandra Talpade Mohanty writes: 
In fundamental ways, it is girls and women around the world, especially in 
the Third World/South, that bear the brunt of globalization. Poor women 
and girls are the hardest hit by the degradation of environmental 
conditions, wars, famines, privatization of services and de-regulation of 
governments, the dismantling of welfare states, the restructuring of paid 
and unpaid work, increasing surveillance and incarceration in prisons, and 
so on. And this is why a feminism without and beyond borders is 
necessary to address the injustices of global capitalism.461 
 In a similar vein, I suggest that decolonial feminism provides a common ground for 
organizing against the operations of a politics of paranoia: not because the effects of these 
practices are felt the most by women in the Global South, but because the politics of 
paranoia involves an enmeshment of race and gender, whereby the processes of 
racialization coincide with that of gendering, both of which take place simultaneously 
within a racist, masculinist framework. Attending to these connections provides a broader 
460 Source: https://www.facebook.com/groups/891434874238823/
461 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “'Under Western Eyes' Revisited: Feminist Solidarity Through Anti-
Capitalist Struggles,” Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 514.
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scope that could account for the ways in which different oppressions and the struggles 
against them interlock. 
The practices around securitization, I have argued, are very much marked by the 
legacies of colonialism. As global capitalism denotes the political and economic system 
built upon a colonial history, a system which has replaced colonial institutions whilst 
continuing the exploitation of the Global South, decolonial struggles are necessarily anti-
capitalist. As militarization is tied to both global capitalism and a biopolitical order that 
renders racialized populations as dispensable, it also operates in conjunction with kinds 
of masculinity that consolidate the identity of a nation. These links are suggestive of a 
need for a decolonial feminist framework in both understanding and combating against 
these practices, and the National Security Council of Egypt's recent proclamation, in 
particular, that unmarried women constitute a national security threat attests to the 
growing importance of approaching securitization from a critical decolonial feminist lens.
It would, therefore, be worthwhile to explore, in a future work, the connections 
between various decolonial feminist struggles (i.e. what Mohanty has called Third World 
feminisms) and how these connections lay out a possible common ground for establishing 
alliances that are situated against the operations of the politics of paranoia. While each of 
these categories are tied to multiple movements that organize themselves around different 
issues, there is much to be learned, I think, within that multiplicity, by way of a 
simultaneous engagement of these struggles as they crisscross. Exploring these 
connections would serve to inspire resistant imaginations to discover and invent new 
ways of relating across difference in the practice of building coalitions. As Gloria 
Anzaldúa states, “Nothing happens in the 'real' world unless it first happens in the images 
205
in our heads.”462
462 Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 109.
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